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INTRODUCTION
This article examines the struggle of women in the Kenyan
Constitutional Review process1 to gain new legal authority for gen-
der equality and women's empowerment.2 It focuses on the 2002 Draft
of a new Kenyan Constitution,' as well as the Draft's relationship
to the current Kenyan Constitution and later constitutional pro-
posals. The constitutional review process is part of a larger move-
ment to democratize the Kenyan post-colonial state, a movement in
which women have struggled to find a voice.4 Although Kenyan
women, like women elsewhere, constitute at least half of the Kenyan
population,5 they have faced difficulties acting in solidarity across
their differences, and the democracy movement threatens to leave
women behind in a legal and social web of beliefs and practices that
limit their human potential and abandons them to a subordinated
status.
1. The 1997 Constitution of Kenya Review Act formally instituted the constitutional
review process. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A.
2. Athena D. Mutua, The Constitutional Review Process:A Gender Audit of "Bomas,"
in STEP-BY-STEP BACKWARDS OR FORWARDS? THE REVISED 2003 FIDA KENYA ANNUAL
REPORT 31, 33 (Fed. Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA) 2003) [hereinafter FIDA 2003].
3. Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), Draft: The Constitution of the
Republic of Kenya, 2002, DAILY NATION, Oct. 2, 2002 [hereinafter Draft].
4. See infra Part I.C; see also Maria Nzomo, Kenya: The Women's Movement and
Democratic Change, in THE AFRICAN STATE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: BETWEEN
DISINTEGRATION AND RECONFIGURATION 167 (Leonardo A. Villalon & Phillip A. Huxtable
eds. 1998) [hereinafter Nzomo, Women's Movement] (discussing the various efforts of
women during the period of activism for multipartyism in the early 1990s).
5. For texts discussing the size and status of women in countries across the globe,
see generally UNITED NATIONS DEv. PROGRAMME, UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1995: GENDER AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/1995/en; Niliifer Cagatay, Engendering Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic
Policies 3-6 (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Working Paper No. 6,
1998); Niliifer Cagatay, Gender and Poverty 2 (UNDP, Working Paper No. 5, 1998) at
http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications.
Women constitute more than half of Kenya's population. Nzomo, Women's Movement,
supra note 4, at 171; Kenya- Run, Lornah, Run: Facts and Stats, PBS FrontlineWorld,
available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/kenya/facts.html. Women in Kenya
also represent a majority of rural "producers" or "agriculturalists." Maria Nzomo, The
Impact of the Women's Decade on Policies, Programs and Empowerment of Women in
Kenya, ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION 9, 16 (1989) [hereinafter Nzomo, Impact].
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In 2002, the "Kenyan people undertook two historic and nation-
ally significant" events.6 The first was the election to unseat the rul-
ing party that had governed the country since Independence.' The
second was the constitutional review process through which Kenyans
sought to create a new constitution for Kenya.' Kenyans were suc-
cessful in the first endeavor in that they elected a new party and
president into government in December 2002.' The second under-
taking proved to be more difficult. In October 2002, the Constitution
of Kenya Review Commission released a draft of a new Kenyan consti-
tution (the Draft). ° The Kenyan National Constitution Conference
(NCC) agreed on a final version of a draft constitution on March 15,
2004 (the Zero Draft)." The government subsequently revised this
draft (the Waco draft),' 2 and it was defeated in a countrywide refer-
endum in November 2005."3 This defeat is largely attributed to the
conflicts about the issues of executive power and devolution. 4 Never-
theless, the constitutional process continues with most of the basic
6. Athena D. Mutua, Foreword, Eyes on the Prize: The Quest for a Human Rights
State in Kenya, in MAKAU MUTUA & WILLY MUTUNGA, EYES ON THE PRIZE 2, 7 (Athena
D. Mutua ed., 2003) [hereinafter A. Mutua, Foreword] (discussing the role of the Kenya
Human Rights Commission in the election and release of the Draft Constitution in 2002).
7. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan: The Quest for Constitutional Reform in Kenya
53-54 (Aug. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Makau
Mutua, Taming Leviathan]; see also Michael Dynes, Moi Car Pelted at Power Handover,
TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 31, 2002, at 18.
8. Kenya: CKRC: The Storm Ahead, THE EAST AFRICAN, Sept. 23, 2002 (discussing
the release of the Draft).
9. A New Beginning in Kenya, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2002, at 18.
10. Draft, supra note 3.
11. CONSTITUTION OF KENYA REVIEW COMMISSION, NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFERENCE, THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2004 [hereinafter ZERO DRAFT].
12. KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 63, PROPOSED NEW CONSTITUTION OF KENYA,
Aug. 22, 2005 [hereinafter WACO DRAFT] (drafted and published by Attorney General
Amos Waco pursuant to Section 27 of the Constitution of Kenya Review Act).
13. Kenya's Draft Constitution Rejected: Electoral Commission, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY,
Nov. 22, 2005.
14. Gus Selassie, D-Day as Kenyans Decide on Divisive Constitution, WORLD MARKETS
ANALYSIS, Nov. 21, 2005 (discussing on the day of the referendum primarily the issue of
executive power and the ethnic issues involved); see also Njoroge Kinuthia, Kenyans
Reject Proposed Constitution, THE NATION, Nov, 22, 2005; Okiya Omtatah, Only
Structures Will Transcend the Tribe, THE NATION, Nov. 25, 2005 (describing the ethnic
tensions that underlie the referendum vote).
However, some speculate that the prospect of women's equality, particularly around
land issues, was used as a tactic to persuade male Kenyan citizens to vote "no" in the
referendum. Bo Goransson, When Will Women Push Own Agenda?, THE NATION, Mar. 29,
2006 (noting:
Though the democratic space is gradually widening, women are still politi-
cally marginalised.
In some constituencies, they were only one third of the registered voters
in the referendum. Reportedly, fear that women would want to inherit land
was one reason that many men voted No to the proposed new constitution.)
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framework for a new constitution established and with Kenyan
women's opportunity to achieve new legal authority geared toward
empowering them hanging in the balance.15
After the election but before the National Constitution Conference
(NCC) began, a group of women activists representing four Kenyan
civil society organizations formed a coalition and established the na-
tional campaign for "Safeguarding the Gains of Women in the Draft
Constitution."16 The goal of the campaign was to engage in efforts to
maintain, enshrine, and strengthen language and mechanisms in the
final constitution that would advance women's empowerment and pro-
mote women's equality. 7 The campaign embraced the ideal of gen-
der equality as the basis for pushing for women's empowerment in the
context of Kenyan society.'" Specifically they promoted three prin-
ciples: social justice, gender mainstreaming, and gender equality. 9
They also relied on their commitment to the solidarity of women
across diversities.20 The campaign drew many of these ideas from
Kenyan women's past activism and the international women's rights
movement.2' The coalition was one of the first groups to review and
15. Muriithi Muriuki, Constitution Review Work Resumes Tomorrow, THE NATION,
Mar. 16,2006; see also Nyabonyi Kazungu, New Team on Review is Best, Asserts Ndingi,
THE NATION, Mar. 13, 2006 (discussing the team selected by Kibaki to advise him on the
future of Constitutional reform).
16. See infra Part III (discussing the campaign); see also Jacinta K. Muteshi, Women
Organizing: Engendering and Constituting the Kenyan State, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST
AFRICA: EMERGENT THEMES, CHALLENGES AND TENSIONS (Makau Mutua ed., forthcoming
2006) (discussing the campaign); Athena D. Mutua, The Constitutional Review Process:
A Gender Audit of 'Bomas," in FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 33-35 (discussing the cam-
paign of which FIDA was a part).
17. FIDA KENYA, INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY (IED), KENYA HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION (KHRC) & LEAGUE OF KENYA WOMEN VOTERS, SAFEGUARDING
WOMEN'S GAINS UNDERTHE DRAFT CONSTITUTION: TRAINING MANUAL 1-2 (2002) [herein-
after TRAINING MANUAL] (justifying the campaign and stating that the campaign goals
are "[t]o safeguard and strengthen the gains for women contemplated in the Draft
Constitution").
18. Id. at 76. For a discussion of gender equality in women's rights, see infra
Part I.A.2. For a discussion on women's rights internationally, see generally Hilary
Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379 (1999);
Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781 (1998) [hereinafter Charlesworth, Crisis]; Hilary
Charlesworth, What are 'Women's International Human Rights?", in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994);
Rebecca J. Cook, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS OFWOMEN: NATIONALAND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTiVES 3 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Arvonne Fraser, Becoming Human: The
Origins and Development of Women's Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 853 (1999).
19. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 76.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Cf. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 42-59 (discussing the equality of Kenyan
men and women against the backdrop of "the regional and international treat[ies], con-
ventions, and forums to which Kenya is a member").
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publish its positions and suggestions to the Draft Constitution after
the election.22 The early release of the coalition's ideas and positions
had significant political impact.23
The Draft Constitution in many respects embraced the ideal of
gender equality and sought to empower women, particularly in the
political structures it envisioned.24 The campaign found, however, that
in advocating both to safeguard and to strengthen these provisions,
its efforts, like women's empowerment efforts since the advent of the
fight for multipartyism,25 were not only constrained by the patriarchal
nature of the society that occasioned their limited access to resources
and participation2" but also by four tensions endemic to the Kenyan
state. These tensions, among others, manifest in many postcolonial
African countries," include: the issue of ethnic conflict and compe-
tition; the incomplete project of modernization; the desire by many
22. The coalition published its recommendations in the Training Manual in March
2003. The coalition publicized these materials among delegates and Parliamentarians
in their training sessions in March and April of 2003. The National Constitutional
Conference begain in late April 2003, at which time the coalition again made these
materials available.
23. For example, the campaign's early support for the Kadhi's Courts appeared to set
the pace and context of discussions about the courts during the National Constitutional
Conference. It also may have helped to minimize the impact of lobbying efforts by The
Church of Kenya, which stood strongly opposed to the Kadhi's Courts. See FIDA 2003,
supra note 2, at 39; see also infra Part IV.
24. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 14-15.
25. Prior to 1992 Kenya was a one-party state. See A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6,
at 7. Protests called for a multiparty state, and this movement was termed the struggle for
"multipartyism." Id. These struggles kicked off the democracy movement in Kenya. Id.
26. M.L. Udvardy, Theorizing Past and Present Women's Organizations in Kenya, 26
WORLD DEV. 1749, 1759 (1998).
27. Most studies of the postcolonial state question whether these are true states
given the fact that they were largely meant to be extractive of resources and thus the
market that developed was not geared toward benefitting the peoples within them.
These postcolonial states combined many sub-nationalities that had to compete for
meager resources. The justifications used to support these states also involved critiques
of these people's social arrangements, which the population generally resented. See, e.g.,
THE AFRICAN STATE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION AND RECON-
FIGURATION (Leonardo A. Villalon & Phillip A. Huxtable eds., 1998); Makau Mutua,
Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 26-34; Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Introduction:
Expanding Legal Protection of Human Rights in African Contexts, in HUMAN RIGHTS
UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE FOR OURSELVES 1, 11-16
(Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 2003) [hereinafter An-Na'im, Expanding Legal Protection]
(quoting Robert H. Jackson & Carl G. Rosberg, Sovereignty and Underdevelopment:
Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis, 24 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 1 (1986), and focusing
on a number of these issues); L. Amede Obiora, New Skin, Old Wine: (En)Gaging
Nationalism, Traditionalism, and Gender Relations, 28 IND. L. REV. 575, 580-85 (1995);
see also INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY (IED), CATHOLIC JUSTICE AND PEACE
COMMISSION & NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF KENYA, REPORT ON THE 1997
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA 30-31 (1998) (discussing "lessons learnt" and obstacles in
the 1997 election including a culture of authoritarianism, ethnic conflict, limits of multi-
partyism and poverty). See generally COLLAPSED STATES (I. William Zartman ed., 1995).
6 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:001
to preserve traditional beliefs and practices; and, since Independence,
the increase in state repression.2" To accomplish their goals, women
had to negotiate these tensions because they engender conflicts among
women generally,29 but specifically because in the constitutional re-
view process they shaped conflicts among women on three signifi-
cant constitutional issues.30
Ethnic conflict and competition over resources reflect the con-
struction of the postcolonial Kenyan state through the colonial exercise
of forcibly aggregating over forty independent and quasi-independent
nations into one state.' This exercise rendered Kenya a pluralist
state, which was also religiously and racially plural, among other
things. 32 This plurality, in interesting respects, is embraced in both
the current and draft constitutions and poses additional obstacles to
women's empowerment. 3 On the issue of ethnic tension, competition
has been fueled by the colonial pursuit and the postcolonial state's
embrace of a divide-and-rule policy among these various nations to
facilitate state control over the country. 4 The primary purpose for
this control was to extract Kenya's resources, first for the colonial
power, and then for the benefit of a small Kenyan elite class.35
28. See generally An-Na'im, Expanding Legal Protection, supra note 27.
29. See Wilhelmina Oduol & Wanjiku Mukabi Kabira, The Mother of Warriors and
Her Daughters: The Women's Movement in Kenya, in GLOBAL FEMINISMS SINCE 1945,
101, 103-04 (Bonnie G. Smith ed., 2000) (noting the diversity of Kenyan women and the
difficulty of pursuing common issues in the context of determining whether a women's
movement exists in Kenya); see also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40-41.
30. See infra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
31. Makau Mutua, The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An
Evaluation of the Language of Duties, 35 VA. J. IN'L L. 339, 347, 365-67 (noting that
many pre-colonial African cultures were self-governing, homogeneous, single language
communities that shared a common culture and traditions; and suggesting that their
homogeneity contributed to their cohesion. He refers to them as "nations" even though
they were not "states in the modern or European sense") [hereinafter Mutua, Banjul].
32. For example, Kenya is religiously diverse, hosting multiple African religions,
Christianity, and a sizable Islamic community, especially after the British secured con-
trol over the coast of Kenya, which is largely Muslim. See generally Ahmed Issack Hassan,
The Kadhi's Courts - Setting the Records Straight, KATIBA NEWS (Nairobi, Kenya), Jan.
2003, at http://www.kenyaconstitution.org/docs/07dO47.htm.
33. For a specific example of how religious and racial plurality posed difficulties for
women's rights advocates during the constitutional review process, see Part IV, infra,
discussing the controversies surrounding Kadhi's courts in Kenya.
34. See Mutua, Banjul, supra note 31, at 366 (noting the divide-and-conquer practices
of colonialists and using the Belgian activity in Rwanda as an example); see also IED,
supra note 27, at 30 (discussing authoritarian rule and divide-and-rule politics).
35. Leonardo A. Villalon, The African State at the End of the Twentieth Century:
Parameters of the Critical Juncture, in THE AFRICAN STATE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE:
BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION AND RECONFIGURATION 3, 10 (Leonardo A. Villalon & Phillip
A. Huxtable eds., 1998) (citing Crawford Young and noting that colonialism's enduring
legacy to the postcolonial state was a "form of control centered on a concern with
extraction of resources and the domination of society"); see also Julius E. Nyang'oro &
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This ethnic competition raises particular challenges for women's
empowerment. Because women are embedded in the cultural com-
munities into which they are born and these communities shape their
thinking and behavior, they are often loyal to the ethnic, cultural, and
religious community networks in which they form some of their
closest bonds.36 To the extent that these communities are suspicious
of the state and of people from other communities, so too are the
women of these communities. 7 Thus Kenyan women are divided by
ethnicity as well as by the social cleavages of race, religion, class,
sexuality and region.3" These divisions often preclude women from
speaking with the united voice necessary to push change on a reluc-
tant power structure.39
Second, the process of colonial resource extraction also began
the process of integrating the Kenyan economy into the larger world
economy and into a modern world, a process skewed and defined
largely by the interests of the Christian West.4" This modernization
was incomplete, however, distorting but nonetheless leaving intact
various aspects of the many Kenyan communities' pre-colonial social
and economic arrangements.41 Many of these social and economic
Timothy M. Shaw, The African State in the Global Economic Context, in THE AFRICAN
STATE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE: BETWEEN DISINTEGRATION AND RECONFIGURATION 27
(Leonardo A. Villalon & Phillip A. Huxtable eds., 1998) (noting that the relationship
between the African state and the metropole continues unabated as evidenced by trade
patterns).
36. Florence Butegwa, Mediating Culture and Human Rights in Favour of Land
Rights for Women in Africa: A Framework for Community-level Action, in CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 108, 109 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed.,
2002) (explaining that women are "cultural and religious beings").
37. Id.
38. Id. at 109-10; see also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40; Martin Chanock,
Human Rights and Cultural Branding: Who Speaks and How, in CULTURAL TRANS-
FORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 41, 41-45 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002).
39. Cf. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40-41.
40. The focus here is the expansion of the market economy, as the argument will
make clear in reference to April Gordon's analysis of the Otieno case. See April Gordon,
Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in Kenya: 'Burying Otieno"Revisited, 20 SIGNS 883 (1995).
However, modernization itself was economically problematic in the colonial context
because its purpose was to extract resources from the country. Additionally, the Kenyan
people associated modernization with the West, presenting a problematic ideological
component. See, e.g., Obiora, supra note 27, at 586. Obiora states that modernization, as
seen from the newly independent postcolonial state, suggested the savagery of in-
digenous relations as distinguished from "all good things which western civilization [had]
produced in the two millennia of its history." Id. (quoting HERBERT J. SPIRO, POLITICS OF
AFRICA: PROSPECTS SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 6 (1963)). She elaborates that although
modernization was "at times responsive to objective conditions, modernization remains
obliged to an imperialistic logic and ratifies a civilizing agenda that is squarely situated
on appalling racist stereotypes." Id.
41. The codification of customary law can be seen as a distortion of these arrange-
ments. See id. at 587-89 (explaining the codification process of customary law as fraught
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arrangements include practices and ideologies that disadvantage
women.42 Although some see these arrangements as being largely
patrilineal, colonial distortions rendered them more patriarchal in
nature, leaving women more vulnerable to exploitation, exclusion, and
further subordination.4" This patriarchal turn may have bolstered
ideologies that supported limiting women's roles and opportunities
in these communities, but the economic stagnation and decline over
the last several years have further complicated this situation.44 Eco-
nomic opportunities available in the emerging paid formal sector of
the modernizing market are few and subject to intense competition
as well as to the influence of ideological preferences for enhancing
men's opportunities.4" Although women challenge the patriarchal
nature of the society, including community practices that limit their
human potential, these efforts exist in tension with the reality that the
majority of Kenyan women are rural poor women who may actually
have greater access to resources and protection within these commu-
nity arrangements than they do in this emerging modern society.46
Third, many Kenyan communities want to preserve their various
and distinct cultural and religious heritages and practices.47 Further-
more, the push for modernization and the past colonial and post-
colonial policies of ethnic manipulation, which both implicitly and
explicitly critiqued a range of traditional practices and arrange-
ments, have created resentments among the communities, which see
this as an attack on their traditions.4" Some of these traditions and
with problems); see also infra Parts L.A and I.B.
42. Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Gender Considerations in Constitution-Making: Engen-
dering Women's Rights in the Legal Process, Paper presented at the Constitution of
Kenya Review Commission Seminar on the Gender Question (Dec. 6, 2001), available at
http://www.kenyaconstitution.org/docs/09cd003.htm.
43. Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1759.
44. See generally Gordon, supra note 40, at 902-03 (discussing the Otieno case and
suggesting that many women did not support Mrs. Otieno because their livelihoods are
connected to their ethnic and cultural communities).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 884.
47. See infra Part V (describing this sentiment and the way in which both the Zero
and Waco drafts capture it in their articles on culture).
48. See Butegwa, supra note 36, at 109 (noting that if the government grants rights
to women in line with secular or other theories, the affected groups might see it as an
"act targeting not just women but the entire religion or culture"); Obiora, supra note 27,
at 578; see also Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority
Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. IN'L L. REv. 483 (2002) (explor-
ing the way that later nationalists, including women in colonial and minority commu-
nities, came to see women as the embodiment of culture and employing a private/public
framework to preserve their cultures through requiring the retention of women in
traditional arrangements). Coomaraswamy argues that this framework resulted in part
from imperialists targeting certain cultural practices that harmed women, such as female
genital circumcision, but doing so from a racist perspective that engendered resentments).
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practices not only disadvantage women but also embody a belief in
gender hierarchy that justifies women's secondary and subordinated
status. 9 Thus the preservation of these traditions is in tension with
the women's gender equality and empowerment agenda, yet women
who come from these communities are also wedded to various aspects
of their cultural traditions through which they have been socialized.5'
Women advocates thus have to mediate these tensions in a way that
is beneficial to women.5
Fourth, the elite class, acting through the postcolonial state both
despite the promise of Independence, became increasingly repres-
sive through both legal and extralegal means.5 These mechanisms
included concentrating and personalizing state power in the hands
of a powerful executive by amending and changing the constitution,
rendering continuing authoritarian rule legal.53 In addition, to main-
tain itself in power the state used extralegal means such as perpetu-
ating violence against individuals and entire communities,' as well
as through outright corruption and theft of the country's resources.5
These practices contributed in part to the stagnation and decline of
the Kenyan economy and to increased public dissension, to which
the state responded with greater repression.56 For women, this trend
49. See generally Celestine Nyamu, Gender, Culture, Development and Human Rights,
41 HARV. IN'L L. J. 408 (2000) [hereinafter Nyamu, Gender] (describing the gender bias
in landholding as embodying gender hierarchy but advocating for understanding these
cultures as dynamic and acknowledging representations about culture as being subject
to interrogation).
50. See, e.g., Coomaraswamy, supra note 48, at 484.
51. See infra Parts IV-V (discussing the campaign's efforts to promote gender equality
while also protecting different cultures' ways of life).
52. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 168-69; see also REPORTOFTHE TASK
FORCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION,
at 9-12 (2003) [hereinafter TRUTH AND JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT]. The Truth and
Justice Commission Report briefly describes the measures and events that led to height-
ened repression in Post-Independence Kenya and lists six categories of state crimes that
constitute the possible terms of reference for the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission. Id. at 19-23. These categories are: (1) political assassinations and killings;
(2) massacres and possible genocides; (3) political violence and killings of democracy
advocates; (4) torture, detention exile disappearance, rape and prosecution of opponents;
(5) politically instantiated ethnic clashes; and (6) violations of economic, social and
cultural rights. Id.
53. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 26-34.
54. See TRUTH AND JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at 21-22 (discussing
massacres in the North Eastern Province of Kenya where ethnic Somalis live, "politically
instigated" clashes particularly in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces, and political
violence against democracy advocates).
55. Id. at 22-23 (noting the connections between human rights violations that involve
bodily harm and economic crimes of corruption such as "forcible eviction of lawful owners"
to steal their land and "looting of the public purse," resulting in "collapsed infrastructure
and economic decomposition").
56. Id. at 23.
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created additional problems for their solidarity in that the state
used the same tools of manipulation that it had used to control the
various other groups in Kenya to control and manipulate Kenya's
women's groups. The state did so by insisting that women focus on
welfare issues, by repressing women's dissent, and by co-opting
women's organizations.57
The democracy movement, of which advocacy for multipartyism
and constitutional reform are parts, was meant to alter this state of
affairs and succeeded in some respects.58 It sought to change and re-
organize the relationship between the governors and the governed
by, in part, facilitating open competition among multiple parties for
the elections of governors, decentralizing government authority, and
guaranteeing the protection of individuals' human rights.59 Whether
the democracy movement was initially meant to change the subor-
dinated status of women is unclear, but women had to fight to make
their voices heard in an environment in which the social tensions dis-
cussed, among others, made it difficult for them to do so in a unified
way.' Furthermore, where women failed to articulate a position,
women's conditions were not always considered."'
57. Id. Scholars are increasingly recognizing the connection between government
corruption and lack of development or degenerating economies. See generally UNDP,
CORRUPTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 35-50 (1997), available at http://www.undp.org/
overnance/docs/AC_Pub_corruption-goodgov.pdf; INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (George T. Abed & Sanjeev
Gupta eds., 2002), available at httpJ/www.imf.orgexternal/pubsnf/2002/govern/index.htm.
58. One of the first successes of this movement was the repeal of Section 2A of the
Constitution which made Kenya a one-party state. Thereafter Kenya became a multi-
party state. See generally WILLY MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING FROM THE MIDDLE:
CIVIL SOCIETY AND TRANSITION POLITICS IN KENYA, 1992-1997 (1999) [hereinafter
MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING]; Willy Mutunga, Building Popular Democracy in
Africa: Lessons from Kenya, in LAW AND THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN EAST AFRICA
199 (Joseph Oloka-Onyango, Kivutha Kibwana & Chris Maina Peter eds., 1996) [herein-
after Mutunga, Building] (discussing the movement towards a multiparty Kenya).
59. See, e.g., Kivuthu Kibwana, One Year after Multi-party Elections: Whither
Patriotism, Democracy and Kenya, in IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EAST AFRICA 311 (Kivutha Kibwana, Chris Mania Peter &
Joseph Oloka-Onyango eds., 1996) (defining democracy, evaluating Kenyan democracy
and focusing on such concerns as the limits of multipartyism in light of a reluctant Kenyan
regime, ethnic clashes, a federal system, and torture; and evidencing a concern for
democratic participation, human rights, and limitations on governmental power); see also
Kivutha Kibwana, The People and the Constitution: Kenya's Experience, in IN SEARCH OF
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY: CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN EAST AFRICA 340 (Kivutha
Kibwana, Chris Mania Peter & Joseph Oloka-Onyango eds., 1996) (advocating for con-
stitutional reform, including equitable sharing of resources, devolution of power, and
individual rights).
60. See Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 171 (noting that "the Kenyan
state [had] largely pursued patronizing policies toward women and women's associations,
encouraging them to function as easy targets for manipulation and exploitation while
attempting to ensure that they pose a minimal threat to the political status quo").
61. Even when women did articulate positions, society did not always accept them.
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Consequently these tensions played a large role in the constitu-
tional review process, particularly in the campaign's advocacy. The
gender equality ideal that the campaign promoted, understood as the
social equality between women and men, provided little assistance
in charting a way for women to overcome their internal divisions in-
formed by these tensions. As such, it failed to stifle conflicts among
women and specifically failed to stifle three conflicts that women
had over important constitutional issues. Furthermore, the concept
of gender equality itself generated controversy among some women's
groups.62 Finally, the campaign's commitment to solidarity proved
to be only the first step necessary to mediating these conflicts.
These constitutional conflicts involved first a clash between
Muslim and non-Muslim women over whether to support the retention
of Kadhi's courts in the constitution." Kadhi's courts are courts long
established in Kenya for the adjudication of personal law issues for
those who profess belief in Islam. 4 The Draft Constitution provided
for Kadhi's courts by limiting the principle of equality,6" bringing
women activists supporting equality into conflict with Muslim women
supporting the retention of Kadhi's courts.66 Second, women were
divided along ethnic lines over the question of decentralizing execu-
tive power and devolution.67 These issues proved detrimental to the
constitutional process as a whole and implicated political struggles
for greater ethnic representation in government as well as the equi-
table allocation of resources among groups, thus pitting women from
For example, at a point of increased advocacy for a new constitution, a woman legis-
lator's motion requiring that women constitute one-third of the Parliamentary seats was
soundly rejected. See infra Part I.C.
62. See infra Part I.A.2.; see also Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193,
U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter CEDAW]; Douglass Cassel & Jill Guzman,
The Law and Reality of Discrimination Against Women, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 287,295-98 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean Koenig eds., 1999) (discussing
the implications of Muslim countries' reservation to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which rejected the application
of equality to gender relations).
63. See infra Part IV; see also Athena D. Mutua, Kadhi's Courts, Women's Rights and
Equality, in TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53-57.
64. Hassan, supra note 33.
65. Draft, supra note 3, Arts. 199-202.
66. Muslims have consistently criticized the equality doctrine; for example, Muslim
countries have made reservations to CEDAW that consistently indicate their refusal to
apply equality provisions to gender relations in Muslim countries. See Cassel & Guzman,
supra note 62, at 295-98; see also infra Part IV.
67. See ANNE MURAGU NYABERA, INSTITUTIONAL GAINS, PRIVATE LOSSES: THE 1998
FIDA(K) ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF KENYAN WOMEN 28-33 (1998)
[hereinafter FIDA 1998].
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various ethnic groups against each other.' Third, some women ques-
tioned whether elite urban women could represent the interests of
the majority of Kenyan women who are rural and poor.69 This issue
concerned the provisions in the Draft Constitution that called for
women to occupy one-third of all elected and appointed positions, posi-
tions that arguably would be filled mostly by urban elite women.7 °
The campaign's experiences with these conflicts and tensions
suggest several insights for pursuing women's equality and empow-
erment in view of women's diversity. The Kenyan experience demon-
strates the critical importance of having a women's movement that
is committed over time to developing, articulating, and acting on be-
half of women's interests in all their diversities, as well as mediating
the social tensions that produce, inform, and shape these diversities.
Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of developing a commit-
ment to solidarity that includes respectfully listening to and valuing
different women's voices and a willingness to craft creative compro-
mises that reflect these differing groups of women's views. The idea
of solidarity is based upon broad notions of gender equality that in-
clude equality among women and not simply social equality between
women and men. As such, this broader notion of gender equality,
despite its controversial nature, views all women as having a voice
in policy formation and takes their differences and various views
into account.
In addition, the Kenyan experience shows that the ideal of gen-
der equality gains its power from attention to the substantive issues
and needs of women rather than from a formal, universalized, and ab-
solutist principle.71 In this sense, equality as a strong normative value
must be understood as a flexible and complex idea. Moreover, the
ideals of gender equality and women's solidarity benefit from in-
cluding an affirmative focus on equitable distribution of resources
and on giving women across communities access to decision-making
structures that influence the distribution of material resources that
challenge existing power relations. This attention and activity evi-
dence a commitment to women across their differences. Ultimately,
any measure of success depends on developing mechanisms within
a movement that can hold women in positions of power accountable
68. Infra Part V. See generally Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7;
INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATION IN DEMOCRACY (IED), ENHANCING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS
IN KENYA: A REPORT ON THE TRANSITION GENERAL ELECTIONS 2002, at 68 (Oketch Owiti
ed., 2003).
69. See infra Part VI; see also FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 28-33.
70. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11.
71. See infra Part IV.
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for ensuring that the needs and interests of women across ethnic,
religious, and class backgrounds are met. These insights were crucial
to the qualified success that Kenyan women have thus far had in the
constitutional review process.
This article consists of seven parts meant to accomplish four
goals: to provide background and context for the campaign for Safe-
guarding the Gains of Women in the Draft Constitution; to examine
the nature of the campaign and its goals for the constitution; to ex-
plore the conflicts among women about the constitution that the cam-
paign encountered; and to assess the campaign's efforts. The first
part contains background information, the foundation and context
upon which the campaign's advocacy was built. Specifically it pro-
vides a detailed overview of the status of women in Kenya, their socio-
economic conditions, their position under the current constitution,
and a summary of the Kenyan women's movement, including its
relationship to both the global women's movement and the move-
ment for constitutional reform.
Parts II and III examine the Draft Constitution and the cam-
paign's efforts to improve it from the perspective of women's empow-
erment. Specifically, Part II briefly describes the status of the Draft
Constitution and then analyzes it from the perspective of women's
rights and the gender equality ideal. Part III examines the campaign's
origins and development and details its conceptual framework.
Parts IV through VI explore the conflicts among women that
the campaign encountered. Part IV analyzes the conflict over the
Kadhi's courts. Part V explores the issue of women's cultural and
ethnic identity in the context of the struggle over decentralizing
executive authority and devolution. Part VI interrogates the urban!
rural divide issue as it relates to concerns about representation in
light of similar claims made by women about men. Part VII assesses
the successes and failures of the campaign in the context of the latest
proposals for a new Kenyan constitution and in constructively
engaging the diversity of women.
I. STATUS OF WOMEN IN KENYA
By just about any measure, women in Kenya
are worse off than men. Their average earnings are
less than half those of men. Only 29percent of those
engaged in formal wage employment are women,
leaving most to work in the informal sector with no
social security and little income. The numbers of
women in formal employment are decreasing...
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Women constitute over 80 percent of the agricul-
tural labor force, often working on an unpaid
basis, and 64 percent of subsistence farmers are
women .... Women [nonetheless] provide approxi-
mately 60 percent of farm-derived income ....
Women's land ownership is minuscule despite
their enormous contribution to agricultural pro-
duction . . . [they] account for only 5 percent of
registered landholders nationally .... Girls re-
ceive less education than boys at every level, and
women's literacy rate (76 percent) is lower than
men's (89 percent). Violence against women is
commonplace: 60 percent of married women re-
ported in a 2002 study that they are victims of
domestic abuse. In another study published in
2002, 83 percent of women reported physical
abuse in childhood and nearly 61 percent reported
physical abuse as adults.
-Human Rights Watch 200572
Women occupy a subordinated status in Kenya. 3 This status is
the result of the political, economic, social, and cultural development
of the country.v4 Their subordination arises and is maintained by a
matrix of historically developed beliefs and practices that various com-
munities hold dear. These beliefs and practices however are based
on rationales embedded in economic and social arrangements that
have changed, been distorted, or destroyed. 5 Women's limited owner-
ship of land and property exemplifies these conditions,76 as well as
72. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE STANDARDS: WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN KENYA 9 (2003) [hereinafter DOUBLE STANDARDS].
73. Id. at 6 (citing the Task force for the Review of Laws Relating to Women, which
noted that gender relations treat male dominance as legitimate and creates a social-
power hierarchy that reduces women to powerlessness, economic marginalization and
social vulnerability).
74. Id.
75. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting that "women-unfriendly customary law has
gradually developed as African societies have undergone change[,] most of which can be
seen as arising from colonization and privatisation [sic]"); see also African Legal Aid
(AFLA), Male Primogeniture Unconstitutional: A Legal Victory for African Women in
South Africa!, AFLA Q., July-Sept. 2003, at 30 (discussing the South African case in
which the Constitutional court found male primogeniture unconstitutional and sug-
gested that the conditions that justified the practice no longer exist).
76. See generally Butegwa, supra note 36, at 108 (describing the various rules that
are relevant to land ownership including marriage, inheritance, and cultural preferences
for males in land ownership and the changing dynamics).
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the interplay of interlocking rules and structures that result in a
separate, mostly private regime regulating women's lives.7"
The current Kenyan constitution in many ways legitimates the
second-class status of women.78 It does so through its embrace of
legal pluralism that embodies both customary and religious laws.79
This framework, although necessary in many ways to accommodate
the pluralist nature of Kenyan society, stifles efforts to ameliorate
women's oppression because it supports the matrix of social arrange-
ments currently in place." For example, although the current constitu-
tion prohibits discrimination based upon sex,81 the anti-discrimination
provision does not apply to matters involving adoption, marriage, di-
vorce, burial, devolution of property on death, or other matters of
personal law.82 Thus the anti-discrimination principle does not apply
77. Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1749, 1751, 1756 (analyzing women's organizations
in Kenya and citing literature to suggest that colonialism imposed a European moral
order embodying the public/private distinction onto the "extant gender relations in
Africa").
78. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42; BADO MAPAMBANO - KENYAN WOMEN DEMAND
THEIR RIGHTS: THE 1997 FIDA(K) ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF KENYAN
WOMEN 5 (1997) [hereinafter FIDA 1997] (noting that as "the current Kenyan Consti-
tution discriminates against women, the issue of the marginalization of women from the
constitutional debate was a key component of the 1997 Kenyan women's rights agenda").
79. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (discussing the ineffectiveness of gender neutral
laws where the laws meet "gender specific reality" and the problems presented by legal
pluralism).
80. Id.
81. The constitution originally did not prohibit discrimination based upon sex but was
amended in 1997 to include sex as a prohibited basis of discrimination. CONSTITUTION Art.
70 (2000) (Kenya), available at http://www.lawafrica.com/constitution/index.asp.
82. Id. at Art. 82 (1997) (Kenya).
(1) Subject to subsections (4), (5) and (8), no law shall make any provision
that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
(2) Subject to subsections (6), (8) and (9), no person shall be treated in a
discriminatory manner by a person acting by virtue of any written law or
in the performance of the functions of a public office or a public authority.
(3) In this section the expression "discriminatory" means affording different
treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respec-
tive descriptions by race, tribe, place of origin or residence or other local con-
nection, political opinions, colour, creed or sex whereby persons of one such
description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of
another such description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or
advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.
(4) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law so far as that law makes
provision:
with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property
on death or other matters of personal law; (c) for the application in the case
of members of a particular race or tribe of customary law with respect to
any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is
applicable in the case of other persons; or (d) whereby persons of a de-
scription mentioned in subsection (3) may be subjected to a disability or
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to the very situations and systems that govern the places where
women live their lives.
Given the socio-economic subordination of women, the fact that
women have exercised little political power is unsurprising. Since
Independence, women's elected representation at the national level
has never risen above five percent, while their representation at the
local level only rose above three percent after 1992.83 Women's polit-
ical efforts have been further hampered by a postcolonial state that
sharpened and enhanced the oppressive apparatuses of the colonial
state. ' From Independence in 1963 until the elections in 2002, this
state has been controlled by one party, the Kenya African National
Union party (KANU), first under the leadership of Kenyatta, the first
president of Kenya, and then under Daniel Arap Moi, who was presi-
dent for twenty-four years." These regimes increasingly became
authoritarian and anti-democratic, brokering little public dissent in-
cluding dissent voiced by women about the subordination of Kenyan
women.' Additionally these regimes hindered economic development
through corruption and intermittent cooperation with a skewed inter-
national economic order."7
Nonetheless, Kenyan women have organized themselves into
women's groups to combat the disadvantages supported by this frame-
work.' Recently they have begun to challenge women's absence in
the political and legal structures that influence the organization of
power as well as the social and economic distribution of resources. 9
restriction or may be accorded a privilege or advantage which, having regard
to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to
persons of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a demo-
cratic society.
Id.
83. Cf. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 173, 180-81.
84. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7 (discussing the postcolonial state
and the constitutional efforts to reform it); see also Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra
note 4, at 168-76.
85. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 168-69.
86. Id. at 168-71.
87. See TRUTH AND JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at 22-23 (linking
economic stagnation in part to corruption); UNDP, supra note 57, at 35-50 (same). The
order is skewed in that Westerners initially built the country upon extractive principles,
and the country continues to exist in uneven economic relations of dependency today.
Nyang'oro & Shaw, supra note 35, at 32-33 (discussing the "classic [economic] depen-
dency syndrome" of the past and arguing that the neo-liberal consensus of open markets
and withdrawing state control will likely not benefit African countries in the future).
88. Maria Nzomo, The Status of Women's Human Rights in Kenya and Strategies to
Overcome Inequalities, ISSUE: A JOURNAL OF OPINION, Summer 1994, at 17, 20 n.4
[hereinafter Nzomo, Status] (noting that women's organizations "mushroomed" in the
post-1992 election period).
89. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 177-80 (discussing the shift from
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The Women's Political Caucus," and later the campaign for Safe-
guarding the Gains of Women in the Draft Constitution,9 is part of
this tradition.
A. Land Ownership: Exemplifying the Status of Women
The ownership of land, one of the most important resources to
Kenyans,92 is a good example of the matrix of conditions, beliefs,
practices, and legal complications that constrain women's empower-
ment.93 The current lack of women's land ownership and the ideol-
ogy that fuels it originated in pre-colonial Kenyan social arrange-
ments. Colonial rule and the post-colonial state later distorted these
arrangements however, worsening their impact on women.94
In most of the pre-colonial Kenyan communities, as in much of
sub-Saharan Africa, individuals did not own land outright.95 Rather,
the family-clan controlled the land, with elders, predominately men,
controlling the access to land for use by individual homesteads." Men,
viewed as perpetuators of the family lineage,97 were conceptualized
as inheriting the right to control and allocate land for maintenance
of their individual homesteads, with women as the primary culti-
vators of crops for family consumption.98 Women were thus an inte-
gral part of the land tenure system,99 and these communities often
welfare focus to strategies of empowerment and noting that "the hope that if enough
women attained key political decision making capacities, they would be able to repeal
the laws that discriminate against women at the social and economic level, and they
could design alternate development policies to mainstream, rather than marginalize,
women's issues").
90. See Kenya Women's Political Caucus, http://www.kwpcaucus.com; FIDA 1998,
supra note 67, at 29-31.
91. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17.
92. See DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7; see also Akinyi Nzioki, The Effects
of Land Tenure on Women's Access and Control of Land in Kenya, in CULTURAL TRANS-
FORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 218 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 2002).
93. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 2.
94. Id. at 7-8; see also Butegwa, supra note 36, at 110; Celestine Nyamu-Musembi,
Are Local Norms and Practices Fences or Pathways? The Example of Women's Property
Rights, in CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 126 (Abdullahi An-
Na'im ed., 2002) [hereinafter Nyamu, Local Norms]; Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at
408.
95. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
96. Id.
97. Butegwa, supra note 36, at 111.
98. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
99. See Butegwa, supra note 36, at 112 (citing Miki Rwebangira and E. Mnemeey,
The Legal Status of Woman in Tanzania, in WOMEN, LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND PRACTICES IN
EAST AFRICA 50 (J. Kabeberi-Macharia ed., 1995)) (suggesting that "so long as women's
work was absolutely central in the production and reproductive system, and land had
not yet become a commodity, women were relatively indispensable and their security in
land rights unlikely to be threatened").
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associated women's fertility with the fertility of land, representing
maternal power.'00 Consequently, women's access to land and other
resources was granted and protected.' However, this access was
protected through women's relationships to men, generally to their
husbands and their husbands' families. 12 Women generally did not
inherit land from either their natal family (because their communi-
ties viewed them as leaving these families upon marriage and becom-
ing part of their husband's clan) or as heirs to their husbands' clan
land, preserved through the lineage system.103 Rather, their husbands'
family provided them access to and use of the land."0 4
As such, marriage was expected, often arranged by families, per-
ceived as a union between families, and occurred in some communi-
ties as early as puberty.0 5 Other practices and rituals, such as bride
price or other exchanges of gifts that the man's family provided to
the woman's family, accompanied marriage."°c Where a husband died
before his wife, the wife maintained her access to her husband's clan
land through the inheritance of such land by her adult sons.' In
the absence of adult sons, some communities practiced wife inheri-
tance whereby another male relative of the husband inherited the
100. Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1753-56. Udvardy discusses the women's organi-
zations in three East Africa groups, two in Kenya, where the female gender was associ-
ated and attributed with maintaining the "fertility of both human beings and the land."
Id. at 1755. He suggests that the social structures of these groups respected and under-
stood women as being responsible for the land, a role that was not viewed as subordinate
but as an integral part of the social system.
101. Butegwa, supra note 36, at 108; see also Gordon, supra note 40, at 903-04 (noting
that usufruct rights are acquired through husband's lineage).
102. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7-10; see also Gordon, supra note 40, at
903-04. But see Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1756-58 (arguing that women's groups also
provided a source of power and protection for women's traditional roles as established
by the community).
103. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7; see also Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42
(noting that "[tihe reason behind males [sic] inheritance was the notion that they re-
mained within the families while the daughters got married and left").
104. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
105. Id.; see also Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting that customary law linked
marriage to circumcision and to puberty, which occurs in some children as young as nine
and eleven, and that child marriages have been the subject of much controversy because
statutory law does not regulate the capacity to contract a marriage under customary
law); FIDA 1997, supra note 78, 37-40 (discussing early marriage and noting that the
practice exists among many Kenyan communities but suggesting that it is a well-known
practice among the Maasai and the Somali people of Kenya). But see STAKING OUR
CLAIM: THE 2002 FIDA KENYA ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN 24-26
(2002) [hereinafter FIDA 2002] (noting that the Children Act of 2001 is intended to offer
children protection from "female circumcision, early marriage, or other cultural rites,
customs or traditional practices that are likely to negatively affect the child's life...").
106. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting that most marriage systems in Kenya
require the payment of dowry).
107. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
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wife, and thus legitimized her continuing claim to clan land use." 8
In these cases, the commonly practiced custom of polygamy, which
involved a man marrying two or more wives, may have aided in
maintaining women's access to land because they could be "inher-
ited" by a male relative who was already married.0 9 Burial of clan
members on the land was and is perceived to solidify the family's
claim to the land.110
Divorce, on the other hand, often required the return of bride
price provided to the woman's family upon her marriage."' This ar-
rangement left little room for concepts of separating or accounting
for any property accumulated throughout the marriage." 2 Upon
divorce, therefore, women often returned to their natal families with
little more than that with which they entered the marriage and
would be provided access to small plots of land by their parents. 113
However, the majority of natal property would be reserved for use
and inheritance by their brothers who carried on the family lineage
and were expected to provide land use and property for their wives'
and families' maintenance." 4
British colonialism disrupted this social system, leaving some as-
pects of it intact while distorting and destroying others." 5 Examples
of four colonial policies demonstrate the effect of this disruption on
land allocation as a resource for women. First, the British usurped
land for ownership and development by whites and the colonial state,
displacing entire communities in the process." 6 Second, they insti-
tuted a system of private property in which clan land was for legal
purposes divided into individual lots and registered to an individual,
usually the male/husband, as owner." 7 Third, they instituted a poll
tax, which forced mostly African males to work for whites and/or the
colonial state."' This practice allowed Africans to access cash with
108. Id. at 12 (discussing inheritance and ritual cleansing and noting in footnote 44
that these practices are "notorious among the Luo and Luhya ethnic groups"); see also
Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (discussing levirate unions as a form of wife inheritance).
109. For example, the Qur'an permits a Muslim man to marry up to four wives if he
does so in the context of providing for orphans when a father dies and where the man is
capable of dealing justly and equitably with all of his wives. HOLY QUR'AN, S. IV:3. See
also Alamin Mazrui, The Equality Bill 2000; an Alternative Islamic Perspective, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AS POLITIcs 310, 314-15 (Kenya Human Rights Commission 2003).
110. Gordon, supra note 40, at 896.
111. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at 408 (discussing an "ethic of care" that allowed
for the provision of natal land for unmarried or divorced daughters).
116. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7.
117. Id.; see also Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at 407-08.
118. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 106-07.
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which to pay the poll tax, thereby beginning the process of integrat-
ing them into the cash and market economy." 9 Fourth, the British
governed through a policy of indirect rule which often strengthened
the hand of a single man, a chief, to direct activities of communities,
often leaving community customs in place.12°
As a result, men, who were required to work outside of their
farms and homes, increasingly left almost all subsistence farming
to their wives and children.12' Working outside of their homes under-
mined and loosened clan control over these men, as their livelihood
no longer rested solely with the community.'22 Moreover, with titles
to the land vested in these individual men, men increasingly gained
power to sell the land without clan permission, without any control
capable of being exercised by their wives, and sometimes without their
wife's knowledge. 2 ' At the same time, the law largely extinguished
land use rights that women had held historically, which meant that
while they might be practiced in some communities they were not
necessarily legally enforceable against husbands with sole title.'24
Colonialism thus shifted women's dependence on family/clan re-
lationships to dependence on a single man, usually her husband.
25
It did so without providing women any countervailing rights to land
as a resource except through appeal to husbands or to a weakened
clan. 26 These clans increasingly exercised little control over men but
were left primarily with control over women, on the basis of traditions
that protected but also disadvantaged women. 27 In addition, women,
often already seen as the source of community life, also came to rep-
resent the embodiment of the clan's and community's culture, and the
community's control over women often represented their efforts to
maintain their culture in the face of a changing social environment. 2 '
Thus, while the pre-colonial social structure could be characterized
119. Id.
120. Gordon, supra note 40, at 888.
121. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting that the concern for women under custom-
ary law has been dropped in the modern era but that the removal of protection "has not
been accompanied with fewer roles for women within the community"); Udvardy, supra
note 26, at 1751 (noting that "the imposition of a Western public/private conceptual
distinction... result [ed] both in a muting of women's participation in the public, political
activities, and to increasingly heavy workloads for women in the private, domestic sphere").
122. See Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 106-07; see also Gordon, supra note 40, at 888.
123. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72; Butegwa, supra note 36, at 110.
124. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42; Gordon, supra note 40, at 906.
125. Gordon, supra note 40, at 906 (citing INGRID PALMER, GENDER AND POPULATION
IN THE ADJUSTMENT OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES: PLANNING FOR CHANGE 140 (1991)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 107.
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as a patrilineal system, this structure has increasingly become a
patriarchal one. 2 '
Women therefore enter the post-independence period primarily
engaged in subsistence farming on land that they do not own and have
no chance of owning due to a system of beliefs developed historically
but maintained presently. Absence of land ownership limits their abil-
ity to access credit or to access other resources in the modern era.
Furthermore, women's landlessness is accomplished and accompa-
nied by a complex of practices and ideas concerning marriage, burial,
and women's competencies that represent the remaining aspects of
their communities' cultures, which these communities struggle to
protect. Practices such as polygamy, bride price, early marriage, forced
marriage, and female genital circumcision remain as evidence of their
cultural identity and in some cases a way for women to access re-
sources, 130 even as they have "hampered women's advancement."''
In addition, women's vulnerabilities have increased in Kenya
by the general worsening of economic conditions over the last two
decades in which the country has seen an insignificant or negative
growth rate.132 Women are more likely to be adversely affected by
these conditions "given their multiple roles as ... mothers, wives,
food providers, care providers, heads of households and workers.' 33
These vulnerabilities have also been increased by the activities of an
emerging African political elite that has continued to usurp additional
land under a cycle of government corruption,"' in a society where
129. See Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1759 (suggesting that pre-colonial Kenya repre-
sented a patrilineal society that increasingly became patriarchal under colonialism); see
also Felix K. Ekechi, Women and the Democratization Process in Africa, in THE TRANsI-
TION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 203, 205-207 (John Mukum Mbaku &
Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere eds., 2003) (discussing the debate about gender parity in
precolonial Africa); Gordon, supra note 40, at 903 (citing Patricia Stamp, Burying Otieno:
The Politics of Gender and Ethnicity in Kenya, 16 SIGNS 808, 813 (1991)).
130. See, e.g., DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 7; FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at
37-40; Erin Han, Legal and Non-Legal Responses to Concerns for Women's Rights in
Countries Practicing Female Circumcision, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 201,208-10 (2002);
Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
131. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration
of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: third and fourth periodic reports
of States parties: Kenya, at 11, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KEN/1-2 (2000) at http://www.un
.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/28sess.htm [hereinafter Kenya Report to CEDA WI.
132. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 14; see also UNDP, Kenya: Macro Economic
Evolution since Independence (2002), available at http://www.ke.undp.org/Corporate
%20Publications.htm; REPUBLIC OF KENYA, KENYA REVIEW AND APPRAISAL: FINAL REPORT
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BEIJING PLATFORM FOR ACTION 1 (2004), available at http://
www.cities-localgovernments.org/uclg/upload/docs/KENYAEnglish.pdf [hereinafter FINAL
REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BEIJING PLATFORM].
133. FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BEIJING PLATFORM, supra note 132, at 1.
134. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, KENYA'S UNFINISHED DEMOCRACY: A HUMAN RIGHTS
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most people engage in agricultural work, 135 and by a society where
men's "success" is preferred."a Thus, women and their claims to land
are increasingly seen as competition.'87 Although the circumstances
of the majority of men have also deteriorated, men have stronger ideo-
logical claims to land and the few opportunities the social structure
now provides, a situation that increases their hostility to women's
claims to resources.13 Under these conditions, many women, as cul-
tural beings, may support retention of their economic and social ar-
rangements and retention of older cultural practices that bind them
to their clans and ethnic communities. They also may encounter less
hostility and have greater access to resources within these cultural
arrangements than they do in the small, discriminatory, private sec-
tor.139 This socio-economic reality may further bind Kenyan women
to these communities and practices.
The received religions, Christianity and Islam, complicate this
picture, as they can embody rules and belief systems that also subor-
dinate women to men under ideologies that characterize the genders
as complementary. Even where they seek to protect some measure
of women's economic independence, as for example with Islam which
provides for some form of women's inheritance, women may still be
unable to access land and other resources. This inability is due to
the patriarchal interpretation of their religions, pre-existing inheri-
tance practices in the community, 140 or the economic realities.
As such, it is unsurprising that women, as a vulnerable group
in Kenya, only own five percent of the land, have higher rates of mal-
nutrition, suffer from inadequate heath care, are increasingly vul-
nerable to HIV, have less education and fewer jobs generally, with
limited access to paid jobs in the formal sector, are consequently dis-
proportionately poor and are largely absent in the decision-making
apparatuses in the country.14 ' It is also unsurprising that some
AGENDA FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT 7 (2002).
135. Nzioki, supra note 92, at 220 (stating that "the livelihood of over 80 per cent of
the Kenyan population is directly dependent on agriculture").
136. Cf. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 33-34 (discussing bias against women's
property rights in Kenya).
137. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 41-42.
138. Id.
139. See Gordon, supra note 40, at 898. Gordon argues that the division among women
evidenced around the famous Otieno case represented a clash between the family/clan
mode of production and the emerging capitalist society. She suggests that the majority
of Kenyan women have more access to resources in the former rather than the latter,
albeit limited access.
140. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 8.
141. Id. at 9-10. See generally FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BEIJING
PLATFORM, supra note 132.
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portion of these women nonetheless feel bound to traditions that do
not seem to be beneficial in the long run.142
B. Kenyan Women and the Current Constitution of Kenya
The current Kenyan constitution in many ways legitimates the
second-class status of women embedded in Kenya's socio-economic
realities by explicitly disadvantaging women in certain circumstances,
such as in matters of citizenship143 and by embracing a pluralist sys-
tem that embodies both customary and religious laws to which the
constitutional anti-discrimination provisions do not apply.144 A net-
work of other laws in many respects discriminates against and dis-
advantages women, including a system of multiple marriage laws.'45
Even where advocates have attempted to cure the disadvantages
embodied in these laws, the patriarchal nature and socio-economic
structure of the society subvert the goals of these laws. 46 The Law
of Succession Act is one such law. 47 Other laws that disadvantage
women include penal laws addressing the definition and administra-
tion of sexual offenses, the absence of separate domestic violence legis-
lation, and certain laws in the employment area. 4 '
The current constitution explicitly discriminates against women
with respect to citizenship. Wheras a Kenyan man automatically
bequeaths citizenship to his children born outside the country with
a foreign wife and also to his foreign wife, Kenyan women do not auto-
matically bequeath citizenship to a foreign husband or to children
born to them.'49 Furthermore, other laws consistent with the under-
lying philosophy guiding citizenship require single women to obtain
consent from their fathers to obtain a passport, require married
women to obtain consent from their husbands, and require mothers
142. Gordon, supra note 40, at 908.
143. CONSTITUTION, Arts. 87-98 (1997) (Kenya).
144. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 18.
145. See Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
146. Id.
147. Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 (Kenya).
148. See FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 8-14 (discussing laws concerning domestic
violence and sexual violence); Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (discussing employment
laws). See generally Penal Law, (2003) Cap. 63 §§ 139-57 (Kenya) (addressing various
sexual offenses, including rape, attempted rape, abduction, statutory rape, forced prosti-
tution, etc.); Laws of Kenya, Cap. 226, 229, 231-237 (addressing employment issues).
149. Compare CONSTITUTION, Art. 90 (2004) (Kenya) (stating that "[a] person born
outside Kenya after 11th December, 1963 shall become a citizen of Kenya at the date of
his birth if at that date his father is a citizen of Kenya") with id. Art. 91 (stating that "[a]
woman who has been married to a citizen of Kenya shall be entitled, upon making
application in such manner as may be prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, to
be registered as a citizen of Kenya"). See also FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 22-24; Kenya
Report to CEDAW, supra note 131, at 22-23 (making similar points).
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with children under the age of seven to obtain the children's father's
consent for the children to travel on their mother's passport.150
The Constitution does not explicitly provide for equality and
equal protection of the laws. Rather, it provides that ". . . every person
in Kenya is entitled to the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual," including the right to 'life, liberty, security of the person
and the protection of the law."'51 This provision is complemented by
Article 82, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of "race, tribe,
place of origin or residence or other local connection, political opinions,
colour, creed or sex .... ,152 However, the anti-discrimination prin-
ciple does not apply to matters involving "adoption, marriage, divorce,
burial, devolution of property on death or other matters of personal
law,"'53 or "in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of
customary law."'"
These exceptions mean that women are subject to potentially
discriminatory laws in the majority of legal cases in which they are
involved. For example, marriage-related claims, including claims in-
volving maintenance, custody, divorce, and succession, constituted
over sixty-seven percent of the cases handled by the Nairobi office of
the Federation of Women Lawyers' legal aid clinic.' 55 These types of
cases represented over fifty-two percent of the cases in their Kisumu
office.' 6 Cases involving land claims constituted another eleven per-
cent of the cases in both offices, with cases involving claims of vio-
lence constituting seventeen percent in Nairobi and twenty-three
percent in Kisumu.'57 Further, because the overwhelming majority
of women work in the informal sector and live within the contexts
of their cultural/ethnic communities,'" many will be subject to poten-
tially discriminatory customary laws and practices.'59
Marriage, divorce, and other personal law claims are governed
by various sources of Kenyan law including customary and religious
150. See FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 22 (noting that a person needs a passport or a
national identity card to get a voter registration card and that to obtain either, the
Registrar of Persons office requires a woman to be accompanied by her husband, a rule
that the government justifies by reference to Article 91 of the Constitution); see also
FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 14-15.
151. CONSTITUTION, Art. 70 (2004) (Kenya).
152. Id. Art. 82.
153. Id. Art. 82(4)(b).
154. Id. Art. 82(4)(c).
155. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 32.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See generally Gordon, supra note 40.
159. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting that because customary law is unwritten,
various formulations of it often reflect the articulators' biases); accord Nyamu, Gender,
supra note 50, at 404-06.
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laws in a complex system of multiple marriage laws. The current
constitution, the supreme law of the land,16 ° does not explicitly pro-
vide the sources of Kenyan law but references several such sources in-
cluding customary"' and Islamic law. 16 2 The sources of Kenyan law
are specifically set out in the Judicature Act'63 and include: the con-
stitution; the National Assembly's legislative acts; specific Acts of the
British Parliament before the establishment of the Republic of Kenya;
English common law and doctrines of equity in force at the beginning
of colonial law; African customary law as a guide in civil matters; and
Islamic law in some matters of personal law affecting Muslims."'64
Furthermore, the government applies Hindu Law on questions of
marriage and divorce under the Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act. 16
Kenyan court decisions also operate as a source of law.'66
Kenya has at least four different systems of marriage.'67 These
different marriage systems represent and seek to recognize the
country's different cultural and religious heritages. They potentially
provide a system of choice under which couples choose to subject them-
selves to the marriage regime they prefer. 6 ' This conceptualization
is hindered by three significant realities. One is that many women
may not even know that they can choose among marriage systems.'69
Second, even if they possess such knowledge, women living and work-
ing in rural communities may face tremendous pressure to marry
160. CONSTITUTION, Art. 3 (2004) (Kenya) (stating that it is the supreme law and its
positions are to prevail where there are conflicts of laws); see also CHARLES MWALIMU,
THE KENYAN LEGAL SYSTEM 23 (1988); Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (citing the
Judicature Act, (1998) Cap. 8 (Kenya)).
161. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 82(4) (2004) (Kenya) (rendering the anti-discrimination
principle inapplicable "in the case of members of a particular race or tribe of customary
law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter
which is applicable in the case of other persons").
162. Id. Art. 66 (authorizing the establishment of Kadhi's courts and providing that
the jurisdiction of a Kadhi's court extends to the "determination of questions of Muslim
law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance in proceedings in which
all the parties profess the Muslim religion").
163. The Judicature Act (1998) Cap. 8 § 3 (Kenya).
164. MWALIMU, supra note 160, at 22; see also The Judicature Act (1998) Cap. 8
(Kenya).
165. MWALIMU, supra note 160, at 26; see also The Hindu Marriage and Divorce Act
(1948) Cap. 11 (Kenya).
166. MWALIMU, supra note 160, at 25.
167. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 8-9 (noting five different systems); FIDA
2002, supra note 105, at 26-27 (noting five different recognized forms of marriage in
Kenya); Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (noting four different systems); see also Catherine
A. Hardee, Note, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural Minorities in Kenyan
Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 712 (2004) (discussing marriage laws under the Hindu
Marriage and Divorce Act; the Mohammedan Marriage, Divorce, and Succession Act; the
African Christian Marriage and Divorce Act; and customary laws).
168. See Hardee, supra note 167, at 715.
169. Id. at 732.
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under traditional rules.17 ° Third, although all marriage regimes, ex-
cept customary law, require registration, each registration regime is
separate.17' Thus, even women who choose a monogamous form of
marriage may not be aware of marriages formerly or subsequently
contracted under other systems or under customary laws.'72
This complex of laws also complicates issues of succession. For
example, in the famous case of S.M. Otieno, 73 although it was argued
that the Otienos married under English common law (arguably akin
to a civil law marriage), the Court ruled that customary law applied
to S.M. Otieno's burial.'74 It thereby granted Otieno's brother decision-
making power over his burial instead of his wife, a decision that impli-
cated issues of access to property.'
75
Dissolution of marriage under most of these systems is compli-
cated by the lack of a developed legal or ideological framework that
contemplates marital property and the idea that women, whether
through labor or financial contribution, contribute to marital prop-
erty. This situation is further complicated by the fact that men may
have multiple wives under different marital systems. Thus, securing
maintenance (alimony) may be difficult if not impossible. Although
some have interpreted Islam as requiring maintenance for wives in
cases of divorce, 71 it is not clear that Muslim women find it any easier
170. Id. at 733-34.
171. Id. at 736.
172. See FIDA, BEYOND THE DOOR: THE CHALLENGES AHEAD: FIDA ANNUAL REPORT
2001, at 16-19 (2002) (discussing some of the problems with the multiple marriage sys-
tem); Hardee, supra note 167, at 736; see also DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 8.
173. Otieno v. Ougo, January 5, 1987, slip opinion of Mr. Justice J.F. Shields (C.A.)
(Kenya). The Court of Appeals ordered a new trial. Mr. Justice S.E.O. Bosire of the High
Court of Kenya ruled in favor of the defendant on February 13, 1987. The Court of Appeals
affirmed Mr. Justice Bosire's ruling on May 15, 1987. See also John W. Van Doren, Death
African Style: The Case of S.M. Otieno, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (1998).
174. Evans Monari, Burial Law - Reflections on the S.M. Otieno Case, 31 How. L.J.
667, 669-770 (1988).
175. Gordon, supra note 40, at 884 (noting that Wambui Otieno, the wife, argued that
the issue was a smokescreen for the Luos to access the deceased Otieno's assets for claimed
burial expenses).
176. The provision of maintenance is often based on Surfi II, verses 240-41, which
require men to provide for their wives and to provide for them when they die or leave
their wives. HOLY QUR'AN S. 11:240-41. This view gains overall support from the verses
regarding inheritance. HOLY QUR'AN S. IV:11-12, 34 (providing that "men are the pro-
tectors and maintainers of women, because Allah has given the one more strength than
the other, and because they support them from their means"). See Zainab Chaudhry, The
Myth of Misogyny: A Reanalysis of Women's Inheritance in Islamic Law, 61 ALB. L. REV.
511, 541 (1997); ALAMIN MAZRUI, THE EQUALITY BILL 2000: AN ALTERNATIVE ISLAMIC
PERSPECTIVE IN HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS 316-17 (2003).
Egypt, in its reservation to CEDAW Article 16, expressed the interrelationship of these
ideas. It stated:
Reservation to the text of article 16 concerning the equality of men and
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations during the
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to secure maintenance given the economic realities in Kenya and the
overall patriarchal nature of the society.' 7
Furthermore, both customary and Islamic marriage norms that
permit parents to arrange marriages for children without their con-
sent and without minimum age requirements have proven problem-
atic in the context of forced and/or early marriages. 17 8 Until recently,
a young girl who refused to be married and those acting on her behalf
had no legal basis to reject the marriage. 179 The consequences of these
practices are many. Forced and/or early marriages, where a young
girl is often married to an older man, usually disrupt a girl's educa-
tion, subject her to the health risks associated with early mother-
hood, and can increase her chances of contracting HIV if the husband
is older and has had other partners. 80 Furthermore, economic stress
may encourage the early marriage of young girls as families look to
receive dowry payments for survival.'8 ' Historically, efforts to combat
forced and/or early marriage, as well as a host of other traditional
practices such as female circumcision, had little legal basis because
they were permitted under customary or religious laws.'82 The enact-
ment of laws such as the Children Act 2001 is slowly rectifying this
state of affairs, at least at the level of law.18 3
Even where laws have been changed in an attempt to cure the
disadvantages women face under customary or other marriage laws,
these reforms have fallen short of their goals because of omissions in
marriage and upon its dissolution, without prejudice to the Islamic Sharia's
provisions... one of the most important bases of these relations is an equiva-
lency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementary which guarantees
true equality between the spouses. The provisions of the Sharia lay down
that the husband shall pay bridal money to the wife and maintain her fully
and shall also make a payment to her upon divorce, whereas the wife retains
full rights over her property and is not obliged to spend anything on her
keep. The Sharia therefore restricts the wife's rights to divorce by making
it contingent on a judge's ruling, whereas no such restriction is laid down
in the case of the husband.
U.N. Dep't Econ. & Soc. Affairs: Division for the Advancement of Women, Declarations,
Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/
reservations-country.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
177. MAZRUI, supra note 176, at 317.
178. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42 (discussing capacity to marry under customary
law); see also FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 37-40 (discussing issue of early marriage).
179. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 37-40; Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
180. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 50-55; see also FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 37-40
(discussing a specific case of forced early marriage and a number of the systems and
support for girls trying to escape early marriage); HIV/Aids: Things We Should Know,
http://www.southafrica.info/public services/citizens/health/aids-findings-101205.htm.
181. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 37-40.
182. Id.; Biketi Kikechi, Moi Bans FGM, Affirms Stand over Women, EAST AFRICAN
STANDARD, Dec. 13, 2001.
183. Children Act (2001) Cap. 586 (Kenya); see also FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 24-26.
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the law, biases in administration, or the law's ill fit with traditional
attitudes and practices." 4 The Law of Succession Act is one exam-
ple." 5 The law's purpose was to provide "a uniform code as far as the
devolution of property on death ... and [to give] both men and
women equal rights to inherit, own and dispose of property."186 It
covers both testate and intestate succession and was meant to apply
in all cases.8 7 However, the Act itself exempted certain land from its
coverage, effectively making the Act inapplicable to pastoral women's
claims specifically for livestock and land.l" These claims remain sub-
ject to customary law. 189 Furthermore, Muslims protested the Act
arguing that it was incompatible with Islamic laws of inheritance
and the Act was made inapplicable to them in 1991.190 And finally,
the surviving spouse, under the Act, only receives a life interest in
the property, which means that she cannot transfer or sell the prop-
erty, and a woman's interest terminates if she remarries."' Except
for the provision exempting Muslims, these other provisions are ob-
vious drawbacks of the law itself.
Other drawbacks occur as a result of various social practices. For
example, the Act's provisions on testate succession specifically pro-
vide for women to own and inherit property. 2 However, the reach
of the Act is constrained by the fact that the majority of wills are
made by men who leave their property to male heirs.'93 Further-
more, women can make a will with "respect to property she owns
[only] ."" As marital property is often registered in the sole name of
the husband, women find they own little in their own names. 195 Thus,
further laws need to be enacted to ensure that marital property is
considered the property of both spouses if women are to access and
devise property accumulated in a marriage.'96 Otherwise, individual
184. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
185. The Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 (Kenya).
186. Kenya Report to CEDAW, supra note 131, at 6; see also The Law of Succession
Act, (1981) Cap. 160 (Kenya).
187. See Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
188. The Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 § 32 (Kenya) (listing regions of the
country exempt from application of the Acts provision); see also Kameri-Mbote, supra
note 42.
189. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
190. DOUBLE STANDARDS, supra note 72, at 32.
191. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
192. See The Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 (Kenya); Kameri-Mbote, supra
note 42.
193. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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women are left to press the point with their spouses, a currently
unpopular position."' Furthermore, the intestate provisions create
a number of problems as they attempt to deal with succession issues
in both monogamous and polygamous marriages. 19 Finally, women
have been disadvantaged in the administration and interpretation
of the Act.' For example, courts have consistently held that married
daughters are ineligible to inherit their father's property, even though
these decisions directly contradict the clear language of the Act.2 °°
Nevertheless, the Law of Succession Act has been heralded as
improving the lives of women.20 ' In allowing women to inherit prop-
erty, the Act shifts the focus from the traditional African inheritance
schemes in which property is held for the benefit of an expansive
and extended family by men to the Western model where family prop-
erty is held for the exclusive use of or at the discretion of a narrower
nuclear family.0 2 Kameri-Mbote comments that, insofar as wives'
and daughters' rights are concerned, this shift is a radical one for
which much of the society is unprepared.0 ' Whether alternatives to
such a shift exist is unclear because few customary practices have
been explored with the goal of understanding them as providing
women the independent economic means to develop adequately and
to protect themselves given their dependent status and increasing
vulnerability.0 4
197. Id. (commenting that Kenyan society is "unprepared for the revolutionary aspects
of the Law of Succession Act in so far as wives' and daughters' rights are concerned").
198. See, e.g., The Law of Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 §§ 36, 40 (Kenya). For ex-
ample, the Act creates problems for women who have married under monogamous systems
and thus believe their marital property is protected in that where their husbands have
entered into previous or subsequent marriages under systems that allow polygamy, these
wives and their children are also entitled to inherit under the Act. See The Law of
Succession Act, (1981) Cap. 160 § 3(5) (Kenya). Thus the marital property, upon the
death of the husband, must be shared, undermining perhaps the concept of monogamous
marriages and certainly a supposed benefit of it. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42. Some
have suggested that an Affiliation Act might be a way to meet the needs of these women
and children. Id.
199. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
200. Id.
201. ANNE MURAGU NYABERA, ALIYA MAWANI, & WANJA NGARI, SETTING THE PACE:
THE 1999/2000 FIDA (K) ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN 33 (2000)
[hereinafter FIDA 1999].
202. Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
203. Id.
204. Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at 413. Nyamu urges that customary practices
be explored to see where they might in fact support women's access to property among
other resources instead of assuming that customary rules always burden women. She
further argues that this exploration should replace acceptance of what simply may be
dominant expressions of a customary practice meant to protect the interests of dominant
groups. Id. at 406-09, 413-16.
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C. Kenya Women's Movement
Women in Kenya have historically organized themselves into
women's groups to provide mutual support."' These groups have
occasionally mobilized around national political issues such as the
war of Independence, °" or issues seen to protect women's lives and
lifestyles. 0 7 Nonetheless, scholars generally have characterized
these bodies as self-help and welfare groups that previously have
been largely apolitical," 8 both by design and by fiat in the context
of authoritarian and undemocratic regimes.0 9 To the extent that the
state directly addressed women's issues, it did so in terms of their
contributions to the household and social welfare, and later in terms
of the discourse of development.210
However, since the fifties these largely grassroots groups have
progressively organized under national umbrella organizations such
as Maendeleo ya Wanawake (Maendeleo), the oldest and largest of
such organizations," and the National Council of Women of Kenya
(NCWK),212 of which the Nobel prize winner and founder of the Green-
belt tree planting movement, Wangari Maathai, was once a leader.
2 13
205. See generally Rhoda Malemba Lewa, Women's Groups and the Law in Kenya, in
LAW AND THE QUEST FOR GENDER EQUALITY IN KENYA 74 (Kivutha Kibwana & Lawrence
Mute eds., 2000); Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29; Udvardy supra note 26; Audrey Wiper,
Equal Rights for Women in Kenya, 9 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 429 (1971).
206. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 106-09.
207. Id. at 106-11 (discussing the grassroots women's groups), 112-14 (discussing
women NGOs); Lewa, supra note 205, at 74-77. See generally Udvardy supra note 26
(discussing pre-colonial women's groups as being focused on maintaining gender roles
that provided a basis of power for women; in this sense they were not simply welfare
organizations but groups with specific goals related to women's gendered power and em-
powerment); Nzomo, Status, supra note 88, at 19-20 (discussing rare unity among women
during the 1992 elections).
208. Some of the Kenyan scholars who argue and characterize these groups as apolitical
include: Kivutha Kibwana, Women Politics and Gender Politicking: Question from Kenya,
CONSTITUTIONAISM INAFRICA: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES 194 (Onyango-Oloka et al. eds.,
2001); Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 15-16.
209. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 170-73.
210. Id. at 177 (noting that these organizations moved from simply promoting welfare
to promoting women's empowerment).
211. Wiper, supra note 205, at 432. Maendeleo ya Wanawake was the first and largest
organization, the goal of which was to organize and mobilize the grassroots organi-
zations. Wiper describes Maendeleo as "a self help organisation concerned with change
at the most fundamental level, the home. It aims to improve domestic standards by edu-
cating women in home making, child care, nutrition, and hygiene." Id.; see also Nzomo,
Impact, supra note 5, at 15 (on MYWO); Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at
174-76; Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 112-13 (on NCWK).
212. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 11; Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 112.
213. See Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1757.
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The establishment of women-focused professional non-governmental
groups (NGOs) has increasingly complemented these grassroots orga-
nizations and umbrella groups. These NGOs include the Federation
of Women Lawyers of Kenya (FIDA) and the League of Kenya Women
Voters (The League), which draw upon the discourse of women's
human rights in their articulation of women's issues.214 The political
efforts of individual women have also complemented grassroots
groups and women's NGOs, together forming the essential elements
in a vibrant women's movement in Kenya.215
With the advent of "multipartyism" in Kenya in the early 1990s
and the global women's movement's success in articulating and pro-
moting the ideal of gender equality and women's human rights, the
Kenyan women's movement has increasingly and politically chal-
lenged the laws, policies and practices that support women's subordi-
nation in Kenya,216 as evidenced by the efforts of the Women's Political
Caucus.217 Specifically, multipartyism and the global women's move-
ment became major elements in the changing focus of the Kenyan
women's movement. Multipartyism provided the political space for
Kenyan women to challenge their subordination more directly.21 The
ideals of gender equality and women's human rights increasingly
provided an ideological framework for Kenyan women's activism,219
214. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 112-13. See generally FIDA 2003, supra note 2.
215. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 102 (discussing whether a women's movement
in Kenya exists). Oduol & Kabira argue that Kenyan women's groups are numerous and
vibrant and note that these organizations constitute the "source of the most radical con-
sciousness to be found in the countryside providing women with a basis for resistance
to exploitation." Id. (quoting Patricia Stamp, Kikuyu Women's Self-Help Groups: Towards
an Understanding of the Relation Between Sex-Gender System and Mode of Production
in Africa, in WOMEN AND CLASS IN AFRICA 27 (C. Robertson & I. Berger eds., 1986)).
Because these groups "are often uncoordinated and fragmented," people tend not to
think of these groups as constituting a women's movement that emphasizes a common
objective, continuity, unity and coordination. Id. These groups do occasionally demon-
strate coordination and cohesion, as they have existed since pre-colonial Kenya and have
often stood together against cultural and patriarchal dominance. Id. at 103. Oduol and
Kabira argue that Kenya's women's movement consists of three elements: grassroots
rural groups; officially registered, largely urban-based women's non-governmental orga-
nizations; and the efforts of individual women. Id.
216. Lewa, supra note 205, at 74.
217. See FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29-31.
218. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 177-81.
219. In this vein, they have supported efforts to mainstream women in economic develop-
ment programs, supported legislation for affirmative action of women and equality, as
well as been involved in efforts to change the marriage laws, fight domestic violence, op-
pose early marriage, fight for equal citizenship rights, legalize and ensure inheritance
rules for women and girls. Furthermore, they have insisted that the Kenyan government
adopt and implement both CEDAW in its entirety and the Beijing Platform. See, e.g.,
Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 11-13.
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and the calls for constitutional review provided a concrete issue and
target for their efforts.22 °
1. Multipartyism: Space22'
Women's issues prior to the early nineties had been discussed
in the context of development. Development was a primary concern
for many of the developing countries after independence. This concern
was also captured in the nascent global women's movement. 22 The
vibrancy of the hundreds of small women's groups throughout Kenya
made them important to development projects and the dissemination
of development information, with a number of larger women's NGOs
being organized around these efforts.2 3 Although these programs pro-
vided some social benefits to women, they failed to provide any change
in the overall economic conditions of women as a group and failed to
act as empowering agents.224
Three factors contributed to this failure. First, due to the socio-
economic and historical development of the country, women lacked
influence or control over vital economic resources and technologies,
development plans and policies, or the "fruits of their production. 228
Thus, even where women's groups were involved in income-generating
projects, these projects rested on a weak economic base.226 Second,
women's groups lacked cohesion.227 The nature of the small women's
groups meant that they primarily sought to address the local and im-
mediate needs of their members. 22' Even though many of these groups
220. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1-3.
221. See Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 176 (noting that multipartyism
provided space for the women's movement to become a force in shaping democratic
change in Kenya).
222. See generally Promoting Women in Development, in WOMEN Go GLOBAL, (United
Nations, Division for the Advancement of Women CD-ROM, July 2002). This interactive
multimedia CD-ROM, published by the U.N. Division for the Advancement of Women,
chronicles many of these efforts, beginning in 1945 up to the year 2000. It notes that
several months after the New Mexico conferences, the U.N. declared the years 1976-1985
the Decade for Women. Id. The international activities during this time coincided with
the second wave of feminism in the West and the liberation of large numbers of women
from developing countries eager to assist in the decolonization and development of
processes in their countries. Id.
223. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 11-12; Udvardy, supra note 26, at 1749-51,1757-58.
224. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 170-75 (discussing the colonial state's
interest in larger NGOs as a mechanism to assert control over women and grassroots
groups); Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 12-13.
225. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 12.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 13.
228. Id.; see also Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 110.
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had been organized under the large umbrella groups, these umbrella
groups, like other women's NGOs, often split within themselves over
leadership issues and goals.229 Third, the Kenyan state was author-
itarian, and although it conceded that women had a role in develop-
ment, it denied the fact that women faced any discrimination.23 Ef-
forts by women to articulate their specific problems or to challenge
unfair practices and laws therefore often faced rebukes and minimali-
zation.231 The state further sought to co-opt women's organizations
to ensure that the primary goals of the one-party state remained
minimally contested, including its views that women were not subor-
dinated and that at best women's efforts should focus on non-political
welfare issues.232 For example, Maendeleo, with its emphasis on
women as "homemakers," at one point officially merged with the state
party, KANU.233 At the same time, NCWK, which during that time
had been one of the only NGOs to "take a position on national issues"
and to make demands for legislative changes in favor of women's
rights, suffered declining membership and a diminishing role.1
4
Kenya, however, was not immune to the wave of democratization
that swept Africa and many parts of the world after the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1989 and the international calls for good gov-
ernance that followed.235 In the 1990s, pro-democracy elements in
Kenyan society began advocating for multipartyism. Specifically,
civil society began advocating for repeal of section 2A of the con-
stitution, the provision that had made Kenya a de jure one-party
state.2 36 The people further called for the registration of additional
229. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 12-13.
230. Id. at 15; see also Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 24-31 (describ-
ing the emergence constitutionally of the authoritarian state upon the framework of the
colonial state in post-Independence Kenya).
231. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 15; Oduol & Kabira supra note 29, at 113 (noting
that the government censored the NCWK, while under the leadership of Wangari Maathai,
for challenging government policies).
232. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 15; Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at
170-71; Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 111.
233. Nzomo, Impact, supra note 5, at 15.
234. Id.
235. See generally George T. Abed & Sanjeev Gupta, The Economics of Corruption: An
Overview, in GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, & ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 1 (George T. Abed
& Sanjeev Gupta eds., 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/2002/
governindex.htm (making the link between the end of the Cold War and the rise in in-
ternational concern in issues of state accountability or good governance). For a critique
of the good governance framework and ideology, see James Thuo Gathii, Representations
of Africa in Good Governance Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to Neo-
Liberalism, in 1998-1999 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65; Nyang'oro & Shaw, supra note 35.
236. Mutunga, Building, supra note 58, at 214-23.
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political parties."7 These calls and protests resulted in the repeal of
the constitutional ban on political parties and the first multiparty
elections in Kenya in 1992.28
Since the 1990s, this activism also created the space for women
groups to engage in concerted political activities and for the women's
movement to expand. For example, women's organizations such as
NCKW, the League of Kenya Women Voters, and the Association of
African women for Research and Development (AAWORD), 239 actively
participated in galvanizing women and the country for the first multi-
party elections, finding a rare but intermittent unity of purpose.24°
In fact, NCKW "launched the National Committee on the Status of
Women (NCSW) to educate women on democracy and their political
rights as Kenyan citizens."" Furthermore, it played an important role
by organizing the First and Second National Women's Conventions in
1992 and 1993 and "brought women together to strategize and demon-
strate their solidarity in the struggle against gender-based oppres-
sion. 242 The NCSW was built on a strategy of "Unity in Diversity"
and turned their attention toward political empowerment with the
hope of securing thirty to thirty-five percent of all parliamentary and
civic seats.243
In addition, many women's organizations were established during
this time.244 For example, the League of Kenya Women Voters,245
237. Id. at 215-17. See generally MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING, supra note 58.
238. The Kenya Constitution did not make Kenya a dejure one-party state until 1982
when it was amended by adding Section 2A. Makau Mutua, however, argues that Kenya
had been a de facto one-party state since 1969. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra
note 7, at 28-35.
239. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 112-13. FIDA was established after the 1985
United Nations Third World Conference on Women, which was held in Nairobi. FIDA
Kenya, Rules for Application for Membership to FIDA Kenya (2003), at http://www
.fidakenya.org/ab.aboutus.htm; see also infra Part III.
240. Nzomo, Status, supra note 88, at 19-20 (commenting on women's rare unity
around the 1992 multiparty elections). The League of Kenya Women Voters, for example,
organized a voter education program during this time. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29,
at 113.
241. Oduol & Kabira, supra note 29, at 112.
242. Id.
243. Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4 at 177.
244. Nzomo notes that women's organizations mushroomed after the 1992 election.
Nzomo, Status, supra note 88, at 20 n.4.
245. The League of Kenya Women Voters was established in 1992 following the repeal
of section 2A. Colleen Harrington, Intern Experiences and Reports: Kenya League of
Women Voters, Nairobi Kenya, available at http://www.claihr.org/claihr-new/nintern
_harrington.html.
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The Education Centre for Women in Democracy,246 ABANTU, 247 and
Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF),245 were all es-
tablished during the space created by the pro-democracy movement.
These groups would join approximately fifty other women's groups
to become the Women's Political Caucus, the alliance that fought to
ensure that women would be included in the constitutional review
process.249 Kenyan women thus began to challenge their status and
to act on the growing realization that even economic empowerment
would require that women be in positions to influence policies, prac-
tices, and laws that hindered their development.2 °
This shift in women's advocacy from a focus on women's issues
almost solely within the realm of home and/or development to a focus
that included activism around women's rights was also occurring at
the international level.25' Because many of the Kenyan NGOs estab-
lished during this period were initially affiliated with larger regional
and international organizations,252 it is unsurprising that these devel-
opments influenced the NGOs' efforts.
246. The Education Centre for Women in Democracy was founded in 1993. Education
Centre for Women in Democracy, http://www.ecwd.org/ (follow "About ECWD" hyperlink).
247. ABANTU for Development, an NGO that believes "that the continuous gender
disparity is a violation of human rights and entrenches poverty especially among women
and is a major hindrance to accelerated development," established in 1990. ABANTU for
Development, http://www.h-net.org/-harrison/ABANTU/aboutrowa.html.
248. Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) was founded in 1990.
WiLDAF, http://www.wildaf.org.zw/.
249. See FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29-31.
250. Nzomo, Impact supra note 5, at 15-16. In her 1989 article, Nzomo urges the
women's movement to become political, noting that "it is mainly through political
struggle that power to control and influence social change in any society is attainable."
She further urges women to increase their participation in trade unions to "fight for
their rights as workers" and also to "seek greater and more effective representation in
high level decision-making positions in the political system. Id. at 16; see also IMPACT,
The Unfinished Women's Agenda, KAMPALA, Dec. 31, 2001, at 20 (quoting Phoebe Asiyo's
article "Words No longer Enough":
There is growing recognition that economic and political participation of
women can not be separated. In fact, women's economic independence is
critical for their exercise of influence on decisions and laws that affect their
lives and families as well as their country. There are strong linkages be-
tween leadership and governance on one hand, and the processes that lead
to poverty and gender disparities on the other.)
See also Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4 at 177-81 (discussing the shift "from
welfare to empowerment" and explaining that it was women's "hope that if enough women
attained key political decisionmaking capacities, they would be able to repeal the laws
that discriminate against women at the social and economic levels, and they could design
alternate development policies to mainstream, rather than marginalize, women's issues).
251. Oduol & Kabiri, supra note 29, at 200.
252. Id. (noting that many of the formalized women's organizations were affiliated
with international women's organizations).
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2. The Ideal of Gender Equality and Women's Human Rights
The Kenyan women's movement has informed and been informed
by the global women's movement for women's human rights. 53 Women
at the global level have increasingly fought for and, to a lesser de-
gree, secured the articulation and understanding of women's rights
as human rights,5 4 encouraged the addition of new rights from the
perspectives of women's bodies and lives,255 and pushed for an under-
standing of human rights as indivisible, interrelated and interdepen-
dent.256 Several world conferences, some women-centered and some
non-women centered, have captured these ideals.5 7 At the center of
253. Kenyan women's efforts have informed the global women's rights movement. For
instance, international literature on women's rights has highlighted Wangari Maathai's
environmental efforts in the green-belt movement. See, e.g., Introduction to United Nations
Decade for Women: Nairobi Conference Adopts Forward Looking Strategies, in WOMEN
Go GLOBAL, supra note 222. At the same time Kenyan women have advocated for the
integration of CEDAW, in its entirety, into Kenyan law and have fought for the imple-
mentation of the Beijing Platform. See FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 64.
Furthermore, the gender equality ideal embodies standards upon which most govern-
ments have agreed. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 62. It thus serves as a benchmark
against which women may evaluate their efforts. The grounding of the gender equality
ideal in the international human rights regime has been crucial to Kenyan women's
advocacy for women's rights because it situates and legitimizes their efforts. Inter-
national acceptance of women's rights legitimizes the gender equality ideal in the eyes
of the government, with Kenyan women constantly reminding the government that it
has signed many human rights conventions. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 42-50.
It also legitimizes women's efforts in the eyes of the Kenyan people, who have often
articulated their struggle for better government in terms of human rights. A. Mutua,
Foreword, supra note 6, at 7.
254. Hilary Charlesworth, Introduction to 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW xix (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999) (stating that "the preference
for the term 'women's international human rights'... suggests a bold claim to inclusion
in the mainstream rather than specialized side waters" of human rights in the 1990s and
arguing that women and women's activism moved to the front and center of the human
rights movement when women began to engage the human rights regime directly). See
generally Berta Herndndez-Truyol, Human Rights through a Gendered Lens: Emergence,
Evolution, Revolution, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3 (Kelly D.
Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999).
255. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, at
217, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (Dec. 20, 1993) [hereinafter
DEVAW]; see also Sherrie L. Russel-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 350, at 357, 373 (2003) (discussing the classification of rape as a crime against
humanity).
256. World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993), http://www.unhchr.chi
html/menu5/wchr.htm; see also Donna J. Sullivan, Women's Human Rights and the 1993
World Conference on Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 152 (1994) (discussing the Vienna
Conference).
257. Hernfndez-Truyol, supra note 254, at 31-33. Hernandez-Truyol notes that during
the 1990s the U.N. hosted six "gender-marginalization-shattering" conferences that dealt
with issues related to women's rights. Women were a central force in many of these con-
ferences. The result of this engagement was a shift in focus to view women's rights as
human rights.
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the women's human rights concept is the ideal of gender equality." 8
This ideal is grounded in the language of the Universal Declaration
and other human rights instruments, which, in addition to language
recognizing "the inherent dignity and.., the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family," also reaffirms "funda-
mental human rights... the dignity and worth of the human person
and... the equal rights of men and women. ..."" The understand-
ing of gender equality as simply requiring the social equality between
women and men is grounded in this ideal.
Women have traditionally been absent from official efforts pro-
moting human rights, leaving a one-sided perspective in human
rights discourse.2" For example, although Eleanor Roosevelt chaired
the committee charged with drafting the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) in the 1940s, she was the only woman on
the committee. 261 Furthermore, only four women were among the one
hundred sixty signatories of the U.N. charter.262 Women's increasing
258. Id. at 29-30.
259. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), G.A. Res. 217A(III), at 71, U.N.
Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). Similar language is also found in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), at 50, art. 3, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200B(XXI), at 53, art. 3, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
260. Charlesworth, Crisis, supra note 18, at 786 (noting that women were absent in
the "processes of defining and implementing human rights standards").
261. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (discussing Roosevelt's role
as chair of the UDHR drafting commission).
262. UN Charter Calls for Equality: Four Women Sign UN Charter, in WOMEN Go
GLOBAL, supra note 222. Much of the "conceptual work for the Charter's language on
women's rights grew" out of women's action in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly as
advanced by the Pan American Union's Inter-American Commission of Women and the
League of Nations. Id. Even though few women participated in the formulation of the
initial human rights regime, the U.N. Charter elaborated on equality or promoted an
additional equality right for women, declaring the "equal rights of men and women."
U.N. Charter pmbl. Furthermore, the UDHR and the Political and Economic Covenants
declare and/or require state parties to undertake to ensure the "equal rights of men and
women" while prohibiting discrimination based on sex. See supra note 259.
The U.N. also established the Commission on the Status of Women ("CSW") in 1946.
Commission on the Status of Women Established, in WOMEN Go GLOBAL, supra note 222.
It monitored and contributed to U.N. activities in early years. Id. The CSW initially
focused on the issues related to the status of women including the political rights of
women, equal pay, women and education, marriage rights, customs and traditions harm-
ful to women, trafficking, and prostitution. CSW Focuses on Women's Rights, in WOMEN
Go GLOBAL, supra note 222. In the early 1960s, with the entry of developing countries
into the U.N. and their concerns about development, the CSW began to focus more on
promoting women in socio-economic development. Promoting Women in Development,
in WOMEN Go GLOBAL, supra note 222. Twenty-one developing countries and Poland
prompted the U.N. to draft the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, on the theory that discrimination against women impeded development. Fraser,
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involvement in developing the gender equality vision within the
human rights movement therefore has been essential.263 This vision
seeks to re-articulate the human rights regime and its fundamental
principle of equality to account for and respond to women's biology
as part of human embodiment and diversity and to eliminate systems
of disadvantage that limit women's human potential.2" The gender
equality ideal understands human rights as an international set of
standards to which the world's nations agree to meet." 5 Furthermore,
it takes seriously the idea that women's rights are human rights. 6
Although the idea of gender equality is grounded in international
human rights, the ideal has been developed in part to overcome some
of the problems that limited the initial human rights regime's appli-
cability to women's lives. 6 7 Women have observed that the regime's
limitations arise in part from three sources. The first limiting source
is that men were the primary creators of the human rights regime,
and the regime therefore reflects men's historical control over most
social institutions and male perspectives, including their bodies, lives,
and experiences.26 Second, the regime is limited by social systems
supra note 18, at 889-94 (noting that this call for a declaration came in 1963 during delib-
eration on human rights questions in ECOSOC).
263. Herndndez-Truyol, supra note 254, at 32 (noting that the women's human rights
revolution was "started by women for women with the goal of inclusion and represen-
tation in the global sphere').
264. Id. at 34-39.
265. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Introduction to HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN
CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE FOR OURSELVES 1 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im
ed., 2003) (noting that international human rights provide an independent standard to
which the community of nations must meet); see also R. Christopher Preston & Ronald
Z. Ahrens, United Nations Convention Documents in Light of Feminist Theory, 8 MICH.
J. GENDER & L. 1, 2 (2001) (noting that feminists have used the international human
rights regime because they see it as a forum for advancing women's rights).
266. It also represented an effort to recapture and to approach women's economic
development from a different perspective, a human rights perspective. Diane Otto, A
Post-Beijing Reflection on the Limitations and Potential of Human Rights Discourse for
Women, in 1 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 115, 123 (Kelly D. Askin
& Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999) (citing Jane Connors, NGOs and the Human Rights of
Women at the United Nations, in 'THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD": THE INFLUENCE OF
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE UN SYSTEM 147, 158-60 (Peter Willetts ed.,
1996)) (explaining that the "strategy aimed at achieving the recognition of women's
'human rights,' rather than 'needs,' was launched... [to] provide a new focus for the
floundering women-in-development agenda").
267. Charlesworth, Crisis, supra note 18, at 786.
268. The invisibility of women and any perspective they might bring to the human
rights regime was accomplished in two primary ways. First, men predominantly con-
trolled and led the states themselves. This control resulted from the socio-historical de-
velopment of most states, which embodied social structures and cultural, political, and
religious laws, norms, and practices of the communities they represented. These norms,
practices, and structures saw and enforced men as the "natural" governors of family,
social, and institutional life and thus the public actors, spokesmen, and decision makers
in all social institutions. As such women were largely absent as state leaders. Second,
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that historically have separately regulated women's lives as part of
the private sphere and thus outside of the vision and purview of state
action.2 69 Relatedly, the third source that limits the applicability of
human rights to women's lives is the regime's orientation itself. This
orientation primarily focuses on the state and regulates state action
vis-A-vis the individual, largely regulating public activity while osten-
sibly preserving private activity to the individual. To the extent that
women's concerns were seen as relating to issues regulated in the
private sphere, their issues warranted little attention from the inter-
national regime.27 ° The human rights regime further manifests a hier-
archy of rights, privileging political and civil rights over economic,
social, and cultural rights,27' and also over collective rights, focusing
the human rights regime focused on legitimate state action, which was conceptualized
as relying on the consent of the governed (at one point mostly men) and regulating the
public sphere of action between individuals. Report of the International Conference on
Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994, 4.24, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.171/13 (Oct. 18, 1994) (noting that "[m]en play a key role in bringing about
gender equality since, in most societies, men exercise preponderant power in nearly
every sphere of life, ranging form personal decisions... to the policy and programme
decisions taken at all levels of Government").
Women, however, were already contesting the exclusivity of men's rights to govern all
forms of social life and as the only public actors required to consent (vote) to governance
when states were constructing the human right regime. Nonetheless, women were largely
viewed as attendant to, dependent upon, and governed by their fathers and husbands.
Women's duties were primarily to these men and children within the context of the
family unit. The family unit was perceived as part of the private sphere inappropriate
for state action. Furthermore, it was idealized and viewed as unproblematic for the indi-
viduals within it. See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist
Approaches to Int'l Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 621 (1991); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886, 895 (1989); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992).
269. Many feminists discuss the impact of the public/private distinction in law. See,
e.g., Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing
Women's Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Susan Millns, Women's Rights After the Human Rights
Act 1998, in WOMEN MAKING CONSTITUTIONS: NEW POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVES 142, 146 (Alexandra Dobrowolsky & Vivien Hart eds., 2003) (discussing cases
in which the European Court of Human Rights has held that "states may be under posi-
tive obligations to prevent harm caused by private persons); Donna Sullivan, The Public!
Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995). Although women certainly constituted individuals covered by human rights
law, their activities were regulated and largely restricted to this private sphere by the
political, legal, economic, cultural, and other social relations where their access to edu-
cation, economic means, decision-making, etc., was often limited. Hilary Charlesworth,
Human Rights as Men's Rights, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 103, 103-05 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [herein-
after Charlesworth, Men's Rights].
270. See supra note 268.
271. This hierarchy privileges civil and political rights as the first generation of rights,
commensurate with the power of the West, over economic, social, and cultural rights, the
second generation of rights. See Hurst Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the
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on the individual rather than groups or communities.272 Finally, the
regime understands equality as requiring the state to provide the
same treatment to individuals while presuming the overall fairness
and neutrality of current social orderings.273 These factors tend to
reinforce the first two limitations, already inherent in the structure
of the regime, rendering its orientation both masculinist and status
quo oriented, with limited applicability to women's bodies, lives, and
social subordination.274
The gender equality ideal confronts these issues within the
human rights regime by analyzing human rights from the perspec-
tive of women, women's biology, and women's lives. This perspective
seeks to alter the human rights regime in five significant ways. First
it seeks to reformulate understandings about specific human rights
through re-envisioning them from a woman's perspective, a process
that often has entailed revealing the hidden male viewpoint in these
rights as well as unpacking the public aspects of seemingly private
regulation.2 75 Thus, this process, for example, has led to violence
against women being understood as a violation of human rights
276
and rape as a crime against humanity where used as a systematic
tool of war.277 In the process more people have come to believe that
human rights, in certain regards, also apply to private actors,278 as
opposed to being solely the obligations of states.
International Protection of the Rights of Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432-
36 (1991) (analyzing the debate in both the League of Nations and the United Nations
between advocates of civil and political rights and advocates of economic, social, and
cultural rights). In human rights equality jurisprudence, this hierarchy requires the
state to provide equal treatment under the law in the realm of political and civil rights
while presumably providing "equal opportunity" to access any other rights. Id. at 1434-35.
272. Developing countries joining the United Nations challenged the human rights
regime's focus on individual rights and were particularly concerned about the right to
development as a collective right and superior to individual claims to property. This
concern resulted in an effort to formulate a third generation of collective rights. Karel
Vasak, Pour une Troisieme Ggndration des Droits de l'Homme, in ETUDES ET EssAIS SUR
LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET SUR LES PRINCIPES DE LA CROIX-ROUGE EN
L'HONNEUR DE JEAN PIcTET 837 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984). For further discussion
of the subordination of collective rights, see generally REBECCA J. COOK, WOMEN'S
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF WOMEN'S HEALTH
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 16, 23-36 (1994); Philip Alston, Making
Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 3 (1988); Charlesworth, Men's Rights, supra note 269; Louis B. Sohn, The New Inter-
national Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L.
REV. 1 (1982); Fernando R. Tes6n, International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism,
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 869 (1985).
273. Otto, supra note 266, at 115-17, 126-31.
274. Id.
275. See Charlesworth, Men's Rights, supra note 269.
276. DEVAW, supra note 255, at art. 5(g).
277. Russel-Brown, supra note 255.
278. Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Rights, 7 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 125, 137-38 (1994).
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Second, the gender equality ideal has advanced a subtle but sig-
nificant shift in human rights equality analysis from one that pre-
sumes the fairness of current social orders and defines equality as
providing the same, nondiscriminatory treatment to each individual,
to an analysis that promotes equality by recognizing that inequality
and disadvantage are inherent within social orders.279 This shift first
appeared in the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW). Later human rights and state under-
standings further articulated this shift.
CEDAW obligated states to take action to eliminate discrimi-
nation against women.2"' It defines discrimination as:
... any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of
sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.2"'
CEDAW then proceeds to obligate states to adopt appropriate
legislation and other measures; to prohibit discrimination against
women by any person, organization, or enterprise; and to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs, and practices that con-
stitute discrimination against women.28 2 It specifically requires
states to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men
and women, including stereotypes,2"3 and to eliminate customary and
other practices based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either
of the sexes.28 4
279. This shift is also apparent in Canadian jurisprudence. Although Canada recognizes
that equality as requiring the same treatment of different individuals, Canadian courts
have also recognized "that every difference in treatment between individuals under the
law will not necessarily result in inequality and.., identical treatment may frequently
produce serious inequality." Colleen Sheppard, Equality Rights and Institutional Change:
Insights from Canada and the United States, 15 ARiz. J. IN'L & COMP. L. 143, 156 (quoting
Andrews v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1989] S.C.R. 143, 164). Canadian courts further acknowl-
edge that "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality...." Id.
(quoting Andrews, [1989] S.C.R. at 169). Canadian jurisprudence has also revealed "a
willingness to accept a more substantive and less formalistic approach to equality and
an explicit rejection of the similarly situated test." Id.
280. See CEDAW, supra note 62.
281. Id. art. 1.
282. Id. art. 2.
283. Id. art. 10 (c).
284. Id. art. 5. CEDAW further requires states to "ensure the full development and
advancement of women." Id. art. 3. It also allows states to establish affirmative action
programs or "temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality be-
tween men and women .... " Id. art. 4. Additionally, CEDAW obliges states to take
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An important feature of CEDAW is that it recognizes that equal-
ity did not exist between women and men.285 In doing so, it looked
behind the formal legal declarations of equal and fair treatment of
people to the actual conditions of women's lives; that is, it looked to
the substance of women's lives as compared to men in determining
whether equality existed and found it did not.286 As such CEDAW
forced states to acknowledge women's inequality and then to correct
it or to justify or deny that women's secondary status existed.
The promotion of gender equality also marked a shift, perhaps
unrecognized at the time, in equality jurisprudence more generally.
The fact that CEDAW sought to promote equality and increased
awareness that equality did not already exist made promoting gender
equality in society, at the level of principle, explicit. Gender equality
became a value and a condition to which countries were not just to
aspire but also to work toward. This idea of promoting equality is cap-
tured in the U.N. Human Rights Committee's adoption of General
Comment No. 28, which, although seeming to reiterate an already
known position, actually takes this position explicitly for the first
time. In it, the Committee notes:
The obligation to ensure to all individuals the rights recognized
in the Covenant, established in articles 2 and 3 of the Covenant,
requires that States parties take all necessary steps to enable
every person to enjoy those rights. These steps include the re-
moval of obstacles to the equal enjoyment of such rights, the edu-
cation of the population and of State officials in human rights,
and the adjustment of domestic legislation so as to give effect to
the undertakings set forth in the Covenant. The State party must
not only adopt measures of protection, but also positive measures
in all areas so as to achieve the effective and equal empowerment
of women.2"7
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in remarriage and to ensure equal-
ity of women and men in freely choosing a partner, to enter marriage based on consent,
and to freely decide the number and spacing of children. Id. art. 16. Moreover, CEDAW
requires states to provide equal rights to women in acquiring nationality and to ensure
equal access to education, id. art. 10, employment, id. art. 11, and health care, id. 12, as
well as equal opportunities for women to represent their governments and formulate
government policy. Id. arts. 7-8. The convention also pays particular attention to the
issue of trafficking against women, id. art. 6, and to "the particular problems faced by
rural women." Id. art. 14.
285. Id. pmbl.
286. Id.
287. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 28, Equality of Rights between Men
and Women (Article 3), U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 179 (May 12, 2003).
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This language builds on a shift perhaps started with CEDAW but em-
phasized and further explained in later women's conferences, includ-
ing the World Conference to Renew and Appraise the Achievements
of the United Nations Decade for Women (Nairobi Conference),288
the United Nations International Conference on Population and
Development (ICPD),289 and the Fourth World Conference on Women
(Beijing Conference) .29 A more general shift in philosophy regarding
the promotion of equality also began to emerge in some U.N. member
countries.29' Additionally, this shift within the gender equality ideal
288. For example, the Nairobi conference noted that equality meant not only legal
equality and "the elimination of de jure discrimination, but also equality of rights, respon-
sibilities and opportunities for the participation of women in development, both as bene-
ficiaries and as active agents." Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise
the Achievements of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and
Peace, World Conference, July 15-26, 1985, Nairobi, Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies
for the Advancement of Women, 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 116/28/Rev. 1 (1986), available
at http'J/www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/nfls/Nairobi1985report.txt [hereinafter Nairobi
Forward-Looking Strategies]. The Nairobi Conference report also explained that:
Equality is both a goal and a means whereby individuals are accorded equal
treatment under the law and equal opportunities to enjoy their rights and
to develop their potential talents and skills so that they can participate in
and can benefit from its results. For women in particular, equality means
the realization of rights that have been denied as a result of cultural, insti-
tutional, behaviourial and attitudinal discrimination. Equality is important
for development and peace because national and global inequities perpet-
uate themselves and increase tensions of all types.
Id. at 11.
289. The International Conference on Population and Development notes that "men
play a key role in bringing about gender equality since in most societies men exercise
preponderant power in nearly every sphere of life." International Conference on Population
and Development, Sept. 5-13, 1994, Cairo, Programme of Action of the International Con-
ference on Population and Development, 4.24, U.N. Doc. AICONF.171113 (Oct. 18, 1994).
290. The Beijing Platform explains that "[e]quality between women and men is a
matter of human rights and a condition for social justice and is also a necessary and
fundamental prerequisite for equality, development and peace." Fourth Conference on
Women, Sept. 4-15, 1992, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20, Annex II (Oct. 17, 1995). The Beijing Declaration gives substance to the
idea of promoting equality by requiring governments to ensure "equal access to and
equal treatment of women and men in education," by recognizing the need to increase
women's access to health care, and by promoting women's economic rights and indepen-
dence, including actions to provide access to employment and control over resources.
Fourth Conference on Women, Sept. 4-15, 1992, Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action, 15, 17, 30, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20, Annex I (Oct. 17, 1995).
291. For example, Canadian jurisprudence interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms understands the Charter as promoting equality. See, e.g., Andrews v. Law
Soc'y. of B.C., [1989] S.C.R. 143, 171. Although Canadian women have fought for this
interpretation, the idea of promoting equality was not limited to promoting equality
between women and men but to promoting equality throughout all Canadian society. Id.
In South Africa, the constitution seeks to "promote the achievement of equality," commit-
ting itself to, among other things, both a non-racist and non-sexist society. S. AFR. CONST.
1996, art. 9. Other newly enacted constitutions throughout Africa contain language that
encompass this shift. See, e.g., UGANDA CONST. (1995).
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is important because, in recognizing the disadvantages embedded in
current social orderings,292 the ideal justifies a focus on the results
of specific decisions, policies, and programs.293 It thus concerns itself
to some degree with outcomes.294
Third, women's global activism around the gender equality ideal
has begun to promote an understanding of affirmative action as a nec-
essary and complementary measure geared toward promoting equal-
ity, as opposed to a deviation from equality.295 CEDAW approved the
use of affirmative action measures to "accelerate" equality, which
"actions are not considered discrimination, 296 adding steam to this
notion. One can also view affirmative action policies as a key measure
in attempts to effectuate economic, social, and cultural rights by bring-
ing more women to the decision-making table and by applying these
policies to certain non-state actors.2 97 Later international conferences
also advanced this matrix of ideas.29" Regarding the participation of
women in international bodies, the Nairobi conference report specifi-
cally refers to the phrase "affirmative action ."2' The Beijing Platform,
292. Interpreting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1979).
293. See Cook, supra note 278, at 137.
294. Id.
295. Women's global activism as manifest in the Nairobi and Beijing conferences ad-
vanced the idea that affirmative actions measures should be used, at a minimum, to correct
societal imbalances in the status of women. See infra note 298.
296. CEDAW, supra note 62, at art. 4.
297. See, e.g., Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e.
298. The Copenhagen, Nairobi, and Beijing conferences all reiterate that affirmative
actions measures should be used, at a minimum, to correct societal imbalances in the status
of women. The Copenhagen conference states, for instance, in paragraph 50:
Governments should, where appropriate, design certain special transitional
strategies and establish compensatory mechanisms aimed at achieving equal-
ity of opportunity in education, employment and health as a means of over-
coming existing inequalities in national administration, the educational
system, employment, health services and the like, it being clearly under-
stood that the special strategies are designed to correct imbalances and
discrimination and will be phased out when such imbalances and discrimi-
nation no longer exist.
World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and
Peace, Copenhagen, July 14-30, 1980, 50, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.94/35 (1980).
299. The Nairobi Conference report notes:
All bodies and organizations of the United Nations system should therefore
take all possible measures to achieve the participation of women on equal
terms with men at all levels by the year 2000. To achieve this goal, the secre-
tariats of the United Nations and all the organizations and bodies within
the system should take special measures, such as the preparation of a com-
prehensive affirmative action plan including provisions for setting inter-
mediate targets and for establishing and supporting special mechanisms...
Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, supra note 288, at 358.
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on the other hand, uses a variation of the European term "positive
action" for affirmative action programs."0
Fourth, in the development of the gender equality ideal, the con-
cept of gender mainstreaming also emerged, a process that has both
institutional and policy implications. Gender mainstreaming pri-
marily requires that all programs and policies be evaluated for their
impact on women and men as gendered individuals,30 ' but it has
also encouraged the creation of new institutional frameworks to
ensure gender analyses and parity between women and men.0 2 The
precursors to the idea of gender mainstreaming appear as early as
the Nairobi conference, °3 but the notion did not specifically emerge
300. References to positive action are in the sections on education. Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Action, Annex II, supra note 290, at 80(c). In regard to political
participation, the Beijing Platform provides that governments should:
Commit themselves to establishing the goal of gender balance in govern-
mental bodies and committees, as well as in public administrative entities,
and in the judiciary, including, inter alia, setting specific targets and imple-
menting measures to substantially increase the number of women with a view
to achieving equal representation of women and men, if necessary through
positive action, in all governmental and public administration positions ....
Id. at 190(a).
With regard to women and the economy, the Beijing Platform asserts that affirmative
action is to be a mechanism for women to access social and economic resources. For in-
stance, actions to be taken by government employers and others include "[i]mplement[ing]
and monitor[ing] positive public- and private-sector employment, equity and positive action
programmes to address systemic discrimination against women in the labour force ......
Id. at 178(f). The Beijing Platform further provides that governments should: "[d]evise
mechanisms and take positive action to enable women to gain access to full and equal
participation in the formulation of policies and definition of structures through such bodies
as ministries of finance and trade .... Id. at 165(d). These ideas reinforce the gender
equality ideal's commitment and focus on effectuating equality in society and on results
as the measure of women's advancement.
301. Gender mainstreaming is
[t]he process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programmers, in all areas and at all
levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and ex-
periences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring
and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and
societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is
not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Economic and Social Council for
1997, at 27, U.N. Doc. A/52/3 (Sept. 18, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 ECOSOC Report].
302. See Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, supra note 290, at 7 1-5.
303. See Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies, supra note 288, at 16. These precursors
include three aspects that would later develop into gender mainstreaming: 1) including
women's perspectives on issues and policies; 2) using gender analyses as a mechanism
for taking into account concerns of both women and men but also assessing the differ-
ential impact of policies on men and women; and 3) developing institutions to monitor
and ensure gender analysis at all levels of government and policy making. The Nairobi
conference report alludes to these ideas, noting:
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until the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.304
The Beijing Platform further solidified the concept of gender main-
streaming, noting that member nations have made "important prog-
ress in achieving equality between women and men" and that some
governments "have established national machineries to ensure the
mainstreaming of gender perspectives in all spheres of society." ' 5
In 1997, the U.N. Economic and Social Council developed policies to
create an "active and visible" commitment to gender mainstreaming
throughout U.N. bodies as a part of implementing the Beijing Platform
for Action.0 6
Fifth, armed with the mechanisms of gender mainstreaming and
affirmative action within the gender equality ideal, women have at-
tempted to harness social and economic resources for the advancement
of women. They have fought to acquire these resources by crafting
arguments that rely on notions of gender equality and the indivisi-
bility of all human rights to justify directing resources to women and
placing them in decision-making positions, albeit with minimum suc-
cess. The Beijing Platform specifically advocated increasing women's
participation in the political arena.30 ' Gender equality thus potentially
The need for women's perspective on human development is critical since
it is in the interest of human enrichment and progress to introduce and
weave into the social fabric women's concept of equality, their choices be-
tween alternative development strategies and their approach to peace, in
accordance with their aspirations, interests and talents.
Id., at 16. The report further explains that it "is desirable that governmental depart-
ments establish a special office in each of them, headed preferably by a woman, to monitor
periodically and accelerate the process of equitable representation of women." Id. at 88.
304. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action noted the need to "mainstream"
women's human rights into the U.N. human rights body of work. World Conference on
Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 37,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993). The integration of women's human rights
requires a "revision of existing methodologies for monitoring and reporting and ...
reexamination of the legal framework to be applied." Sullivan, supra note 256, at 163.
305. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Annex II, supra note 290, at 25.
The Beijing Platform also provides three strategic objectives for achieving the further
implementation of gender mainstreaming. Strategic Objective H.1 calls for governments
to "[c]reate or strengthen national machineries and other governmental bodies" for the
advancement of women who have "the ability and competence to influence policy and
formulate and review legislation." Id. at Strategic Objective H.1. Strategic Objective H.2
is the integration of "gender perspectives in legislation, public policies, programmes and
projects." Id. at Strategic Objective H.2. Strategic Objective H.3 calls for governments
to "[g]enerate and disseminate gender-disaggregated data and information for planning
and evaluation."Id. at Strategic Objective H.3.
306. 1997 ECOSOC Report, supra note 301, at 28. The 1997 report also required all
U.N. entities to "institutionalize mainstreaming of gender perspectives at all levels." Id.
at 30. The U.N. Council noted that gender mainstreaming was to be applied everywhere,
and in particular, in policy analysis and development, research, technical assistance,
servicing intergovernmental bodies, and data collection, analysis, and dissemination. See
id. at 30-35.
307. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Annex II, supra note 290, at 1.
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embodies a vision of substantive equality concerned with justice and
with the "absence of major disparities in people's resources, political
and social power, well-being and [an absence] of exploitation and
oppression." ' Ultimately gender equality is a principle of political
justification that guides and directs the allocation of resources in favor
of women in light of their social inequality.
30 9
The gender equality ideal, however, has some drawbacks. First
it focuses attention solely on gender relations and therefore on
women's equality with men, resulting in several consequences. The
ideal makes men's lives and experiences the standard against which
* society measures equality.10 In this way it ignores the breadth and
depth of women's subordination as defined by their own biology, lives,
and experiences. 11 It also reenforces the male biases already inherent
in many social institutions,312 while simultaneously obscuring the
fact that because men are divided by race, class, and so on, some men
also experience oppression.313 This drawback raises the question of
which group of men's lives and experiences define social equality.314
The ideal similarly fails to recognize that women, like men, are sub-
ject to social cleavages of ethnicity, race, class, nationality, and other
characteristics. It thus precludes the possibility that one class or
race of women perhaps should be equal to another class or race of
women, limiting the many axes and social boundaries that the goal
of promoting the equal worth of every individual implies. 15 In other
308. Donna Greschner, Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality? 27 QUEENS L.J. 299,
303 (2001) (quoting J. BAKAN, JUST WORDS: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL WRONGS
46-47 (1997)).
309. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldon, Jurisprudence and Political Theory: The Substance of
Equality, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1350, 1358 (1991).
310. Catherine A MacKinnon, On Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
34 (1987) (suggesting that sex equality discourse contains a hidden male norm).
311. Otto, supra note 266, at 118-19; see also MacKinnon, supra note 310, at 36 n.18
and accompanying text (critiquing sex equality analysis in the U.S. and noting that, in
reference to the case of General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (now statutorily
superseded), women have been denied pregnancy benefits because women's equality is
understood to mean sameness with men, who do not need pregnancy benefits).
312. Charlesworth, Men's Rights, supra note 269, at 104-06 (noting that the gender
equality ideal limits women to a world already created socially and institutionally by
men, thereby constraining and in some ways eliminating women's ability to change and
transform institutions, practices, and norms that men have already created).
313. BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 18 (1984).
314. From an analytical perspective, the difficulties in forming comparative gender
groups simply may mean that certain women are only equal to similarly situated men,
even if these similarly situated men are poor and oppressed themselves. See Otto, supra
note 266, at 115-19, 133; see also HOOKS, supra note 313, at 18.
315. The idea of equality and nondiscrimination informs the idea of equal worth. The
UDHR recognizes and "reaffirm[s] their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dig-
nity and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women ....
UDHR supra note 259, at 72.
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words, the ideal does not recognize that some of the same social
systems that result in women's diversity also result in the myriad of
different ways in which society subordinates women. Second, the
gender equality ideal provides no roadmap as to how women should
overcome the divisions created by this diversity. Finally, the ideal of
gender equality remains contested in several social quarters.316 None-
theless, these ideas increasingly influence Kenyan women's activism,
and Kenyan women's efforts in pursuing women's solidarity across
their diversity calls for a broader understanding not only of gender
equality but also of equality among and between different women.
3. The Women's Political Caucus: Bringing Women's Voices
into the Advocacy for Constitutional Reform
The influence of the global women's movement on Kenyan
women's activism became clear during advocacy for a new Kenyan
constitution. This advocacy became another moment of focus and
unity in the women's movement, although brief, in the form of the
Women's Political Caucus. In particular the Women's Political Caucus
advocated for the inclusion of women in the constitutional reform
process on the basis of the gender equality ideal, including its focus
on affirmative action and gender mainstreaming.
Multipartyism in the 1992 Kenyan elections failed to remove
from power Daniel Arap Moi, the president, and the Kenya African
National Union party (the Moi-KANU regime).317 Many of the civil
society actors involved in the push for multipartyism had predicted
such an outcome.3"' Before the elections some of these actors had ar-
gued for the complete overhaul of the state, including its constitution,
to create an appropriate political system capable of allowing Kenyans
to attain their goals of social, economic, and cultural empowerment.319
These groups would later focus squarely upon the current constitu-
tion, which the British had created with minimal input by Kenyans
316. Cassel & Guzman, supra note 62, at 290, 293.
317. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 60.
318. MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING, supra note 58, at 37 (discussing how the
Coalition for a National Convention (CNC) tried to encourage the opposition parties to
boycott the elections and were not surprised when they lost). Mutunga also notes that
Maria Nzomo and Jayne Michuki drafted the gender provision in the preamble of the
Proposal for a Model Constitution, an effort that the Kenyan Human Rights Commission
initially led. Id. at 55, 68 n.16.
319. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 58-59 (describing the goals
of civil social society actors after the legalization of multi-partyism and quoting Odindo
Opieate, Of Phrase-Mongering and the Political Debate, NAIROBI L. MONTHLY, Sept. 1991,
at 4).
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and that had generated little allegiance from either ordinary Kenyans
or the elites who inherited it. Consequently, governing elites had
easily amended the constitution, transforming it into a document
that both centralized and personalized state power in the office of
the president.32 ° Furthermore, the state, perfecting the tools of re-
pression and economic extraction available to it under the current
constitution, had become increasingly repressive in the years preced-
ing multipartyism.321 Civil society actors had sought to change this
oppression, calling for a national convention for constitutional change
and later drafting a model Kenyan constitution. 2
The opposition parties within the civil society movement, how-
ever, had insisted on "minimum legal and constitutional reforms to
level the playing field" with the hope that they would then be able to
"capture... state power." 2' The Moi-KANU regime had refused to
make the kinds of changes that would enable democratic elections,
and this maintenance of the status quo, coupled with the fact that
the opposition parties were split into largely ethnic blocks fielding
their own candidates, doomed the hopes of regime change. 24 The
fervor and political activity for a new constitution thereafter increased,
initially led almost completely by civil society advocates.325
Women, both in groups and as individuals, were part and parcel
of this increasingly vocal civil society movement.3 2 ' Their efforts
320. Id. at 27-31 (discussing the amendments in the constitution that led to the centrali-
zation and personalization of state power). The first amendment declared Kenya a republic
with the president as head of state and commander-in-chief, changing the Kenyan state
from a quasi-federal system with a weak national prime minister answerable to and headed
by a governor-general who reported to the British monarch. Id. at 27-28. Later amend-
ments made it easier to "amend the constitution; declare a state of emergency; abolish
the right of appeal to the Privy council, the last court of appeal for current and former
British colonies; ... grant the President power to detain individuals without judicial
review; [and] abolish the bicameral parliament." Id. at 29. These amendments also pro-
vided that a presidential candidate be elected by a party, which, given KANUs status
as the only effective party, gave KANU a preserve on the presidency. Id. When Moi
became president in 1981, he further amended the constitution in several ways, one of
which was pushing through the enactment of the Section 2A amendment that outlawed
all political opposition and rendered Kenya a de jure one-party state. Id. at 33.
321. Id. at 58-63.
322. Id.; see also MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING, supra note 58, at 55, 68 n.16.
Mutunga notes that the Kenya Human Rights Commission's support of gender pro-
visions in the proposal for a model constitution blossomed into the establishment of the
group called the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change or the 4Cs. Id. at 46-64.
323. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 58.
324. Id. at 59-60.
325. See generally MUTUNGA, CONSTITUTION-MAKING, supra note 58.
326. For instance, the Kenya anti-rape organization and Wangari Maathai were a force
behind part of the Middle Ground Group who joined those supporting a national con-
vention as proposed by the Coalition for National Convention (CNC). Id. at 29, 43 n.20.
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however were largely fragmented until April 23,1997,327 when Phoebe
Asiyo, a woman and member of Parliament, put forward a motion in
Parliament calling for affirmative action for women in representa-
tion. 328 The motion proposed that the government introduce legis-
lation requiring that at least one-third of political parties' candi-
dates for local and national office be women (a percentage discussed
at the international level, including in the Beijing Platform) and that
funding go to this affirmative action policy." 9 The motion further re-
quired the government to introduce a constitutional amendment es-
tablishing two Parliamentary constituents per province exclusively
for women candidates.33 ° Many women's groups had rallied behind
the motion,3 ' but the overwhelmingly male Parliament unceremoni-
ously and crudely rejected it. 3 2
The motion's defeat marked the birth of the Women's Political
Caucus, an alliance that unified many of the women's organizations
and became the political force that carried women's concerns into
the forums advocating for a new constitution.333 Asiyo's motion came
after a declaration by civil society organizations, including the op-
position parties, that they would not participate in the 1997 elections
unless "'faciliatory' constitutional and legal reforms were imple-
mented. ' 34 The declaration arose out of the National Convention
Assembly (convened by the National Convention Executive Council
(NCEC)), an organization that included members who represented
various stakeholders, including "opposition party parliamentarians,
heads of religious institutions, representatives of trade unions, the
youth, various civil society organs and women. '335 NCEC thereafter
planned and implemented a number of mass rallies to make the
point.336
327. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 22. Women had not "collectively articulate[d] a
position on the constitutional reform process" prior to April, 1997. Id. However, given the
later events of that year, "1997 mark[ed] a watershed year in respect of pressing for
woman-friendly law reform in Kenya. 1997 [sic] is the year in which Kenyan women
finally collectively articulated their demands for inclusion in the constitutional reform
process." Id.
328. Id. at 52.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 58.
332. Id. at 52.
333. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 57-58 (interview with Dr. Wanjiku Kabira, convener
of the WPC, describing the motion brought by Asiyo and birth of the WPC from its
ashes).
334. Id. at 21.
335. Id.
336. These rallies took place between May and October, 1997. Id. at 27-28.
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In August 1997 in the NCEC's Second National Convention, the
Women's Political Caucus (WPC) presented a document entitled The
Women's Reforms Initiative - A Document of the Kenya Women's
Political Caucus, in which they made their demands for the inclusion
of women in the advocacy of constitutional reform and any process
established to accomplish this purpose.337 Significantly, the WPC's
demands included: that women make up half of any body charged
with constitutional reform; that under a new constitution, thirty
percent of the seats in Parliament be reserved for women; that the
government enact legislation to implement the Beijing Platform and
ratify Article 13 of the Women's Convention, providing Kenyan women
equal access to socio-economic benefits; and that the constitution
establish a gender equality commission.' All of the WPC's demands
echoed themes made throughout Kenyan women's past advocacy
and the global women's activism around women's human rights and
gender equality.
By September, however, Moi, hoping to thwart the progress of
the NCEC in its demands for comprehensive constitutional and
political reform, reached out to the opposition political parties. 39 He
then established a Parliament-based process for constitutional reform
over which the government had control. ° Called the Inter Parties
Parliamentary Group (IPPG),3 ' this effort shifted the constitutional
debate from civil society to Parliament. 2 This shift disadvantaged
women and women's groups because very few women held seats in
Parliament. 43 Nonetheless, the WPC, as well as FIDA, submitted
materials to this government-based process to ensure women's in-
clusion in constitutional reform.3" The IPPG, which later passed the
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act of 1997, accepted some of the
WPC's proposed constitutional reforms."' Notably, the IPPG amended
section 82(3) of the constitution to include sex as a prohibited basis
of discrimination.346 Nevertheless, Moi again won the elections in
December of 1997. 347
337. Id. at 22.
338. Id. at 64.
339. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 66.
340. Id. at 66; FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 29.
341. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 29.
342. Id.
343. Id.; see also FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 28.
344. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 29.
345. Id. at 29-30.
346. Id. at 30; see also Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A.
347. Moi Wins Disputed Kenyan Election, CNN, Jan. 3, 1998, http://www.cnn.coml
WORLD/9801/03/kenya.wrap/.
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The WPC continued to advocate for women's equal participation
in the constitutional review process 348 and became a significant
player in the process 4 9 when the IPPG enacted and then amended
the Constitution of Kenya Review Act in late 1998, under heavy pres-
sure.35 The Act established the constitutional review process and
provided that the review would be conducted through three organs:
a commission, district forums, and the national forum.35' The com-
mission was to be the primary organizing organ responsible for con-
ducting and facilitating civic education, collecting and collating the
views of the Kenyan people, and conducting studies and research on
constitutionalism," 2 for the purposes of preparing a draft bill to alter
the current Constitution (which would eventually become the Draft
Constitution). 3 The Commission initially was to consist of twenty-
five official commissioners (later changed to twenty-seven),3 4 thir-
teen commissioners selected from political parties, and twelve from
civil society including religious organizations.55 Of the civil society
348. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 32 (noting that FIDA and the WPC submitted
memoranda suggesting that "[g]ender equality should be one of the inviolable principles
guiding the constitutional review process and the new Constitution;" that half the
Commissioners should be women; that the chair and vice chair should be of different
sexes; and that civic education should be undertaken before the Commission collects public
views). Regarding gender equality the WPC suggested the Act be amended to read:
There is hereby established a Commission to be known as the Constitution
of Kenya Review Commission to facilitate the review of the Constitution by
the people of Kenya and eventual alteration of the Constitution . . to the
intent that the Constitution shall stand the test of time and -.. . exalt and
enshrine good governance under the rule of law, the values of human rights,
democracy and gender equality...
Id. at 32 (omissions in original).
349. Id. at 29.
350. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A; FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29.
351. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A § 2B.
352. Id. at § 10 (a-c).
353. Id. at § 26(7) (calling for the Commission to compile a report on its recommen-
dations and to draft a bill to alter the Constitution). This draft bill was interpreted to be
a draft of a new Constitution. This interpretation was subject to some debate and a
number of legal challenges. See id. at § 27.
354. Id. at § 7.
355. Id. at § 3. It reads:
(1) There is established a Commission to be known as the Constitution of
Kenya Review Commission.
(2) The commission shall, subject to subsection (3), consist of-
(a) the chairperson appointed in accordance with section 5;
(b) thirteen persons nominated by the political parties represented in the
Inter-Parties Parliamentary Committee of whom at least two shall be women;
(c) one person nominated by the Muslim Consultative Council and the
Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims;
(d) one person nominated by the Kenya Episcopal Conference;
(e) one person nominated by the protestant churches in Kenya as repre-
sented by -
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positions, women would occupy eight seats: five seats nominated
from women's organizations, two seats from political parties, and one
seat from other civil society organizations.356 The legislation specifi-
cally authorized the WPC to nominate the five commissioners from
women's organizations.3 57
The WPC's success in ensuring that women would be included in
constitutional reform would also contribute to its downfall. As a nomi-
nating body for the review commission, the WPC proposed and nomi-
nated five women to become commissioners. 3" Their nominations set
off a storm of dissent, led in part by the government and in particular
by Moi and his followers, who claimed in part that "rural women who
comprise the majority of Kenyan women would be without a voice in
the Commission because all the nominated [women] Commissioners
were urban and elite women." '359 Some women also dissented, particu-
larly a number of members of Maendeleo ya Wanawake, who argued
that the WPC's designation as the nominating body for women's
organizations was inappropriate because the WPC was not even a
registered women's group. 6° In addition, they complained that the
WPC had not included a person from the Rift Valley Province, the
largest province in Kenya. 36' These women filed an application for
judicial review challenging the WPC's status as the nominating body
for women and its selected nominees, an application that the court
later dismissed.362
(i) the National Council of Churches of Kenya;
(ii) the Seventh Day Adventist Church;
(iii) the Church of God;
(iv) the Kenya Indigenous Christian Churches;
(v) the Evangelical Fellowship of Kenya;
(f) five persons nominated by women's organisations through the Kenya
Women's Political Caucus of whom at least one shall be a woman with a
disability;
(g) four persons nominated by the civil society through the National Council
of Non-Governmental Organisations, particular regard being had to the youth,
the disabled, professional associations and the pastoralists in Kenya, of
whom at least one shall be a person with a disability and one a woman;
(h) The Attorney General or his representative who shall be an ex-officio
commissioner.
356. Id.; FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29. The WPC negotiated for these positions.
NGOs, political parties, and religious organizations initially dominated women's seats.
The WPC suggested that a significant number of positions go to groups representing
women qua women as opposed to other issues. FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29-30.
357. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A § 3(2)(f).
358. FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 30.
359. Id. at 31.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 30.
362. Id. at 31-33.
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Women were not the only group bickering over the nominations
to the review commission. Political parties were also fighting over
how many nominations each party possessed." This political bicker-
ing stalled the process for almost a year.3  In late 1999, two parallel
efforts were launched to salvage and jumpstart the review process,
one by Parliament and the other by civil society. 65 Although the WPC
survived the nomination process, it would not survive the bifurcation
of the constitutional review process.
Parliament again amended the Constitution of Kenya Review
Act (the Review Act), this time establishing the Parliamentary Select
Committee to oversee the constitutional process and the review com-
mission." It created a slightly different review commission consisting
of fifteen commissioners, of which only three would be women, a de-
crease from one-third to one-fifth.361 Opposition leader Raila Odinga,
a long-time politician from the second largest ethnic group in Kenya
and head of the National Development Party (NDP), headed the Par-
liamentary Select Committee." The NDP had entered into a marriage
of convenience with the Moi-KANU regime, in many ways further split-
ting the opposition parties. 9 Civil society, for its part, established a
parallel constitutional review process under the stewardship of the
religious communities, called the Ufungamano Initiative."' This ini-
tiative, decrying the government process as "anti-people," structured
its process and selected its commissioners on the basis of the meet-
ings that had informed the 1998 amendments to the Review Act.37'
The WPC came out in support of a "people-driven" constitutional
process and in opposition to what many saw as Moi's plan to control
the process through Parliament. 7 ' This support was not unanimous,
however, and the WPC leadership thereafter also split over which
constitutional review process to support.
3 73
363. Id. at 35.
364. FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 36.
365. Id.
366. ANNE MURAGU NYABERA ETAL., SETING THE PACE: THE 1999/2000 FIDAANNUAL
REPORT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF KENYAN WOMEN 12 (FIDA 2000) [hereinafter FIDA
2000].
367. Id.
368. International Press Institute, 2000 World Press Freedom Review, http://www
.freemedia.atcms/ipi/freedom detail.html?country=/KWOOO1/KW006/KW0160/&yea
r-2000 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006); Raila Odinga: Official Website, http://www.raila2007
.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
369. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 70.
370. FIDA 2000, supra note 366, at 12-13.
371. Id. at 13.
372. Id. at 14; Judith Achieng, Rights - Kenya: Women's Political Caucus Calls for
People-Driven Constitution," GLOBAL INFORMATION NETWORK, Nov. 15, 1999.
373. Tervil Okoko, Kenya's Women Major Political Lobby Group Cracks Ranks, PAN-
AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, July 7, 2000, http'J/www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/36/202.html.
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Although many factors contributed to the spilt in the WPC,3 74 a
catalyzing movement occurred when Asiyo, the chair of the Caucus,
refused to take up her nominated seat on the Ufungamano-led con-
stitutional review commission.375 Asiyo planned to run on the NDP
ticket in the future, a party that had been a major supporter of ef-
forts on gender matters.3 76 Asiyo explained her reluctance to take
the nomination by stating 'there was need for the two reform ini-
tiatives to work together."'377 In response, several members of the
WPC's Credentials and Management Committee called for Asiyo's
resignation. 378 These members included Dr. Wanjiku Kabira, the
initial convener of the Caucus; Martha Koome, the FIDA chair-
person; Abida Alia of the Association of Muslim Sisters in Kenya;
and Gichugu Member of Parliament Martha Karua." 9 They argued
that "the fundamental issue bringing together the [WPC] members
was ensuring the women's agenda in a people-driven Constitutional
review process. '3 ° The divide had ethnic undertones as Asiyo and
Raila Odinga belonged to the second largest ethnic group in Kenya,
the Luos,381 whereas Kabira came from the largest ethnic group in
Kenya, the Kikuyu (as did former president Kenyatta). 82 When Asiyo
refused to resign, the Kabira group split from the WPC to form the
Women's Political Alliance.38 3
The split came during a year of potentially landmark gains for
women on the legislative front, including legislative movement on
affirmative action and equality.' The latter initiative unfortunately
374. Id. (stating that "the core of the bitter row is that the caucus has been operating
on the basis of [a] ladies' agreement, with no definite terms;" that the WPC suffered "a
despicable lack of communication among the leaders and the member NGOs;" that the
WPC lacked "operational structures and transparency;" and that the alliances on any
side of the split were forged among regional clusters that "smacked of ethnic chau-
vinism"); see also FIDA 2000, supra note 366, at 14 (noting that "lack of formal institu-
tional structures," among other factors, contributed to the split); FIDA 2002, supra note
105, at 5 (noting that the split came from within the Caucus but that its initial unity was
viewed with suspicion by conservative forces).
375. FIDA 2000, supra note 366, at 14.
376. Okoko, supra note 373 (commenting that "[tihis means she must go the Odinga
way" and making the connection that Odinga and Asiyo share the same ethnic affiliation).
377. FIDA 2000, supra note 366, at 14 (citing THE DAILY NATION, July 17, 2000).
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. (quoting THE DAILY NATION, July 17, 2000) (emphasis added).
381. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 22.
382. Id.; see also Okoko, supra note 373 (describing their groups' ethnic affiliations and
noting that "in Kenyan politics ethnicity is a great factor").
383. FIDA joined the Women's Political Alliance, as did The League of Kenya Women
Voters. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 11.
384. See Jacinta Sekoh-Ochieng, Year of Landmark Gains for Women, THE NATION,
Dec. 28, 2000, at 28, available at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/36/201.html
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also faced the protests of Muslim women.3 ' Although the WPC ceased
to be the powerful and unified force it had been, its work laid the
public and intellectual groundwork that informed what would later
become the campaign for "Safeguarding the Gains of Women" and its
principles of social justice, gender equality and gender mainstream-
ing.3" Nevertheless, its internal conflicts would continue to haunt
these efforts.
II. THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION
In September of 2002, the Constitution of Kenya Review Com-
mission (CKRC) released its Draft Constitution."7 The constitu-
tional review process had gotten underway in part due to the efforts
of Professor Yash Pal Ghai,3" whom Moi appointed as chair in late
2000.389 The commission's work was a boon for the inclusion of a
number of women's concerns, largely because of the efforts under-
taken by women through the WPC and other women's groups. 39 ° At
the same time, the release of the Draft was accompanied by a dra-
matic election campaign, the stunning results of which contained
the seeds of dissension that would hamper the consideration and
adoption of the Draft Constitution.
A. Constitutional Review Underway
Professor Yash Pal Ghai, as chair of the Constitution of Kenya
Review Commission (CKRC), spearheaded negotiations that resulted
in the merger of the parallel constitutional review processes," ' which
(stating that Parliament passed an affirmative action motion spearheaded by the WPC
and permitted introduction of an Equality Bill for consideration, which FIDA helped to
formulate). The Attorney General published both the Criminal Law Amendment Bill,
2000, which if enacted would "be a boon for girls and women seeking redress for sexual
violence," and the Domestic Violence Bill. Id. The Family Court was finally launched to
handle cases "related to custody of children, divorce, separation, burial disputes and legiti-
macy," as well as matters of guardianship, probate, alimony and the Married Women's
Property Act. Id. Finally, the President appointed a commission to review Kenya's land
law system. Id.
385. Id.
386. See Athena D. Mutua, The Constitutional Review Process: A Gender Audit of
"Bomas," in FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that four Civil Society Organisations
worked together to initiate the campaign).
387. Draft, supra note 3.
388. See Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 78 (stating that Yash Pal
Ghai was a constitutional law expert and human rights scholar who previously consulted
in the writing of other countries' basic laws).
389. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 6.
390. Id. at 13-18.
391. Id. at 6; see also Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 78-83.
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was codified in the again amended Constitution of Kenya Review Act
in 2001.92 The CKRC, with the Parliamentary Select Committee pro-
viding oversight as liaison between the CKRC and Parliament, began
its work after the negotiated Ufungamano members of the CKRC
were sworn in.393 Owing to Kenyan women's past advocacy, women
ultimately comprised seven of the twenty-seven CKRC commissioners,
one delegate from every district, and twenty or so delegates drawn
women's organizations and other civil society organizations, for a total
of approximately one hundred of the 629 delegates slated to attend
the National Constitutional Conference.394
Part of the work of the Commission was to collect views from
ordinary Kenyans about a new constitution.395 The views collected
from Kenyans registered general support for women's rights.396 Many
women's groups also submitted reports to the Commission for consid-
eration as part of this collection process. In addition, the Commission,
in its capacity of conducting studies and researching issues, included
a review of gender concerns in their review of constitutionalism.397
The Draft Constitution, issued in September of 2002, reflected this
support for women's rights and drew upon Kenyan women's past
advocacy, insights, and international norms,3 9 among other things,
in structuring provisions that sought both to empower and protect
women's participation in the Kenyan polity. As a result the Draft
itself was a watershed document for the potential realization of new
legal authority for women's rights and the ideal of gender equality
in Kenya.
B. The 2002 Elections
The release of the Draft Constitution accompanied a dramatic
election campaign season that saw a number of the most credible
opposition parties and their leadership unite under the National
Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK).399 NAK was the first opposition party
since 1992 that had a credible opportunity to oust KANU.4 °° KANU
392. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A; FIDA 2002, supra note 105,
at 6 (noting that the bill became law on May 24, 2001).
393. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 6-7.
394. Id.
395. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A § 17(b).
396. CONSTITUrION OF KENYA REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
KENYA REVIEW COMMISSION 56 (2002) [HEREINAFTER CKRC REPORT] (summarizing
"[t]hirteen main points from the people" and including "equal rights and gender equity"
in the list).
397. Id. at 50-53.
398. Id. at 99, 131, 139-40.
399. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 102-03.
400. Id. at 103.
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needed to choose a successor for Moi to run in the 2002 Presidential
election since the constitution barred Moi from seeking another term.401
Moi snubbed several senior KANU officials when he anointed Uhuru
Kenyatta, the son of late president Kenyatta, as his heir apparent
and ensured that Kenyatta became the KANU presidential candi-
date.4"2 Attempting to force Moi to alter his selection of Kenyatta as
KANU's presidential candidate, several of these senior officials, led
by Raila Odinga of the NDP party, formed the Rainbow Alliance.4" 3
Although the Alliance failed to sway Moi's decision, its open and
bold defiance of the Moi-KANU regime captivated the nation.40 4 In
an effort to capitalize on the public support of the LDP and to unify
Kenya's electorate, NAK and the LDP signed a memorandum of un-
derstanding in October 2002 to form the National Rainbow Coalition
(NARC), a coalition party.40 5 Inspired by the executive arrangements
contained in the Draft Constitution, NARC agreed that if it won the
elections, elected officials would divide cabinet posts equally between
the two parties and appoint Odinga to a newly created prime minister
position.4°6 Although NARC triumphed in the December 2002 elec-
tions, ending the almost forty-year rule and monopolization of state
power by KANU, its origins would negatively impact the process for
constitutional review.40 7
The election of Mwai Kibaki as president of Kenya and NARC's
majority sweep into Parliament rendered the Kenyan population
jubilant.40 ' President Kibaki failed however to fulfill the promise of
power-sharing with the LDP faction of NARC and placed mostly
NAK Parliamentarians and other old Kibaki stalwarts into the cabi-
net and other high-ranking government positions.409 These political
401. Id.
402. Id. at 104-05.
403. Id. The Alliance later formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Id.
404. Id. at 103-04.
405. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 105.
406. Id. at 105.
407. Id. at 138-39, 155,160 (discussing the election of NARC, the constitutional battles
between its warring factions, and the referendum defeat in November 2005). The author
argues that the conflicts around governing and the constitution were actually conflicts
within a corrupt political class that used state power for its own aggrandizement and
continuously fought about the rotation of positions as a means to continue to use the
state for similar purposes. Id.
408. Carnival Mood After NARC Boss Takes Over, THE NATION, Dec. 31, 2002, avail-
able at httpJ/www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/31122002INews/News3ll2 200214
.html; Odhiambo Orlale, NARC Crowds Cheer as GSU Officers Leave Moi Residence, THE
NATION, Dec. 31, 2002, available at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/3112
2002/News/News311220024.html.
409. Makau Mutua & Willy Mutunga, The First Hundred Days: A Report Card on
President Kibaki and NARC, in MAKAU MUTUA & WILLY MUTUNGA, EYES ON THE PRIZE
68, 69 (Athena D. Mutua ed., 2003) [hereinafter EYES ON THE PRIZE] (describing the first
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appointments infuriated the LDP members who claimed a breach of
the memorandum of understanding.41 ° This political infighting had
ethnic overtones as the different coalition partners had formerly
represented largely ethnic-based parties.41 The majority of Kibaki's
appointments were from his own ethnic group or from closely related
or affiliated groups, adding to the dissatisfaction.4"2 This infighting
carried over into the constitutional review process.4 3
In late April 2003, the Kibaki government reluctantly convened
the much-awaited National Constitution Conference.4 4 The new gov-
ernment, and particularly the executive branch, had entered office
under the old but current Constitution and appeared to have grown
comfortable with the extensive powers it provided.415 Nonetheless, con-
sistent with their campaign promises, NARC convened the National
Constitution Conference (NCC) to review the Draft Constitution
pursuant to the Review Act.41 The NCC consisted of 629 dele-
gates gathered from around the country, including all members of
Parliament, representatives from a host of civil society organiza-
tions, and elected delegates from each of the districts in Kenya.4"7
wave of President Kibaki's appointments as plausibly legitimate but describing his
second wave of appointments as consisting of "KANU stalwarts" and 'loyal cronies").
410. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 23.
411. Id. (noting that the Luo were loyal to Odinga and the LDP, whereas many of the
cabinet positions following the 2002 elections went to individuals from the Mt. Kenya
region, home to the Kikuyu. The Mt. Kenya region voted overwhelmingly for NARC).
412. Id.
413. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 112; see also A. Mutua,
Foreword, supra note 6, at 22.
414. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 44 (noting that the Kibaki government, which had
become comfortable with the broad executive powers provided under the current consti-
tution, seemed threatened by the idea of constitutional reform, an anxiety that mani-
fested itself as a hesitancy to convene the NCC).
415. Id.
416. Constitution of Kenya Review Act, (2001) Cap. 3A §§ 4, 27, 28.
417. Id. at § 27(2), providing The National Constitutional Conference shall consist of:
(a) the commissioners who shall be ex-officio members without the right to
vote;
(b) all members of the National Assembly;
(c) three representatives of each district, at least one of whom shall be a
woman, and only one of whom may be a councillor elected by the respective
county council in accordance with such rules as may be prescribed by the
Commission;
(d) one representative from each political party registered at the commence-
ment of this Act, not being a member of Parliament or a councillor;
(e) such number of representatives of religious organisations, professional
bodies, women's organisations, trade unions and non-governmental organi-
sations registered at the commencement of this Act and of such other interest
groups as the Commission may determine:
Provided that -
(i) the members under paragraph (e) shall not exceed twenty-five per cent
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The NCC met over the course of a year in three sets of four to six
week periods. Referred to as Bomas I, II, and III, the initial sitting
of the NCC was chaotic.41 Many factors caused this chaos, but one
involved the initial indecision about the format to use for debating
the Draft.419 The conference settled on a chapter-by-chapter review
of the Draft."' The second reason for some of the chaos was the in-
fighting in NARC that carried over into the conference.421 Bomas I
quickly became organized around ethnic groupings, owing in part to
the manipulation of delegates by the factious Parliamentarians, who
consisted of a full third of the conference.422 One of the central goals
for LDP politicians was to ensure that a new constitution enshrined
the powerful prime minister position that the Draft envisioned, a posi-
tion Raila Odinga hoped to eventually occupy.423 The NAK governing
faction vehemently opposed this position and eventually walked out
of the NCC.424 By this time two other controversial issues had emerged
involving the devolution of government power and the retention of
the Kadhi's courts." 5 These issues, together with the issue of the
prime minister's position, eventually stalled the entire process.426
Thirteen technical committees, organized by Draft chapter, began
reviewing their assigned chapters in Bomas II after completing the
debating phase in Bomas I.427 In Bomas III, the committees completed
their chapter reviews of the Draft and adopted suggested revisions.428
The conference as a whole then voted on the committee's recommen-
dations.429 It accepted the NCC's revised draft constitution, popularly
of the membership of the National Constitutional Conference under para-
graphs (a), (b), (c) and (d); and
(ii) the Commission shall consult with and make regulations governing the
distribution of representation among, the various categories of represen-
tatives set out in paragraph (e).
(3) The chairperson of the Commission shall be the chairperson of the
National Constitutional Conference.
(4) The quorum of the National Conference shall be one half of the members.
For a critique of the NCC delegation, see Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note
7, at 111-13.
418. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 42.
419. Id. at 42-43.
420. Id. at 35.
421. Id. at 43.
422. Id. at 43-44; see also Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 111; A.
Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 22-24.
423. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 116.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 142-44.
426. Id. at 142.
427. Id. at 116; see also FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 35.
428. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 116; see also FIDA 2003,
supra note 2, at 35.
429. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 116.
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known as the "Zero Draft," in March 2004 and forwarded it to Parlia-
ment.4 0 The Zero Draft retained the initial Draft's very powerful
prime minister position, with the balance of executive power going
to the appointed prime minister as opposed to the elected presi-
dent.431 LDP had triumphed. This issue, along with devolution and
the retention of Kadhi's courts, remained divisive within the NARC
government and throughout its review of the Zero Draft.
The fractious government spent over a year trying to re-negotiate
and review the Zero Draft.432 Having modified the Zero Draft, par-
ticularly the chapters regarding the executive branch and devolution,
among others, the government released a new draft (the Waco draft)
in August 2005.4s3 This draft was defeated in a countrywide referen-
dum, with the NAK government faction publicly supporting adoption
of the Waco draft as the new constitution for the country and the
LDP faction publicly advocating against it. 43 4 President Kibaki is
currently in the process of convening a committee of experts to advise
the government on what steps it should take regarding constitu-
tional review. The gains that women made as embodied in the various
draft constitutions hangs in the balance.
C. The Draft: Equality?
The Draft Constitution produced by the CKRC was massive, con-
taining some twenty chapters and almost three hundred provisions.'
It significantly reorganized and altered the balance of state power
by devolving power to multiple and increasingly local levels;436 de-
centralizing executive (presidential) power through the addition of
a powerful prime minister as the head of the cabinet;437 strengthening
430. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11.
431. Compare id. Art. 152 ("Authority of President") with id. Art. 172 (defining authority
of Prime Minister).
432. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 161-63, 168-75.
433. WACO DRAFT, supra note 12.
434. Jillo Kadida & David Mugonyi, Orange victory vow, DAILY NATION, Nov. 23, 2005
(discussing the proposals by the Orange No-Vote, consisting of the LDP, to enter into talks
with the Banana Yes-Vote, consisting of the NAK faction of NARC, on the future of the
constitutional process).
435. Draft, supra note 3.
436. Id. Art. 215 (devolving power to four local levels: villages, locations, districts, and
provinces).
437. Id. at Arts. 151(2)(a)(1), 170 (stating that the prime minister, in addition to being
the political party leader, is the leader of the Cabinet and presides over its meetings).
Under the current constitution, the president is the head of government. CONSTITUTION,
Art. 17 (1992) (Kenya) (making no mention of a separate Prime Minister position). Also,
under the Draft Constitution, the President can only dismiss the Prime Minister on a
vote of "no confidence" by Parliament, as opposed to the President's current powers, under
which the vice president and most other ministers serve at the pleasure of the president.
Compare Draft, supra note 3, Art. 174, with CONSTITUTION, Art. 16 (1992) (Kenya).
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the legislative branch;4 "8 and creating a second legislative branch, the
National Council, in addition to the National Assembly, Parliament.43 s
Furthermore, the Draft Constitution included "a comprehensive bill
of rights,"44 including the socio-economic rights of social security,
health, education, housing, food, water, and sanitation.44 ' The Draft
also proposed norms, institutions, and structures that would "democ-
ratize the [Kenyan] state." '442
The Draft Constitution addressed many of the issues for which
the Kenyan women's movement had advocated. For instance, it ob-
ligated the state to "ensure the fullest participation of women, the
disabled, and the marginalised communities... in the political, social
and economic life of the country. 443 It ensured the personal security
of everyone "from all forms of violence from either public or private
sources." '444 Although the Draft Constitution only required the state
to achieve "the progressive realisation" of its provisions for socio-
economic rights,445 many Kenyans saw these rights as crucial for
women because they are often "the providers of food, water, and
health care for their families." '446 In addition, the Draft provided that
women would represent one-third of elected and appointed govern-
ment positions447 and established a special constitutional Commis-
sion on Human Rights and Administrative Justice that included a
gender department, albeit not an independent gender institution."'
Unfortunately, although the Draft sought to implement the ideal of
gender equality,449 contained a provision providing for the equal pro-
tection and benefit of the law,450 and was undoubtedly informed by
equality precepts, it lacked an explicit commitment to equality as a
value. Specifically, equality was not a primary or basic tenet of the
2002 Draft, unlike two more recent constitutions enacted in Uganda
438. Compare Draft, supra note 3, Arts. 171(3), 175(1) (stating that Parliament must
approve appointment of Cabinet ministers), with CONSTITUTION, Arts. 16-17 (1992) (Kenya)
(making no mention of requiring Parliament's approval in granting the president authority
to make appointments).
439. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 105.
440. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 94; see also FIDA 2002, supra
note 105, at 15 (commenting that the bill of rights is "extremely broad").
441. Draft, supra note 3, Arts. 56-62.
442. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 94; see also Draft, supra note
3, Arts. 75, 279 (guiding courts on how to interpret the Bill of Rights and defining the
objectives of constitutional commissions).
443. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14(11).
444. Id. Art. 41.
445. Id. Art. 30(3).
446. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 38.
447. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14(12).
448. Id. Art. 288.
449. Id. Art. 288(3)(c)(I) (instructing Gender Commissioner to "promote gender equality
and equity").
450. Id. Art. 33.
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and South Africa, both created in the last decade." 1 For both coun-
tries, equality forms an intricate part of the intrinsic and explicit
values of their constitutions and their visions for society.
For example, the Preamble to South Africa's Constitution states:
"We... adopt this constitution.., to... [1]ay the foundations for a
democratic and open society in which government is based on the
will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law." '452
Chapter 1 of the South African Constitution, the Founding provision,
further declares that "The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign,
democratic state founded on the following values: Human dignity, the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms. 453 Similarly the Preamble in the Ugandan Constitution
states that the country is "[c]ommitted to building a better future by
establishing a socio-economic and political order through a popular
and durable national Constitution based on the principles of unity,
peace, equality, democracy, freedom, social justice and progress. ... "'
The Kenyan Draft Constitution in contrast makes no mention of
equality in the preamble.455 Furthermore, in the article listing the
founding values of the Republic, equality is noticeably absent.456 It
states:
The Republic of Kenya is founded on republican principles of good
governance through multiparty democracy, participatory gover-
nance, transparency and accountability, separation of powers,
respect for human rights[,] fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law.4"7
451. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996; UGANDA CONST. (1995).
452. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, pmbl.
453. Id. Art. 1.
454. UGANDA CONST., pmbl. (1995).
455. See Draft, supra note 3, pmbl., which states as follows:
We, the people of Kenya -
AWARE of our ethnic, cultural and religious diversity and determined to
live in peace and unity as one indivisible sovereign nation;
COMMITTED to nurturing and protecting the well-being of the individual,
the family and the community within our nation;
RECOGNISING the aspirations of our women and men for a government
based on the essential values of freedom, democracy, social justice and the
rule of law;
EXERCISING our sovereign and inalienable right to determine the form
of governance of our country and having fully participated in the constitution
making process;
Do adopt, enact and give to ourselves and to our future generations this
Constitution.
GOD BLESS KENYA.
456. Id. Art. 6(2).
457. Id.
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In fact, equality barely makes an appearance in Chapter Two.
It is only mentioned in relation to the idea of a state religion, declaring
that "[s]tate and religion shall be separate. There shall be no state
religion. The state shall treat all religions equally." '458 The notion of
equality makes its first significant appearance in Chapter Four, on
citizenship, in which all citizens of Kenya are "equally entitled to the
rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship," as well as its "duties
and responsibilities. 459
Equality is most noticeably absent among the principles, goals,
and values of the nation as articulated in Chapter Three, Article 14.
This chapter describes the Republic's responsibility for promoting
such principles and goals as national unity, recognizing diversity of
its people, promoting principles of democracy, eradicating corruption,
ensuring access to justice, promoting human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and ensuring the fullest participation of women, disabled
and marginalized communities, among others.461 As such, equality
is not an independent value in the Draft.462
Unsurprisingly, the Bill of Rights of the 2002 Draft contains the
principle of equality in the list of fundamental rights and freedoms.
In this respect it is similar to both the Ugandan and South African
Constitutions. The initial mention of the equality principle in this
chapter is unfortunately in Article 34(2) on the limitation of rights:
The provisions of this chapter on equality shall be qualified to
the extent strictly necessary for the application of Islamic law
to persons who profess the Muslim faith in relation to personal
status, marriage, divorce and inheritance.4"3
Thus the first rule articulated in the Bill of Rights regarding equality
as a principle is in fact a limitation on that principle.4"4 The actual
equality provision appears two articles later, providing that:
(1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and equal benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights
and freedoms.4"5
458. Id Art. 10.
459. Id. Art. 16 (a), (b).
460. Id. Art. 14.
461. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14.
462. Although arguably equality is included in the commitment to human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Id. Art. 14(17).
463. Id. Art. 31(4).
464. Given Muslim women's protests against the Equality Bill, Sekoh-Ochieng, supra
note 384, the drafter perhaps sought to embody the value of equality in various provisions
without explicitly calling attention to the notion. Regardless of their motivations, they
failed when they limited equality before ever defining it.
465. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 33.
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This language is typical of equal protection language.4 6 But un-
like the South African Constitution, the Draft contains no language
indicating a commitment to promoting equality.46 v Furthermore
little in the Draft indicates a substantive notion of equality or equal
protection. In the absence of an act to clarify its meaning, one could
interpret the Kenyan equality provision as referring simply to mere
formal equality. The anti-discrimination provision in the Kenyan 2002
Draft Constitution follows the equality provision in Article 34.468
The Kenyan women's movement promoted many notions of equal-
ity, and the 2002 Draft nevertheless reflects several of the interests
articulated by this movement. For example, the Draft captures the
idea of equal citizenship, 46 a concept expressed in women's literature
470
as well as in literature discussing constitutionalism and women.
The Draft also contains an article specifically establishing that women
should have the same rights as men and provides for what one could
characterize as affirmative action measures to bring about equality,
authorizing "reasonable facilities and opportunities to enhance the
welfare of women." '471 The article also specifically provides for the
equal right to inheritance and control over property and specifi-
cally prohibits any law, culture, custom, or tradition that undermines
466. Cf. UGANDA CONST., art. 21 (1995), which states in part:
(1) All persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political,
economic, social and cultural life and in every other respect and shall enjoy
equal protection of the law.
(2) Without prejudice to clause (1) of this article, a person shall not be dis-
criminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe,
birth, creed or religion, or social or economic standing, political opinion or
disability.
467. The Draft's language is almost exactly the same as the language in South Africa's
constitution regarding equality. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Art. 9. However, the South African
equality provision adds that "to promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvan-
taged by unfair discrimination may be taken." Id. The South African equality provision
then combines, in three additional sections, the principles of non-discrimination. Id.
Although some have suggested that this language does not explicitly call for substantive
equality, read together with the Equality Act enacted pursuant to the South African
Constitution, substantive equality is the goal. SHADRACK B.O. Gu'rro, EQUALITY AND
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 126 (Brenda Barron ed., 2001).
468. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 34 reads:
The state shall not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone
on one or more grounds, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic
or social origin, color, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture,
language or birth.
Article 34 later allows the state to take "measures designed to benefit individual or groups
who are disadvantaged." Id.
469. Id. Art. 16.
470. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
471. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 35.
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women's interest or status.472 These provisions go to the heart of
many of the issues that undergird women's inequality and with
which the campaign for Safeguarding the Gains of Women in the
Draft Constitution was concerned. Thus the Draft signaled poten-
tially new legal authority for women's rights and empowerment.
III. THE CAMPAIGN
A. The Birth of the Coalition
In the heat of the fall 2002 election campaign, Betty Maina of the
Institute of Economic Affairs quietly convened and hosted a group
of scholars, NGOs, religious leaders, and others to study the Draft
Constitution.47 Among this group were Yash Pal Ghai, the chairman
of the Constitutional Review Commission, and Willie Mutunga, execu-
tive director of the largest human rights organization in East Africa,
the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC),474 and the force be-
hind the meeting.475 Called "the Friends of the National Constitutional
Conference," the public nicknamed it the Palacina Group because its
members met at the Palacina Hotel in Nairobi.476 The group had some
twenty members who divided themselves into teams to study various
sections of the Draft including the structure of government, land and
environment, the leadership code, religion, and women/gender issues,
among others.477
A subcommittee of the group charged with reviewing the Draft
through the lens of gender produced a report, which, among other
things,4"' outlined a plan of action to ensure that NCC delegates
472. Id.
473. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 14-15.
474. See EYES ON THE PRIZE, supra note 409, at 2.
475. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 14-15.
476. Ken Opala & Macharia Gaitho, Why the Law Review Team Rose against Its
Chairman, THE SUNDAY NATION, Jan. 19, 2003, available at http://nationaudio.com/
NewsfDailyNation/19012003/Comment/19012003324456.html.
477. The groups were Representation, Land and Environment, Structure of
Government, Peace & National Security, Women/Gender, Religion, Strategy, Public
Finance, and Leadership Code.
478. The Gender Report to Palacina noted two issues regarding language on gender.
The first question was whether the draft constitution should use the word gender and,
if so, whether it should appear consistently throughout the document in addition to the
word sex to refer to biological sex. FRIENDS OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
FERENCE, GENDER REPORT TO PALACINA 1 (2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter
PALACINA GENDER REPORT]. It suggested that the phrase men and women replace generic
terms such as people to emphasize that the constitution applied to both genders. Id.
Second, the report questioned whether the notion of substantive equality should somehow
be introduced into the Draft. Id. The Report further identified three significant concepts
to maintain and strengthen in the Draft: affirmative action, gender mainstreaming, and
2006] GENDER EQUALITY IN THE KENYAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 67
would consider and retain gender provisions in the final constitu-
tion.479 These strategies included soliciting leadership from one of
Kenya's women's groups to lead an organized and concerted effort
in support of women's rights.4" This subcommittee's work would
be one of the only endeavors that mushroomed into a full-fledged
constitutional campaign in the form of "Safeguarding the Gains of
Women in the Draft Constitution." In January, critics of Yash Pal
Ghai's leadership in the Constitutional Review Commission accused
the Palacina group of trying to take over the functions of the CKRC. 1
Although some CKRC and Palacina members engaged in heated ex-
changes in the press, the Palacina group quietly died.482
Women involved in Palacina later identified the Federation of
Women Lawyers of Kenya (FIDA) as the organization that might
best advance a program for advocating women's rights in the con-
stitution at the NCC. FIDA, a civil society membership organization
consisting primarily of women lawyers and law students,483 was
started in 1985 after the Third U.N. Conference for Women.4 Its
purpose is to "increase access to justice for women in Kenya" and to
"improve the legal status of women in Kenya."4" FIDA provides legal
an independent gender commission. Id. at 1-2. The Report also proposed several amend-
ments to the 2002 Draft covering chapters one through nine. Id. at 3-5.
479. Lynn Waneke was initially to head the group charged to review the 2002 Draft
through the lens of gender but was unable to attend many of the meetings. In late
November, Willy Mutunga approached the author to work on the gender section of the
group. He later also recruited Jacinta Muteshi, a consultant on gender issues who also
served on the board of the KHRC. Muteshi and the author combed the first half of the
2002 Draft and drafted proposals to improve it on gender issues, proposals that would
be the first and final report to Palacina. See id.
480. Id. at 2-3. The Report outlined the following steps:
1. Soliciting Leadership - letters to leading women organizations informing
them on what we have done, seeking advice on proposals and soliciting
leadership
2. Building and strengthening Coalitions with Muslim women and other
women groups
3. Building and strengthening Coalitions with Ufungamano and other
organizations
4. Preparing papers, fact-sheets, and information on gender issues
5. Hosting meetings, workshops, [and] educational fora for Parliamentary
and conference members, and parallel workshops/conferences before and
during Constitutional Conference.
481. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 14-15; Opala & Gaitho, supra note 476.
482. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 15.
483. FIDA Kenya, Rules for Application for Membership to FIDA Kenya, http://www
.fidakenya.org/oppmembership.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) (noting that there are
four categories of membership including student members, practicing women lawyers,
and honorary and affiliate members who become so through recommendation by the
governing body of FIDA).
484. FIDA Kenya, About Us, http://www.fidakenya.org/ababoutus.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006) (describing the organization and its objectives).
485. FIDA Kenya, Our Objectives, http://www.fidakenya.org/ab-objectives.htm (last
visited Sept. 21, 2006).
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services to women through its legal aid program.4" It is also commit-
ted to raising awareness about women's issues through its programs
on women's rights monitoring and advocacy, gender and legal rights
awareness, and public relations and fundraising.4"7 Like many organi-
zations, FIDA has conducted civic awareness programs to prepare
the citizenry for the CKRC's process of collecting views from Kenyans
on the constitution.4" They have also been leading participants in sev-
eral legislative efforts on behalf of women.4"9 These efforts included
drafting and promoting bills on equality and domestic violence.49 °
Members of the Palacina Gender Group met with the executive
director of FIDA, Jane Kiragu.49' Cecilia Kimemia, executive director
of the League of Kenya Women Voters (the League), was also present
at the meeting. Kiragu and Kimemia both saw the potential program
of educating NCC delegates on women's rights as a continuation of
their organizations' efforts on constitutional reform.492 Both FIDA and
the League agreed to take on the project, which Jane Kiragu dubbed
"Safeguarding the Women's Gains Under the Draft Constitution. 493
FIDA and The League immediately arranged for a consultative meet-
ing of various human rights and women-focused organizations on
February 7, 2003.49' Leaders of the project decided that FIDA, the
League, the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), and KHRC
would collaboratively form the core group of the coalition, with FIDA
as the head administrative organization.495 As primary leader of the
campaign, FIDA would supply the administrative support for the
coalition's work, including spearheading fundraising, providing office
space, personnel, and materials.4  In return each organization would
486. FIDA Kenya, Mission, http://www.fidakenya.org/ab-mission.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
487. Id.
488. A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 15.
489. See FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 7-8, 22-29 (discussing legislative efforts in which
FIDA was involved, including legislation for the Equality Bill and the Domestic Violence
(Family Protection) Bill).
490. Id. at 28-29.
491. Koki Muli, Jacinta Muteshi, and the author, all of whom were members of the
Palacina Gender Group, attended the FIDA meeting.
492. These reform efforts were in part captured in the document entitled Women's
Agenda for the Republic of Kenya, compiled by FIDA Kenya for the Women's Political
Alliance on September 9, 2002 and released at the same time as the Draft Constitution.
FIDA, WOMEN'S AGENDA FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA (2002).
493. See generally TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17. The campaign was originally
known as the "Campaign for Safeguarding the Gains of Women in the Draft Consti-
tution." Id. at ii. Noel Media, who printed the manual, changed the name during the
editing process.
494. Id. at 1.
495. Id.; A. Mutua, Foreword, supra note 6, at 15.
496. Meeting with FIDA, the League, IED, & KHRC, in Ufungamano House, Nairobi,
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coordinate any independent fundraising targeted for the constitu-
tional process with the coalition.497
The consultative meeting held at Ufungamano House provided
a big psychological boost for the campaign but foreshadowed future
competition among women's groups. As it turned out, another
women's group had scheduled a similar meeting and several of the
participants at Ufungamano House speculated that they had done
so upon learning about "FIDA's meeting." Nonetheless, thirty women
attended the consultative meeting from approximately twelve differ-
ent organizations.49 The attendees were extremely excited about the
project and divided themselves into working committees to focus on
the five areas of work that the workshop identified as needed. These
committees focused on conference procedures, lobbying and advocacy,
media, training, and technical aspects of the provisions in the Draft
Constitution.499 Only the technical and training committees ever
became fully functional,"' but the coalition left the meeting with a
strong mandate to pursue the project. Thus the Campaign for Safe-
guarding the Gains of Women in the Draft Constitution was born.
B. The Campaign's Training Manual: Social Justice, Gender
Mainstreaming, and Gender Equality
The training manual for "Safeguarding Women's Gains Under
the Draft Constitution" became the most comprehensive and signifi-
cant statement of the campaign's message. It defined the campaign's
principles, stated and explained the campaign's positions on contro-
versial issues, provided proposed changes to the Draft Constitution,
and provided the campaign's training exercises.5 ' The campaign's
newspaper Yawezekana, the only onsite newspaper that covered the
NCC, later supplemented the manual." 2
Kenya (Feb. 7, 2003); see also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1 (noting that FIDA
was the lead organization for the campaign).
497. Id.
498. The organizations represented were ABANTU, CRADLE, FEMNET, FIDA,
Hienrich Boll Foundation (HBF), IED, KWEC, KHRC, KUPPET, NARC (the governing
political party), The League, UON, and WRAP. FIDA, Report on A Consultative Work-
shop on "Safeguarding the Gains of Women in the Draft Constitution" (2003) (on file
with author).
499. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 1.
500. Minutes of Meeting on the Development of Training Materials for the Consti-
tutional Conference, in FIDA Kenya Offices, Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 26-27, 2003) (on file
with author); Minutes of the Training Committee Meeting, in League of Kenya Women
Voters Boardroom, Nairobi, Kenya (Feb. 10, 2003) (on file with author).
501. See generally TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17.
502. Several of the early editions of Yawezekana are available at http://www.fidakenya
.org/bomas-agender.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
70 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:001
The coalition decided early that it would make arrangements to
train the provincial delegates to the NCC. °3 Training the delegates
would provide the campaign members an opportunity to get to know
some of the delegates, particularly some of the women delegates.
This training would also expose a range of delegates to campaign
issues.0 4 Consequently, it became evident that the coalition required
materials on which to train these delegates; the group settled on a
training manual.
Meeting in late February, the core group of the coalition met as
part of the technical committee to draft the training manual.0 5 The
coalition decided that the manual would consist of three parts: train-
ing exercises; a section on background information, which would
include the principles, positions, and essays that explained and sup-
ported the positions recommended; and the suggested alternative
language to the Draft.50 6 The coalition also agreed that the primary
objective of the manual was to provide delegates with the tools to
participate effectively in the conference and to familiarize them with
the campaigns goals, objective, positions, and ideas.0 7
To prepare delegates to engage in the conference effectively, the
coalition began four significant training efforts. The first effort was
to simplify the conference procedures.' Believing that parliamentary
procedures could pose substantial obstacles to delegates' participation,
the coalition simplified these procedures and developed a set of exer-
cises that would provide delegates practice in using them.0 9 Second,
the coalition included in the manual exercises meant to explain the
purpose of constitutions in structuring governance and the govern-
ments' relationship to its citizenry.510 It also provided a historical
503. Id. at 1.
504. Id. at 1-2.
505. The core group at this point and until part II of the NCC consisted of Jane
Kiragu, executive director of FIDA; Edla Muga, a staff attorney with the League (who
singlehandedly simplified the conference procedure); Koki Muli, executive director of IED;
Jacinta Muteshi, board member of KHRC; Enid Muthoni, a staff attorney with FIDA; the
author, a consultant to the campaign and to the KHRC; Immaculate Muringo Njenge,
a staff attorney at FIDA and assistant to the campaign; and Wairimu Mungai, volunteer
and secretary for the campaign. Winnie Guchu, then a consultant to FIDA, led the manual-
drafting workshop. Joyce Majiwa, chair of FIDA from 2003 to 2004, contributed the
essays on equality as part of her role on the technical committee, as did Jane Kamangu
of CRADLE.
506. See generally TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17.
507. Id. at 1 (explaining in a section entitled "Campaign Justification" that delegates
to the NCC needed to understand the content of the Draft, language in the Draft, and
conference procedure to participate effectively).
508. Id. at 1, 4-10.
509. Id. at 4-11, 61-74.
510. Id. at 11-16.
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overview of constitution-making efforts in Kenya.511 Third, the manual
included a set of exercises to draw the delegate's attention to the
language in the Draft Constitution, language that, if implemented,
would stipulate the basic rules and arrangements for governance.
This section particularly focused on language about gender and gender
relations as a way of introducing the campaign's goals, positions, and
ideas.512 Finally, the manual included exercises to teach and test
lobbying skills, skills the campaign believed would be of crucial im-
portance to delegates who would have to persuade and lobby others
to their point of view during the conference.513
Writing the section of the manual on "Background Information"
helped to crystallize the coalition's specific ideas and positions. 14 The
first idea to emerge was the concept of the three key principles of
social justice, gender equality, and gender mainstreaming, principles
that would guide the coalition's efforts.15 Almost all of the coalition's
proposed improvements to the Draft advanced one of these three
principles.1 6 Each of these principles represented a distinct element
511. Id.
512. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 16-29.
513. Id. at 29-32.
514. Id. at 33-74.
515. Id. at 76. These principles represented a refinement of the ideas developed in the
Palacina Gender Report. There the ideas were gender mainstreaming and affirmative
action. PALAcINA GENDER REPORT, supra note 478, at 1-2. Here the concern for the Gender
Commission fell under the gender mainstreaming principle, equality was set out as a
separate principle, and affirmative action fell under the idea of social justice. TRAINING
MANUAL, supra note 17, at 76.
516. The manual includes twenty-nine proposed changes to the language of the 2002
Draft Constitution. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 77-94. One can group these
changes as follows:
Equality and Anti-discrimination Articles
Chapter Three: National Goals, Values and Principles
1. 14(10) - advances equality by including it among fundamental principles;
2. 14(11) - advances anti-discrimination by explicitly authorizing the social
justice measure of affirmative action;
Chapter Four: Citizenship, Article 19(1)
3. 19- supports equal citizenship for women and men and for their children;
Chapter Five: Bill of Rights
4. 31 - advances equality by eliminating limitations on equal rights; specifi-
cally, by requiring Islamic courts to adhere to the equality principle;
5. 34 - advances anti-discrimination by explicitly authorizing the social
justice measure of affirmative action;
6. 35 - advances equality by removing discriminatory stereotype from the
Draft's language and by authorizing affirmative action;
Chapter Nine: Judicial & Legal System
7. 199 & 200 - requires applications of Shari'a law to be consistent with
social justice and equality in fact;
8. 200 - advances equality by suggesting a right of appeal to non-Muslim
courts where the Kadhis court did not adhere to "the ends of social justice
and equality;"
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Chapter 11: Land & Property
9. 232 - advances gender equity by prohibiting "gender discriminatory laws,
regulations, customs, [and] practices related to land;"
Chapter 14: Public Service
10. 265- requires police to "avoid bias or discrimination with regard to...
women, marginalized and vulnerable groups or other sections of society;
Social Justice
Chapter Three: National Goals, Values, and Principles
11. 14(12) - emphasizes that goal of one-third principle is gender parity;
Chapter Five: Bill of Rights
12. 30 - establishes procedure by which government must prove that it
does not have the resources to implement a particular right and emphasizes
gender equity;
13. 39 - requires the State to provide representation to "disabled persons
in decision-making at all levels;"
14. 55 -gives pregnant women the right to reasonable working conditions
and to special protections against harmful work;
15. 76- extends right of fair representation in elections to "other margin-
alized communities;"
Chapter Six: Representation of the People
16. 77 - requires that eighty percent of a political party's "candidates for
proportional representation at public elections" be women;
17. 95-strengthens funding for political parties with promotion of women
candidates
Chapter Seven: The Legislature
18. 107 - proposing that the first eighty percent of Mixed Member
Proportional System nominees be women, representing all districts and
including "persons with disabilities, or who are youth and minorities;"
19. 109 - emphasizes that goal of one-third principle is gender parity;
Chapter Nine: Judicial & Legal System
20. 184 - ensures that justice be accessible to all men and women;
Chapter 10: Devolution
21. 226 - ensures that revenue distribution "include budgets that target
women and other marginalised communities;"
Chapter 13: Public Finance
22. 243 - requires allocation of resources "to enhance women's equality
and equity and develop mechanisms for compiling gender-disaggregated
statistics;"
Gender Mainstreaming: Articles
Chapter Nine: Judicial & Legal System
23. 147 - empowers Parliamentary Service Commission to "identify and
formulate gender equality guidelines for all parliamentary bodies and other
offices on which gender balance and fair representation must be realised;"
24. 194 - requires a gender-balanced bench;
Chapter Seven: The Legislature, Articles
25. 205 - empowers Judicial Service Commission to ensure gender
mainstreaming;
Chapter 10: Devolution
26. 213 - states that one of the purposes of devolution is to protect and
promote interests of women;
27. 230 - applies one-third principle to local governments;
Chapter 14: Public Service
28. 265- requires police departments to develop policies to combat domestic
violence and child abuse;
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of the gender equality ideal for which Kenyan women had historically
fought and was grounded in the rhetoric and strategies of global
activism for women's human rights.
1. Social Justice
The coalition defined social justice as a
commitment to policies, principles, structures, activities and mea-
sures that bring about just and fair social arrangements. These
measures and arrangements enable all people and communities
to live up to their full human potential and to actively participate
in and benefit from the social, economic, cultural and political life
of the country. Affirmative Action is a temporary form of a social
justice measure meant to remedy past and present discrimination,
promote equality, eliminate the effects of barriers to opportunity,
and create mechanism[s] to bring about equality, equity, parity
and justice.517
One of the primary goals of the social justice concept was to articulate
and justify the necessity of affirmative action in promoting women's
equality in Kenya. In particular it was to justify the one-third prin-
ciple, instituting women's representation as contained in the Draft. 1 '
The social justice commitment also embraced the campaign's support
of the Mixed Member Proportional representation system (MMP) also
employed in the Draft Constitution.519 Perhaps more importantly,
the social justice principle was a means to reach out to other groups
that might have seen the constitutional effort as an opportunity to
reorder the power relations among various ethnic groups.52 °
a. Rearticulating Affirmative Action
The campaign sought to re-articulate the issue of affirmative
action as a social justice issue by incorporating affirmative action
within the broader framework of social justice and justifying it as a
measure aiding in the creation of just and fair social arrangements.521
Chapter 17: Constitutional Commissions and Constitutional Offices, Articles
29. 287 & 288 - establishes separate Gender Commission;
517. Id. at 76.
518. Id. at 34-35.
519. Id. at 57-59.
520. Id. at 34 (defining social justice as "giving a chance to marginalised and dis-
advantaged groups to be visible in leadership in parliament, local authorities and other
structures of government").
521. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 76.
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Opposition to the one-third principle, voiced by several organizations
and individuals after the Draft was released in September, partly
motivated the move to recast, situate, and explain the concept of af-
firmative action as a social justice measure.522 One example of this
opposition was found in a pamphlet entitled A Gathering Storm
published by an association of Christian churches called the Kenya
Church.523 The pamphlet critiqued the "overemphasis on Affirmative
Action," arguing that this "overemphasis" could "easily affect the need
for hard work and merit."'524 Furthermore, in apparent reference to
women seeking positions of leadership and representation, it noted:
' There are dangers in the proposed reversal of the God given struc-
ture of the family, and specifically of the leadership role and position
of the man."'525 The pamphlet reserved its harshest critique for the
Kadhi's courts, which this federation wanted eliminated from the
Draft Constitution.
526
Other examples of opposition to the one-third principle were
found in newspaper coverage of the issue. For example, a newspaper
editorial by a young man railed against the one-third policy as an
unfair and undemocratic policy, arguing that "gender activism pro-
motes bias against men. 5 27 He suggested that the youth should stand
against affirmative action because they would be the ones primarily
hurt by it; that his future job should not be given to "an unqualified
woman;" and that women, like men, should have to run for elective
office on the same footing. 2 ' The manual includes a response to the
young man entitled Case Study on Social Justice, which likens his
response to a young white South African woman who, when seeking
admissions to a foreign educational institution, became enraged that
affirmative action plans favoring black South Africans might be in
place at the institution."9 The article notes:
[This young woman] seemed oblivious to the fact that the entire
social, cultural and political system in South Africa had been
geared toward ensuring the success of white students like her-
self... Met she seemed decidedly undisturbed by this fact or
that the vast majority of the most beneficial educational spots,
jobs, and previously occupied political positions had gone to whites,
522. See, e.g., id. at 37-39 (discussing one such article).
523. KENYA CHURCH, A GATHERING STORM? CRITICAL CONCERNS ON THE DRAFT
CONSTITUTION (2003).
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Athena D. Mutua, Case Study on Social Justice, in TRAINING MANUAL, supra note
17, at 37.
528. Id.
529. Id.
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even as she was profoundly disconcerted by affirmative action pro-
grammes designed to bring and ensure a fraction of those benefits
to qualified but disadvantaged blacks.
The young man in the article demonstrates the same blind
spot. He is unbothered by men occupying an overwhelming major-
ity of the governing, business and private positions in this society.
Yet he is incensed by proposed constitutional provisions seeking
to ensure that people, representing more than half the population,
earn at least 1/3 of the government positions.
530
The essay further chastises the gentleman for assuming that only
men constitute the youth and that women were presumptively un-
qualified for any particular position.53' It also notes that the young
man has increased potential access to political office, as compared
to a potentially more qualified woman, as the result of the unearned
and unfair privileges of being born male in Kenya. 32
The primary essay on social justice in the manual was originally
an essay by Technical Committee member Jane Kamangu justifying
and explaining the campaign's support of affirmative action. Kiragu
later edited and recast the essay as a social justice piece during the
course of writing the manual. 3 The revised essay gave examples of
other social justice measures (including Africanisation measures) that
the Kenyan government had previously implemented to remind the
public that many different groups had been beneficiaries of affir-
mative action.5 ' These affirmative action plans operated in a variety
of sectors comprising the educational, 535 economic,5 36 and political
realms. 3 7 Jane Kiragu commented while editing the essay that the
public might finally understand women's rights advocates' support
of affirmative action based on this recasting of the debate.
530. Id. at 38.
531. Id. at 39.
532. Id. at 37.
533. Jane Kamangu, Social Justice and the Constitutional Review, in TRAINING MANUAI,
supra note 17, at 34.
534. Id. at 34-35.
535. Id. (listing as examples the "quota system in the education system regarding
admission to national and secondary schools, tertiary institutions and others where,
through affirmative action, students have been admitted from marginal areas of Kenya
into national secondary schools with less points than those from high potential areas,"
and the "[d]ecision by joint Admission Board in 1997 to lower admission points for girls
to public universities by 1 mark").
536. Id. at 35 (noting the "Africanisation of the economy in 1965 during which Kenyan
Government adopted a deliberate policy to increase opportunities for Africans").
537. Id. at 35 (noting that in the political sector the following affirmative action policies
had been implemented: "[t]he 1998 Constitution of Kenya Amendment Bill regarding
nomination of commissioners," and "[t]he IPPG brokerage prior to the 1997 General
Elections that required 50 percent nomination of women MPs, leading to the nomination
of 5 women MPs in the current parliament").
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Although many Kenyans and NCC delegates firmly identified
the one-third idea as an affirmative action tool, the campaign saw the
one-third idea as a principle, a matter of equality and social justice. 1 8
Both were right: the one-third principle was a social justice measure,
but one meant to move the country toward equality.5 39 Through the
course of the campaign, however, the coalition found itself trying to
distinguish between the mechanisms (temporary affirmative action
measures that would result in women constituting at least one-third
of all elective and appointed offices) from the one-third provision as
a permanent social justice principle.54 ° As such they sought to cast
the one-third idea as a social justice provision to be permanently en-
shrined and maintained in the constitution as a constitutional prin-
ciple applicable to both women and men." The campaign viewed any
immediate mechanisms used to implement the one-third principle
as potentially temporary affirmative action policies that the State
could only eliminate after "parity had been reached." '542 The cam-
paign pushed this distinction with some measure of success. The Zero
Draft enshrined the one-third provision as a permanent principle,543
although many NCC delegates appeared not to make the distinction
in discussions.
b. The Mixed Member Proportional Representation
System: Implementing the One-Third Principle
The campaign began to conceptualize many of the other struc-
tural constitutional arrangements it supported as social justice mea-
sures, including the Mixed Member Proportional Representation
538. See Press Release, FIDA, Safeguarding the Gains for Kenyans in the Draft Consti-
tution, THE SUNDAY NATION, May 11, 2003, at 30-31, available at http://www.fidakenya
.org/news/news_090603_01.htm (identifying the one-third principle as an equality issue).
539. Id. (discussing one-third principle as a provision of equality and emphasizing that
"[tihe one-third principle is a principle!").
540. The Draft identified the one-third principle as a principle. For instance, Article
14(12) on the national goals, values, and principles states "[t]he State shall implement
the principle that one-third of the members of all elective and appointive bodies shall be
women." Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14(12).
541. See Press Release, FIDA, supra note 538.
542. In the manual, the coalition proposed the following alternative language for Draft
Article 14(12): 'The state shall implement the principle that at least one-third of the
members of all elective and appointive bodies shall be women, with the eventual goal of
gender parity and balance." TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 79 (emphasized words
represent the suggested alterations). Although the state could eliminate these measures
after reaching parity, it presumably also would have to reinstate these measures if neces-
sary to maintain a balance between male and female representatives.
543. ZERO DRAFr, supra note 11, Art. 12(2)j) (stating that the State shall "implement
the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of elective or appointive bodies
shall be of the same gender").
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system (MMP).544 The MMP system, proposed by the Draft Constitu-
tion and supported by the campaign, combined the two most common
electoral systems: the majoritarian system (or the first-past-the-post
system) and the proportional representation system. 45 Under this
system Kenyans would continue to elect 210 constituency repre-
sentatives to Parliament but would also elect an additional ninety
parliamentarians selected through party lists pursuant to rules for
proportional representation.54
Although the campaign supported the institutionalization of
the MMP system, 47 it went farther, proposing a radical use of the
proportional representation seats: that women occupy all ninety
seats! 48 The Draft went some distance in institutionalizing the one-
third principle by requiring that women occupy half of the new ninety
544. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 79.
545. Id. at 57-59. Under the majoritarian system, the candidate who wins the highest
number of votes in a constituency wins the election, regardless of whether that candidate
won a majority of the votes. Id. at 57. Under the PR system, an election ballot contains
only party lists, with voters voting for a party. Id. at 58. The parliamentary seats are dis-
tributed to the parties in proportion to the number of votes cast for each of the parties. Id.
Kenyan elections currently operate under the majoritarian system with 210 constitu-
encies. Id. at 57. In addition to the 210 constituency seats, the Kenyan system also provides
for twelve "nominated" parliamentary seats that are distributed to the parties in pro-
portion to the number of constituency seats won by party members. CONSTITUTION, Art.
33 (1998). The parties then nominate individuals of their choice to occupy the number
of seats they have captured. Id.
546. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 59. This system would allow Kenyan voters
to vote for an individual to represent their constituency (as part of the 210 members) and
vote for the party that they thought would best lead the nation (through party list). Id.
In this dual system, a voter might select a constituency representative from one party
but cast a proportional representation vote for another party. MMP provided a system
unlike the "nominated" parliamentarian system, in which a constituency vote automatically
counted as a vote for the party in which the constituency representative belonged. Id. at
59. The "nominated seats" feature of the Kenyan system made discussions about MMP
very difficult because many of the delegates saw the proportional representation elections
as simply an explosive expansion of the twelve nominated seats from twelve to ninety
seats. Id. As such these delegates believed the proportional representation feature simply
constituted additional seats into which the party bosses could place their friends. Id.
547. The campaign members, like the drafters of the 2002 Draft Constitution, saw MMP
as combining the best features of both systems. Id. at 33. The majoritarian system better
promoted geographical and group representation and allowed for the assessment of indi-
vidual candidates, thereby promoting accountability. Press Release, FIDA, supra note
538. The proportional representation feature, on the other hand, better reflected the idea
of "one-person, one-vote," promoted the building of political parties, discouraged gerry-
mandering, and encouraged voting across ethnic lines. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note
17, at 59. Proportional representation also tends to result in a greater number of women
being elected. Id. at 37.
548. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 33 (recommending that delegates "[s]upport
women occupying all new 90 additional seats in National Assembly"); see also id. at 84-
85 (suggesting that eighty percent of the proportional presentation list be women).
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proportional representation seats.549 It did so by requiring the party
list to alternate between women and men,550 an arrangement referred
to as the zebra.55' The Draft also required that thirty of the hundred
seats in a newly created second chamber consist of women.552
Under the zebra method women would constitute at most a mere
fifty-five seats out of a three-hundred-person Parliament."3 Although
fifty-five is considerably more than the number of women who have
ever served in Parliament,554 this result did not meet the one-third
principle. Implementing the one-third principle would entail women
occupying one hundred of the three hundred parliamentary seats, a
critical mass more likely to reshape the orientation of Parliament.5 5
Thus the coalition recommended that women constitute the first
eighty percent of all PR party lists, that these women represent a
different district until all districts were represented, and that the
lists include persons with disabilities, youths, and minorities.556 The
purpose of requiring each district to have a woman representative
was to ensure geographical and ethnic diversity of the women MPs
and to guard against the predominance of urban women.557 Further
the idea that the lists include women with disabilities, young women,
and minority women was a means to ensure that the overall goals of
the proposed proportional representation system in Kenya were met.55
549. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 107 (5)(b).
550. Id.
551. Elizabeth Powley & Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, Democracy and Governance, in
INT'L ALERT & WOMEN WAGING PEACE, INCLUSIVE SECURITY, SUSTAINABLE PEACE: A
TOOLKIT FOR ADVOCACY AND ACTION (2004), available at http://www.huntalternatives
.org/download/43_section4.pdf.
552. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 106 (1)(b).
553. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 60 (noting that although the Draft Con-
stitution guaranteed forty-five seats, it was unlikely that fifty-five other women would
be elected to result in one-third representation by women).
554. See Nzomo, Women's Movement, supra note 4, at 177 (reporting that "women con-
stituted only 1 percent of all MPs" in Kenya in 1992); FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 4
(discussing the election as part of its examination of the NARC political Manifesto). The
Kenyan people elected eight women to Parliament in 2002: seven from NARC and one
from KANU. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 4. Parliament included eight women in 2002,
four in 1997, six in 1992, one in 1988, two in 1983, and no more than four in any previous
elections. Id.
555. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 59-60.
556. Id. at 83.
557. Press Release, FIDA, supra note 538.
558. Id. This insight came from IED Executive Director Koki Muli, who was a consul-
tant on using a proportional representation system. The campaign also suggested that the
proposed government funding of political parties be tied more closely to the successful
recruitment and election of women representatives. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17,
at 84-85. These particular campaign suggestions reinforced the idea that social justice
was in part about the issue of representation.
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c. Attempting to Appeal to Others Through the Social
Justice Principle
Although the social justice principle sought to place affirmative
action in a broader framework, the principle also served in two ways
as a broad appeal to all who were concerned about constructing a just
and fair society. 59 First it recognized that these other communities
were constituted in part by women."8 ° By building solidarity among
women and seeking justice for women, the campaign sought justice
for all communities."' Second, advocacy of the social justice principle
provided a framework for embracing the concerns of a wide range of
communities on the fairness of current social arrangements. In this
sense it sought to appeal to people interested in reordering these ar-
rangements through the constitutional review process from their
own community perspectives. 62
For example, one could characterize the campaign's support for
maintaining Kadhi's courts in the Draft Constitution as an attempt
to reach out to Muslim women in particular but also as an attempt to
reach out to another community through women's concerns. By em-
bracing the needs of this "minority" community, the campaign broad-
ened its reach and demonstrated its concerns for other communities
while also deepening and reinforcing the rhetorical association of
women, the marginalized, and minority communities. The social jus-
tice concept potentially appealed to many of the various peoples and
ethnic groups in Kenya.563 However, because the recasting of affir-
mative action as social justice was incomplete, even in the minds of
the coalition, the affirmative action framework bound and limited a
broader conceptualization of the groups that might have understood
their concerns in a social justice framework.5" Affirmative action
559. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 76 (defining social justice as "measures that
bring about just and fair social arrangements... [and] enable all people and communities
to live up to their full human potential").
560. Id. at 40 (explaining that "women are concerned about the disabled, other disad-
vantaged groups, children, workers and the poor," and others because women constitute
half of all these groups worldwide and more than half of these groups in Kenya). The
manual also explains the concept of intersectionality and its implications for differently
situated women, and it argues that women are concerned about all of the issues in the
constitution because women are effected by all the issues contained therein and have
their own ideas about these issues. Id.
561. Id.
562. Id. at 40-41.
563. See, e.g., id. at 40 (discussing diversity among women and emphasizing the asso-
ciation of women with other disadvantaged groups while noting that women's "identities
are defined along political, social, cultural, racial, [and] ethnic ... lines").
564. The rhetorical association of women's rights with the rights and needs of margin-
alized communities and people with disabilities predated the campaign. For example,
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policies were understood as benefitting those whom society has dis-
advantaged. Thus to the extent that the affirmative action frame-
work continued to dominate discourse, it reinforced the positive but
limited link between women's rights and the rights of marginalized
communities and people with disabilities, groups that the existing
social structure had obviously disadvantaged.
2. Gender Mainstreaming
The campaign's central focus with respect to the principle of gen-
der mainstreaming was to secure an independent gender commis-
sion.565 Although the Draft provided for a gender department within
the Human Rights Commission,566 women's groups' past advocacy
had insisted on an independent entity."' The campaign also sought
to facilitate the operation of the gender commission and ensure that
gender issues would feature in all policy discussions by situating
the responsibility for gender awareness in several offices through-
out government.568
Article 14(11) of the 2002 Draft Constitution states: 'The Republic shall ensure the fullest
participation of women, the disabled, and the marginalised communities and sectors of
society in the political, social and economic life of the country." Draft, supra note 3, Art.
14(11). Furthermore, some have described the 2000 Equality Bill, which the Attorney-
General's office drafted in conjunction with FIDA and is pending in Parliament, as a
measure to "outlaw discrimination faced by various marginalised groups, in particular,
women, children, pastoralists, members of religious minorities and the disabled." FIDA
2002, supra note 105, at 8.
The campaign also used this language when discussing social justice. For example,
Kamangu's essay suggests that social justice means "giving a chance to marginalised and
disadvantaged groups to be visible in leadership in parliament, local authorities and other
structures of government." TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 34 (emphasis omitted).
In addition, the campaign's newspaper at the NCC, Yawezekana, often made reference
to women and the marginalized. See, e.g., Yawezekana Reporter, Affirmative Action:
Getting thc Real Picture, YAWEZEKANA, Sept. 8-10, 2003, at 2 (discussing the idea that
affirmative action is not just for the benefit of women but also for the marginalized and
disadvantaged, pastoralists, disabled people, etc.).
565. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 50-53.
566. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 288.
567. FIDA 1997, supra note 78, at 64.
568. See, e.g., TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 85-86 (proposing changes to Article
147 of the Draft that would empower Parliamentary Service Commission to "identify and
formulate gender equality guidelines for all parliamentary bodies and other offices on
which gender balance and fair representation must be realised"); id. at 86 (proposing
changes to Art. 184 of the Draft that would require the state to "ensure a gender sensi-
tive bench through providing ongoing education for judges on gender issues"); id. at 88
(proposing changes to Art. 205 of the Draft that would empower Judicial Service
Commission to formulate "guidelines, in consultation with the Gender Commission and
other offices, rendering decision-making, court processes, and the judicial culture, gender
fair"); id. at 90 (proposing changes to Art. 232 of the Draft that would require the state
to ensure gender equity in property laws); id. at 91 (proposing changes to Art. 265 of the
Draft that would require the Kenya Police Service to develop gender-sensitive policies).
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The Draft Constitution provided for a Commission on Human
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) that included a Gender
Commissioner and presumably a gender department within the con-
text of the commission. 9 The CHRAJ was to be an independent com-
mission with the mandate to "educate the public on its role, purpose
and functions;" to investigate complaints brought by individuals, their
families or other interested persons or organizations; and to "conduct
investigations, on its own initiative."57 Furthermore, like all of the
constitutional commissions, it had the power to establish branches
at the provincial and local levels.57'
Although the Human Rights Commission was strong and had
the kind of authority to investigate complaints that many women
thought important for an independent commission,"' the Draft did not
provide for an independent commission on gender. Women's groups
had historically advocated for an independent "Gender Equality
Commission," '573 and the campaign drew upon their arguments in pro-
posing the same. The campaign argued that Kenya lacked a national
policy on gender, that no state machinery existed with authority to
enforce measures or influence policies for women's advancement,
and that none of the sucessful efforts to improve women's lives had
resulted in a statutory institution (such as a government agency) to
ensure that the government consistently took equity issues into
account.574
The campaign's arguments suggested that an independent in-
stitution was necessary to address women's issues and that subsum-
ing gender issues under the rubric of the Human Rights Commission
might marginalize women's issues.5 75 Although the necessity of an
569. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 288.
570. Id. Art. 282.
571. Id. Art. 279(3).
572. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 17 (celebrating Article 73 of the Draft, which pro-
vided that persons acting in the Republic's interest could bring suits to enforce the Bill
of Rights); see also Draft, supra note 3, Art. 73. Article 282 similarly grants the CHRAJ
authority to investigate complaints and applies to suits brought to the constitutionally
mandated Human Rights Commission established in Article 288. Id. Art. 282; see also
TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 51 (listing duties of the commission to include exam-
ining human rights complaints brought by women, men, and other non-state actors, and
appointing special reporters "to investigate specific human rights concerns").
573. FIDA 1997, supra at 105, at 64.
574. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 50; see also FIDA 2002, supra at 105, at 18
(making a similar argument but noting that the executive branch included a Women's
Bureau that considered women's issues).
575. Cf. Penelope Andrews, Striking the Rock: Confronting Gender Equality in South
Africa, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 307, 330 (1998) (discussing the debate over the South
African Commission for Gender Equality and noting that its supporters believed that
only an independent commission could "deal comprehensively with women's issues").
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independent commission is implicit in the campaign's arguments, it
never fully addressed the issue of whether women's interests and the
interests of the country might better be served by an independent
gender commission or by integrating women's concerns into a human
rights framework institutionalized in the way the Draft Constitution
proposed.576 In defending the Palacina Group's integrated approach,
Yash Pal Ghai suggested (referencing the South African debate) that
women's issues might be ghettoized in a separate commission and
that, given the hostility to gender equality and the high cost of estab-
lishing several different independent commissions, a separate gender
commission might be underfunded and thereby marginalized. Further,
institutionalizing an integrated approach where gender issues are
part of human rights discussions promotes the idea of women's rights
as human rights. This approach presumably would help the Human
Rights Commission to develop "the means to cope with women's sub-
ordination so that the experiences and needs of women can be incor-
porated into a comprehensive and effective strategy to combat all
kinds of discrimination, no matter where they originate." '577
Nevertheless, the momentum for an independent gender com-
mission had built, bolstered by the NARC government's pledge and
initial steps towards establishing an independent gender commis-
sion.57 This momentum made the campaign confident that women
could secure an independent gender commission in the constitution,
and the campaign members therefore devoted little discussion to
whether this was the correct approach. The campaign was aware
however that the Commission could be marginalized and thus sought
to ensure that other constitutionally mandated mechanisms were in
place to facilitate the Commission's functioning and to ensure that
all government entities contemplated gender concerns in the design
of policies and program. The campaign accomplished this task by
proposing that the Judicial and Parliamentary Service Commissions
be responsible for facilitating gender issues and concerns.579
576. See id.
577. Andrews, supra note 575, at 331.
578. See FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 29 (noting that the Gender Commission es-
tablished by the NARC government was not constitutionally mandated and thus could
be proscribed).
579. The Draft would empower the Parliamentary Service Commission to "provide such
services and facilities as are necessary to ensure the efficient and effective functioning
of Parliament," Draft, supra note 3, Art. 147(3)(c), and "to undertake, singly or jointly with
other relevant authorities and organizations, such programmes as will promote the ideals
of parliamentary democracy." Id. Art. 147(3)(h). The Judiciary Service Commission is more
powerful than the Parliamentary Service Commission in that it recommends judicial ap-
pointees to the president; reviews and makes recommendations "on the terms of service
of Judges, magistrates and other judicial officers;" investigates complaints against judges;
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3. Gender Equality
The gender equality principle was different from the other two
principles in that it was to strike at the heart of an array of concepts,
traditions and practices that promote or result in gender hierarchies
in which women's lives are devalued, disadvantaged, limited or other-
wise oppressed. The campaign defined gender equality broadly as the
''equal valuing by society of women and men" and included ideas of
equality under law, equality of opportunities, and equality of out-
come.58 ° The equality principle required the government to recognize
and prepares and implements educational and training programs for judges, among other
duties. Id. Art. 205(1). The Draft also empowers the Judicial Service Commission "to
encourage gender equity in the administration of justice." Id. Art. 205(1)(g).
580. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 20-21. The manual first introduces the concept
of gender while explaining the concept of gender equality, noting:
Gender refers to the roles and responsibilities that society constructs,
assigns and expects of women and men on the basis of their biological and
physical characteristics. These expectations inform stereotypes.
Gender roles change over time ...
Gender roles and responsibilities are to be found in the economic, social
and political realms.
Gender is learnt and will vary within a culture and between cultures.
Gender roles are very affected by age, class, ability, ethnicity and race.
The term "gender" allows us to bring both men and women into our con-
stitutional discussions about equal participation, power and respect for all.
The manual continues, explaining that society's construction of gender roles and respon-
sibilities:
Creates unequal power relationships between women and men.
Labels women as inferior, undervalued and vulnerable.
Denies women full participation within society.
Places greater value on men's roles and functions and allow [sic] surplus
resources and benefits to be made available to men as a group.
Is a source of pleasure and creativity and other valuable things for both
women and men?
Id. at 19.
The campaign's definition of gender performs four functions. First it explains that gender
refers to those roles that society constructs based on biological characteristics. Society
defines gender based on biological sex, and the definition suggests that gender is at least
in part a social construction because gender roles change over time and vary within and
across cultures. Second, the definition attempts to make clear that the term gender applies
to both men and women. Society assigns roles to both men and women based on their
biological sex, and the term gender brings both men and women into the constitutional
discussion. Third, the definition seeks to promote women's advancement by noting that
current social constructions of gender roles create unequal power relationships between
women and men, label women as inferior, deny women participation in society, and place
greater value on men's roles. The logical conclusion is that society needs to include women,
equalize power relations, change or revalue men's and women's roles, and reallocate
resources. Fourth, the definition recognizes that both men and women (despite their de-
valuation and limited access to social goods) still consider their gender roles as a source
of pleasure, creativity, and other valuable things. Although one could argue that this in-
sight suggests that women enjoy their victimized positions, it instead explains that they
find joy in being women despite being devalued, that they often do not see their roles as
being devalued, or that in any case they value at least some of their roles. The statement
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and compensate women for their disadvantaged social status through
mechanisms such as affirmative action and the creation of other en-
abling conditions that would result in equality. 1 It also required rec-
ognition of the differing needs, interests, and requirements of women
and men.5"2 The campaign urged a "result-oriented contextual view
of equality" that would permit "both facially neutral and [gender] spe-
cific laws to be questioned for their impact on individuals or groups
of women, [and to] deliver defacto [sic] equality."'583 The campaign de-
manded substantive equality in accordance with notions embedded in
the gender equality ideal, and the campaign wanted to see results. 54
represents the diversity of women's reactions to their status and roles in society and the
contradictions within those views.
The campaign then defines equality and thereby gender equality. It explains equality
as:
The equal valuing by society of women and men. To ensure equality entails
the removal of discriminatory barriers. To move towards equality between
women and men, it is essential that a whole range of resources are made
accessible to both women and men in terms of: respect, participation in all
aspects of life, access to institutional power, wealth, control over one's life,
security etc. This enables women and men [to] realise their full potential.
Gender equality refers to:
Equality under law.
Equality of opportunities (rewards, access to resources that enable oppor-
tunities, etc).
Equality of outcome (recognising the differences in needs, interests and
requirements of women and men so as to ensure equity).
Id.
581. Id. at 20, 42-44.
582. Id. at 42-44.
583. Id. at 44 (quoting Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women's Human
Rights and Strategies for their Implementation, 21 BROOK. J. IN'L L. 799, 816-17 (1996)
(describing the Canadian Charter's equality provision).
584. The manual also captures the campaign's promotion of the broad idea of substan-
tive gender equality. Joyce Majiwa, The Right to Equality and Non-discrimination, in
TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 42. Majiwa, chair of FIDA from 2003-2004, explains
the complex notion of equality as embracing both equality of opportunity and equality
of results and critiques the notion of equality as simply "sameness." Id. at 42-43. She argues
that understanding equality as simply sameness or requiring the same treatment as men
results in men and their experiences being used as the standard of evaluation, obscuring
the biological difference between women and men and "the ways in which women's social
reality is very different from those of men." Id. at 42. This social reality is one of histori-
cally and socially created subordination and disadvantage. Id. Thus she suggests that
neutral laws that aim at sameness or symmetry where social reality is asymmetrical
simply perpetuate women's inequality. Id. Therefore she advocates for the "corrective
approach" to equality, which she characterizes as a "result-oriented contextual under-
standing' that takes women's particular disadvantages into account, remedies them, and
thus focuses on equality of opportunity, access to opportunity, and results. Id. at 44. This
corrective approach, she concludes, may sometimes mean that remedies will require
identical treatment of women to men. Id. In other situations, this approach may require
a remedy that acknowledges the social, political, and legal realities of women's lives. Id.
By using this language Majiwa demonstrates the campaign's awareness of the Canadian
corrective model as an emerging equality paradigm, which promotes substantive equality
as equality per se.
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The campaign's objective in adopting the gender equality prin-
ciple, however, was to ground and support the proposals it had for im-
proving specific provisions in the Draft Constitution. These included
proposals to strengthen the value of equality and especially gender
equality in the Draft, as well as strengthen the gender dimensions on
language related to inheritance, land, marriage, and the right to life.585
Although Kenyan women's past efforts inspired these proposals, they
also drew on ideas found in international law as developed by global
women's activism.58
a. Strengthening Equality
One of the first suggestions made to strengthen the principle of
equality in the Draft was to include gender equality as one of the basic
principles within Chapter Three, Article 14, on the nation's goals, prin-
ciples, and values.587 Determined not to alter the Draft rights and
fundamental freedoms."' Article 14(10) of the Draft Constitution
stated, "[t]he Republic is fully committed to respect, protect and
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms and enhance the
dignity of individuals and communities."8 9 This provision was inter-
esting because it stated a commitment to human rights and funda-
mental freedoms as the primary and motivating idea, and it sought
to include and potentially imply a balance between the individual
and community. The coalition sought to build upon this provision by
introducing the idea of equality between men and women as also
being a primary and motivating idea.5 s° The coalition proposed that
the article read as follows: 'The Republic shall respect, protect, pro-
mote and ensure human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the equal
protection and benefit of law for men and women and enhance the
dignity of individuals and communities."5 ''
The coalition further believed that it had to rephrase or elimi-
nate the limitation on equality in Article 31 to strengthen the equality
principle in the Draft.592 The limitation was very narrow. It limited
585. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 77-94 (proposing changes to the Draft
Constitution).
586. See id. at 45 (discussing equal rights of Kenyan women in the context of inter-
national law).
587. See id. at 78 (proposing changes to Article 14 of the Draft).
588. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 78.
589. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14 (10).
590. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 78. The campaign also sought to complement
the potential relationship between the individual and community by subtly suggesting that
individuals appear to be either female or male and together make up communities. Id.
591. Id.
592. Id. at 80-81.
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the principle of equality "to the extent strictly necessary for the ap-
plication of Islamic law to persons who profess the Muslim faith in
relation to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance." '593
This limitation posed a number of problems. First, given the
absence of the equality principle in the opening chapters of the
Draft and the limitation on equality even before the appearance of
an equality provision, the limitation seemed to devalue equality as
a principle or value. 94 Second, although the Draft language seemed
to make clear that equality was only limited with respect to Islamic
personal law, campaign members believed that courts might inter-
pret the limitation broadly because the Draft listed Hindu, Islamic,
and African personal and customary laws as sources of Kenyan law.595
Stated differently, some believed that the limitation could set a prece-
dent for its application to other personal or customary practices in
which people professed a belief.59 Such an interpretation could lead
courts to protect personal and customary laws that provided for prac-
tices such as inequitable inheritance policies, women's inability to own
or control land, wife inheritance, etc.597 Because this limitation pro-
vided a contradicting impulse, courts might use it to protect similar
practices despite the equality provision and the provision providing
specifically for women's equality in Article 35.595 Third, the limitation
on equality arguably allowed for the permanent unequal treatment
of Muslim women by the state.599
The concern that Muslim women would not receive the benefit
of equality worried core participants in the coalition (all of whom were
non-Muslim women), but all seemed to agree that Muslim women
were suspicious of attempts to impose foreign values on interpreta-
tion of Islamic law. 00 In fact, Muslim women had protested against
the 2000 Equality Bill, drafted by the Attorney General's office and
FIDA.6°' As such, tinkering with the limitation on equality posed the
problem of potentially dividing women across religious lines.60 2 The
campaign might have been inclined simply to avoid the entire issue,
but their awareness of the looming issue of the Kadhi's courts forced
593. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 31(4).
594. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 81.
595. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 5(1).
596. FIDA 2002, supra at 105, at 20.
597. See Kameri-Mbote, supra note 42.
598. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 35 (providing for equal treatment between women and
men, women's right to receive the same dignity as men, and equitable inheritance laws,
and prohibiting customs that undermine women's "dignity, welfare, interest[s] or status").
599. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 20.
600. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 81.
601. Sekoh-Ochieng, supra note 384.
602. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 81.
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them to confront the impact of their proposals on women's solidarity
across religious diversity. 3
b. Inheritance, Land, Marriage, and the Right to Life
The campaign was concerned about practices such as chastise-
ment of wives by husbands, wife inheritance, child marriages, and fe-
male genital circumcision. °4 They were particularly concerned about
inheritance practices, other practices that economically disadvan-
tage women in relation to property and land ownership, marital rela-
tions, and reproductive autonomy. 5 The Draft captured and reached
the heart of these matters in some limited way. For instance, with
regard to unequal inheritance arrangements and other customary
practices that disadvantaged women, Article 35 specifically provided
that "[w]omen and men have an equal right to inherit, have access to
and control property" and that "[a]ny law, culture, custom or tradition
that undermines the dignity, welfare, interest or status of women is
prohibited."60 6 On marriage, the Draft provided that "Every person
who is at least eighteen years of age ... has the right to marry, based
upon the free consent of the parties; and.., has the right to found
a family."60 7 Furthermore, it provided that persons in the marriage
are "entitled to equal rights in the marriage, during the marriage,
and at the dissolution of their marriage." 8 The Draft did not address
women's reproductive autonomy, but the campaign found relief in the
right to life provision that simply stated "Everyone has a right to life"
and abolished the death penalty.0 9
The campaign believed that the inheritance clause in the section
on women was a good beginning in the fight against unequal inheri-
tance practices for most of Kenya's women.610 They had conceded
this ground in regard to Muslim women upon their request, but the
campaign believed that customary inheritance rules were a primary
603. Id. at 54 (discussing how support of the Kadhi's courts was "one way to strengthen
that solidarity and commitment between [non-Muslim] and Muslim women").
604. FIDA had addressed these issues over the years. See, e.g., FIDA 2003, supra note
2; FIDA 2002, supra note 105; FIDA 2000, supra note 366.
605. See, e.g., FIDA, supra note 492, at 17 (lobbying for the new Kenyan constitution
to guarantee to every person "[e]njoyment of the highest attainable standard of health
including reproductive healthcare") (emphasis added); id. at 58-64 (describing govern-
mental finance reforms important to women); id. at 65-68 (describing eleven reforms
regarding women and land rights).
606. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 35 (on women).
607. Id. Art. 38(3) (on family).
608. Id. Art. 38(4).
609. Id. Art. 32 (on the right to life).
610. See, e.g., TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 46 (listing Article 35 as a provision
that advanced equality).
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obstacle to women owning land.611 Although a constitutional provision
might give women a basis for making claims against particular prop-
erty, the campaign was under few illusions that such a provision alone
would alter years of this practice. The campaign therefore proposed
an amendment to the chapter on land in the Draft Constitution.612
They proposed that the state's obligations to define and review a
national land policy include a duty to ensure "gender equity and the
elimination of gender discriminatory laws, regulations, customs, [and]
practices related to land."'13 Furthermore, the campaign later sup-
ported a proposal suggesting that marital homes be placed in both
spouses' names and that surviving spouses receive a reasonable
portion of the late spouse's property whether or not a will existed.614
The campaign calculated this provision to prevent marriage homes
from being sold from underneath women and to protect women from
being thrown off property after her spouse dies.
On marriage, the campaign thought the family provision in the
Draft was adequate. The family provision had an age requirement
and required consent of the parties.6 5 These two aspects of the pro-
vision seemed to address the problems of early marriage and forced
marriage. Although these provisions did nothing to address the under-
lying causes of both these practices, they could give individual women
a leg on which to stand when fighting a forced or under age marriage
and provide women's advocates a platform for creating other laws and
plans of action to attack these practices. In addition, FIDA discussed
fighting for legislation that would standardize marriage laws. 616
With regard to women's reproductive autonomy, the campaign
said little." 7 However, it quietly began working with several women's
health organizations that indicated they were prepared to fight
against the Christian forces that were insisting that the right to life
provision be amended. These religious groups wanted the provision
to read "Every person has a right to life from conception to natural
death."6 ' The campaign decided that to take on this fight publicly
might limit the overall effectiveness of the campaign given general
611. Id. at 90; see also Rosemary Okello, Land Matters for Women, YAWEZEKANA, May
29, 2003, at 3.
612. Id. (proposing alternative language to Article 232(2) on land policy frameworks).
613. Id.
614. See FIDA 2003, supra note 3, at 40.
615. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 38.
616. FIDA 2002, supra note 105, at 26-27. The family provision (Article 38) produced
little reaction among the public except that many religious groups wanted the consti-
tution to confine marriage to the union of a man and a woman, thereby making gay and
lesbian marriages illegal. See, e.g., KENYA CHURCH, supra note 523.
617. See generally TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17.
618. KENYA CHURCH, supra note 523.
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anti-abortion sentiment in the country. This sentiment exists despite
the fact that approximately one hundred Kenyan women die each day
from complications arising from abortions.619
The last of the campaign's ten 'Tentative Positions to be Rec-
ommended to Members" referred to these issues.62 ° It recommended
that delegates "[s]upport [the] Bill of Rights as currently written
with gender fairness inspired proposed changes."62' This hands-off
approach, while perhaps aiding the campaign in its overall struggle,
may have undermined its position on these issues because, consistent
with positions pushed by Christian forces, both the NCC's draft (the
Zero Draft) and the government-altered draft (the Waco Draft) pro-
vided that life "begins at conception," with abortion limited to save
the life of the mother or pursuant to laws enacted by Parliament.622
Furthermore, both of these later drafts limited the definition of mar-
riage as being between a man and a woman6 23 and replaced the age
requirement with the language of "adults."'624
C. Equal Valuing of Women and Men: Neutrality?
The campaign embraced one of the central features of the gender
equality ideal, which defined equality as between women and men.625
In this sense, as many feminist scholars have pointed out, women's
equality is measured against the experiences of men, as defined by
men, the favored and more powerful group.626 Although the develop-
ment of the gender ideal seems to have moved beyond this compara-
tive notion to address women's concrete lived experiences and the
specific types of subordination that women face, gender equality
viewed as women's equality with men has two other flaws that be-
came clear in the constitutional process.
619. Foetuses Spark Kenya Abortion Row, BBC NEWS, June 3, 2004, http://news.bbc
.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa13773913.stm (noting that abortion is illegal in Kenya and reporting
mortality statistics for women who receive illegal abortions).
620. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 33.
621. Id.
622. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 34 (allowing for the termination of an unborn
child only to save the life of the mother); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 35 (stating
that "[a]bortion is not permitted except as may be provided for by an Act of Parliament").
Both provisions leave open the possibility for a later fight for abortion rights. Whether
the Parliament as currently organized would yield a more liberal view regarding abortion
is unclear.
623. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 41 (3); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 42 (3).
624. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 41 (2); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 42 (2)
(noting that "every adult has the right.., to marry a person of the opposite sex, based
upon the free consent of the parties").
625. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 20, 42-44.
626. See, e.g., id. at 42.
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The first flaw was that, in explaining that gender referred to
women and men, the idea that the campaign was pursuing gender
equality to advance the empowerment of women in a largely patri-
archal order was lost. For instance, the provision for women's equality
was isolated in a single article to advance the status of women.6 ' By
the end of the Kenya National Constitution Conference however, the
delegates had renamed this article the "Gender" article with minimal
substantive changes.2 These changes potentially transformed the
article into a gender neutral article, eviscerating its purpose of ad-
vancing women's status and inadvertently reaffirming the status
quo. The revised article undermines the former women's provision
because laws, cultures, and customs that protect the status of men
are often dependent on the subordinated status of women. Stated
differently, in a patriarchal society such as Kenya, the status of men
is predicated in part on women's subordinate roles and positions in
society.629 To protect this status while supposedly also protecting
women's status potentially leaves the status quo untouched. This
language could have been unintentional and simply the result of poor
drafting, but it demonstrated the ease with which the concept of
gender equality could be transformed into a gender-neutral concept.
Second, the gender equality ideal did little to address the di-
versity of women. The campaign was aware of this problem and pub-
lished essays in response that explored the diversity of women.3 °
Although the campaign was committed to solidarity of women across
their diversities,63 in practice it faced a number of challenges to this
solidarity. The following section analyzes one such challenge that
went so far as to cause the campaign to question its commitment to
the principle of gender equality.
IV. ISSUE OF KADHI'S COURTS
In tackling the issue of Kadhi's courts, the coalition's commit-
ment to solidarity and diversity required it to listen respectfully and
to value the voices and experiences of the Muslim women whose be-
liefs were different from their own.6"2 Many Muslim women were
627. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 35 ("Women have the right to equal treatment with
men .... (4) Any law, culture, custom or tradition that undermines the dignity, welfare,
interest or status of women is prohibited.").
628. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 37 (entitled Gender and stating that "[w]omen
and men have the right to equal treatment including the right to equal opportunities in
political, economic, cultural and social activities .... Any law, culture, custom or tradition
that undermines the dignity, welfare, interests or status of women or men is prohibited').
629. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 37-39.
630. See, e.g., id. at 40.
631. Id. at 54.
632. Id. at 40, 53-57.
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suspicious of the campaign's views of equality and believed that the
preservation of Kadhi's courts was potentially a mechanism for em-
powering them.3 The coalition, in contrast, drawing on past Kenyan
women's activism, believed ideas of equality were their best route to
empowerment.6"4 In resolving this conflict, the campaign found that
it could use equality, as a strong normative value and understood as
a flexible and complex idea, to craft creative compromises that ad-
dressed the substantive needs of these different women. In this sense,
the ideal of equality gained its power from attention to the substan-
tive issues and needs of women rather than from a formal, univer-
salized, and absolutist principle. From the campaign's perspective,
the idea of solidarity itself was based upon a strong normative and
substantive value of equality, despite its controversial nature in the
context of conversations between Muslim and non-Muslim women.63
Substantive equality also viewed all women as having a voice in
policy formation, taking their differences and various views into
account.636 It also informed a broader view of gender equality.
On the issue of Kadhi's courts, the substantive needs of Muslim
women entailed a fight for rights on their own terms without the over-
riding precepts embedded in a country and legal system that were
largely non-Musim. 7 The coalition had to be willing to craft creative
compromises that reflected these differences. A substantive view of
equality aided this process, and promoting women's solidarity pro-
vided a strong incentive to find a compromise.
Kadhi's courts have a long history in Kenya and under the cur-
rent constitution.63 They have long been part of the Kenyan legal sys-
tem and part of the judiciary. 39 They apply Islamic personal law to
those who profess a belief in Islam." ° The Draft Constitution retains
633. Id. at 57.
634. Id.
635. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 57.
636. Id.
637. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54-55.
638. See Hassan, supra note 33 (discussing the history of Kadhi's courts on the coast
of Kenya). At Independence, although the British effectively controlled the coastal strip
of Kenya, the Sultan of Zanzibar maintained a claim to sovereignty over the Strip. Id.
"In 1895, the Sultan gave the British power to administer the 10 mile coastal strip sub-
ject to their respecting the existing Kadhis Courts among other conditions. The British
did so and declared a protectorate over the coast while the rest of Kenya was a colony
proper." Id. Hassan further explains that in 1961, two years before Independence, the
British government and the Sultan revisited the status of the coastal strip. Id. They
appointed a Commissioner to review the issues who later recommended that the Strip
should be a part of Kenya subject to the Kenyan government agreeing to respect the
existence of the courts. Id. The Kenyan government agreed, and the Sultan relinquished
his claim to sovereignty over the Coastal Strip to Kenya. Id.
639. Id.; see also CONSTITUTION Art. 66 (2000) (Kenya).
640. CONSTITUTION Art. 66 (5) (2000) (Kenya).
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these courts as part of the judiciary6" and authorizes them to apply
Islamic personal law in a manner not limited by the Draft's equality
provisions."' The Draft also expanded the jurisdiction of Kadhi's
courts to provide greater access to a growing population, to cover small
claims transactions, and to have appellate powers.64 The Muslim
community, including Muslim women, supported the retention and
expansion of the Courts in the final constitution.6' Muslim women
also advocated for provisions that would increase the required quali-
fications necessary for an individual to become a Kadhi, reasoning
that better qualified Kadhis rendered better decisions for women.6"
The campaign knew that the Kenya Church opposed the reten-
tion of Kadhi's courts, arguing that Kenya was a secular state and
that the constitution should not mention specific religions or reli-
gious institutions.646 It and other groups advocated instead for a
freedom of religion provision similar to the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 4 ' They also suggested that Kenyans
should be subject to the same single law and that non-Muslim
Kenyans should not have to pay taxes for a specialized religious
court. 8' The issue later proved so explosive that Ufungamano, the
organization viewed as largely responsible for giving birth to the final
constitutional review process, split over the issue. 9 Ufungamano orig-
inally consisted of leaders from the Catholic Church, the Protestant
National Council of Churches of Kenya, the Muslim Supreme Council
of Kenya, and the Hindu Council of Kenya."' Muslims pulled out of
the group on April 22, 2003.51
641. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 199.
642. Id. Art. 31 (4).
643. Compare id. Art. 200 with CONSTITUTION Art. 66 (5) (2000) (Kenya) (providing
that jurisdiction of Kadhi's courts extends only to "questions of Muslim law relating to
personal status, marriage, divorce or inheritance").
644. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 39-40.
645. Muslim advocacy groups made comments to this effect in many conversations
throughout the NCC.
646. KENYA CHURCH, supra note 523. The Kenya Church "is an inter-denominational
federation bringing together all major Church denominations and other independent
Church groups in Kenya." For more information e-mail info@kenyachurch.or.ke. Much
of this pamphlet addressed the "special protection and privileges" provided for Islam. Id.;
see also Juliana Omale, Separating Religion from Practice, YAWEZEKANA, May 22, 2003,
at 1-2; Arthur Okwemba, Voices of Delegates, YAWEZEKANA, May 22, 2003, at 2 (dis-
cussing the opposition to Kadhi's courts).
647. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 56.
648. Id. at 57.
649. Independent Catholic News, Kenya: Muslims, Christians Disagree Over Draft
Constitution (2003), http://www.indcatholicnews.com/kenmusc.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2006) (explaining the disagreement over Kadhi's courts).
650. See Human Rights Watch, World Report 2001: Kenya: Human Rights Developments
(2001), at httpJ/www.hrw.org/wr2kl/africa/kenya.html (describing the Ufungamano group
members and efforts in the constitutional reform process).
651. Independent Catholic News, supra note 650.
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Because Muslim women wanted to maintain the Kadhi's courts
in the NCC's draft constitution, the campaign had to decide whether
it would act in solidarity with Muslim women by reaching out to their
communities and supporting their demands." 2 This question was
made more urgent by the fact that the same Christian opposition that
opposed Kadhi's courts also opposed women's empowerment, partic-
ularly the affirmative action provisions in the Draft that advanced
women's rights to political participation.65 The campaign expected the
opposition to mount a ferocious fight. Women, they thought, needed
to be unified around the issue of women's empowerment and women's
rights. As such, after lengthy debate the campaign came out in sup-
port of Kadhi's courts.6"4 Their support rested upon on two primary
justifications that seemed to address the substantive needs of Muslim
women. The first was the idea that Muslim women perceived Kadhi's
courts, particularly on the coast of Kenya, as women's courts protect-
ing women's rights.6 5 The second argument was that the campaign
should support the protection and rights of a religious minority.6 6
In the end the campaign nevertheless had to confront and compro-
mise on the limitation on equality as applied to Kadhi's courts.
A. Kadhi's Courts as Women's Courts
Willy Mutunga, who was Executive Director of KHRC at the time
of the NCC,657 was the first person to raise the issue of the Kadhi's
courts and women's solidarity with the coalition. He argued that
Kenyan Muslims generally perceived the Kadhi's courts as women's
courts, particularly on the coast of Kenya where a large portion of the
Muslim community lives.65 He also noted that increasing numbers
652. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53-54.
653. See, e.g., KENYA CHURCH, supra note 523; Juliana Omale, Kadhis' Courts Steal
the Thunder from Chapter on Judiciary, YAWEZEKANA, June 5, 2003, at 11.
654. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53-57 (addressing arguments for and against
supporting the Kadhi's courts and justifying the campaign's decision to support them).
655. SUSAN F. HIRSCH, PRONOUNCING AND PRESERVING: GENDER AND THE DISCOURSES
OF DISPUTING IN AN AFRICAN ISLAMIC COURT 136-37 (1998).
656. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54-55 (stating that support of Kadhi's courts
"is consistent with women's concern for real justice. Just like women want real equality,
equity, and fair representation, Muslims want the real freedom to enjoy their religion").
657. See Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Profile of Dr.
Willy Mutunga, http://www.icj-kenya.org/default.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
658. Susan Hirsch agrees with this position but notes that Muslim men in particular
criticize Kadhi's courts as being "women's courts." HIRSCH, supra note 656, at 137 (dis-
cussing in the chapter entitled "Marital Disputing in Kadhi's Courts" the complex history
of the Kenyan Kadhi's courts, in which Muslim men at different times have viewed the
Kadhis and these institutions as collaborators of the state). Hirsch also notes that the
increasing success women have had in cases before the Kadhi's courts contributes to these
views. Id.
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of Muslim women were bringing cases to Kadhi's courts and win-
ning! 9 As women's courts, so the argument went, this institution pro-
vided an opportunity for women to make their voices heard66 ° and
provided Muslim women an opportunity to enforce favorable Islamic
provisions, particularly regarding maintenance. 61
The notion that Kadhi's courts in Kenya have proven relatively
helpful to Muslim women has some support. Since the 1970s, more
Muslim women have taken their marital complaints to Kadhi's courts
and the majority of women win their cases against their husbands. 2
Susan Hirsch notes that the number of cases filed in Kadhi's courts
in Mombasa and Malindi have increased since the 1970s and that 'in
Malindi, the number of divorces registered for 1985 and 1986 exceeded
the number of marriages.""66 Women bring most of these claims.6 4
Of the 129 legal claims filed in a twenty-month period in Malindi,
women brought 108, while men brought a mere seventeen. 5 Ninety-
three of the claims brought by women were for failure of the men to
"provide economic support of one kind or another."'666 Women won
42.5% of their cases, settled 39.8%, and lost only 1.9%, with 14.8 %
unresolved."7 Men, on the other hand, won 23.5%, settled 35.3%, and
lost 29.4% of their cases, with 11.8% unresolved.668 Furthermore,
most of the cases "won by women resulted in awards of maintenance
and/or dissolution of marriage. 669
The CKRC reached a similar conclusion on the value of the
Kadhi's courts. After considering the views collected from Kenyans,
the Commission noted:
[I]t was clear that for Muslims, [Kadhi's courts] had become a
symbol of their Islamic faith and culture but more importantly
for the Muslim women, the courts became an important site for
659. Id. at 127.
660. Id. at 137, 139-93.
661. Id. at 126 (explaining that more than seventy percent of the cases brought by
women in the Malindi Kadhi Court concerned maintenance). Hirsch explains that women
tend to bring strong cases by collecting evidence of strife over time and of having taken
their problems to other disputing contexts such as family, local elders, and spiritual
healers, all of which evidences their having persevered. Id. at 129. Some Muslim women
at the NCC argued that the Qur'an, presumably with regard to maintenance, gave them
more rights than equality rights would provide.
662. Id. at 125, 127.
663. Id. at 125.
664. HIRSCH, supra note 656, at 125.
665. Id. at 126.
666. Id.
667. Id. at 127.
668. Id.
669. Id.
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resisting the oppression experienced in marriage and in their
domestic circumstances in a traditionally patriarchal and male
dominated society. Through these courts, Muslim women have
succeeded in fighting for the protection and enforcement of their
rights as guaranteed under Islamic law and to challenge negative
cultural practices and customs of Muslim communities that tend
to undermine these rights. 70
This description of the Kadhi's courts interestingly suggests that the
courts are sites of women's resistance to patriarchal conditions, lo-
cating these conditions instead in "negative cultural practices and
customs," and presuming that Islamic law provides a remedy for
them. Whether many of these patriarchal conditions rest only in pre-
existing cultural practices and not in mainstream interpretations
of Islam is debatable.
Unlike the CKRC, Hirsch cautions against reading Muslim
women's increasingly successful use of the Kadhi's courts as entail-
ing resistance to male domination. 7 ' She argues rather that women
engage in acts of faith by petitioning Kadhi's courts. 72 They are dem-
onstrating their faithfulness to their religion while perhaps trying
to change their circumstances with regard to individual men.673 She
demonstrates that women in making their claims constitute them-
selves as gendered subjects through the narratives that they tell in
court. 74 These narratives are gendered because mostly women en-
gage in this linguistic form.67 Women often reference themselves in
these narratives as having complied with Islamic law through having
"persevered." '676 The idea suggests that whereas men are to maintain
women and exercise control over them, the women, who are being
maintained, are to "persevere." '77 Hirsch nonetheless concedes that
the accumulation of successfully pursued cases by women may in
the long term have some transformative effects. 78
670. CKRC REPORT, supra note 396, at 163; see also Walter Owuor, Judiciary and the
Kadhi's Courts, KATIBA NEWS, Jan. 2003, at 8-9 (discussing and analyzing the seventeen
questions regarding the judiciary that the CKRC proposed to Kenyans). Owuor notes that
of the 17,010 responses received by the CKRC, half came from the Coastal and North
Eastern Provinces, both of which have large Muslim populations. Id.
671. HIRSCH, supra note 656, at 136-37.
672. Id. at 137.
673. Id. ("Turning to Kadhi's Court affirms her connection to Islam, even as it calls her
piety into question and, simultaneously, constitutes her as a supplicant to the state.).
674. Id. at 139.
675. Id. at 91-92.
676. Id.
677. HIRSCH, supra note 656, at 91-92.
678. Id. at 129.
96 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 13:001
B. 'Real' Religious Freedom for Minorities
The second argument on which the campaign based its support
for retaining Kadhi's courts was that retention of the courts fur-
thered religious freedom and protected a minority religious group.
The campaign argued that support of Kadhi's courts was consistent
with women's concern for real, substantive justice.679 Just as women
wanted real equality and advocated for new mechanisms to imple-
ment that equality, the campaign argued that Muslims wanted real
freedom of religion.' In an overwhelmingly Christian country whose
cultural and religious understandings derived from the Christian
West, establishing true freedom of religion for Muslims required
mechanisms such as Kadhi's courts.681 The campaign argued that
these policies and institutions would result in substantive equality
and/or religious freedom and not simply freedom of religion and equal-
ity on paper.
The campaign reminded Christians that they had sought similar
policies and mechanisms in Islamic countries where Christians were
minorities.682 One specific example given by the campaign was the
situation in Albania when the government decided to compel free
public education for all children in 1934.' Although the proposed edu-
cation system was not religious education per se, Albanian Christians
saw this compulsion as resulting in an Islamic-oriented education
for their children and abridging their freedom of religion.6" They
fought for an exemption to this law and the right to educate their
children in their own schools. 8 5 In doing so, they implied that appli-
cation of a neutral law in the context of an Islamic, although secular,
state did not guarantee substantive freedom of religion.6 6 Similarly,
the campaign was committed to building and maintaining the social
justice institutions that would enable and guarantee real substan-
tive freedom for religious minorities, be they Christian or Muslim,
in Kenya or abroad.
Finally, the campaign attacked the idea that Kenya should adopt
a neutral freedom of religion provision like the First Amendment in
the United States Constitution.6 7 They implied that the absence of
679. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53-54.
680. Id. at 54.
681. Id.
682. See Omale, supra note 647, at 2.
683. Id. at 54-55; see also HENRY STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 96-97 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the Albanian
education case).
684. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54-55.
685. Id.
686. Id. at 55.
687. Id. at 56.
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Kadhi's courts in an overwhelmingly Christian state would operate
to disadvantage Muslims and their practices despite being a facially
neutral treatment of religion.' The campaign argued that "a Kenyan-
styled arrangement, which includes the Kadhis courts may be a supe-
rior arrangement in terms of real freedom of religion and social jus-
tice." '89 The campaign also used this argument to challenge Christian
opposition to women's rights, which these groups attacked as a foreign
idea to Kenya.6" The campaign suggested that these Christian groups
were the ones promoting foreign ideas while women strove to protect
indigenous institutions that had worked to foster peace between the
two religious communities.6 9'
In the final analysis the campaign refined and rephrased this
argument by replacing its emphasis on freedom of religion with em-
phasis on the notion of "protect[ing] a minority's way of life." '692 One
can understand this move as a signal of appreciation for the different
cultural practices of Kenya's more than forty various ethnic groups,
including pastoralists.693 From this perspective, society views Muslims
as a unified people instead of a group with differing religious beliefs,
and it draws upon understandings of the Muslim community as an
ethnicized cultural community complete with its own cultural and
social arrangements.694 Additionally, the idea of protecting the way
of life of an ethnic group that is culturally or religiously distinct may
have resonated with similar claims made by many Kenyan ethnic
groups to maintain their distinct cultural heritages and traditions.
The campaign shared this sentiment, recognizing women's diversity.
Specifically, the campaign acknowledged the reality that women are
688. Id.
689. Id.
690. See, e.g., KENYA CHURCH, supra note 523.
691. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53 (noting that the Kadhi's courts
"exemplif[y] the peaceful and co-existent relationships in [Kenya] between Muslim and
non-Muslim communities").
692. Press Release, FIDA, Safeguarding the Gains for Kenyans in the Draft Con-
stitution, THE SUNDAY NATION, May 4, 2003 (on file with author); see also TRAINING
MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54.
693. MSN Encarta, Kenya, http://encarta.msn.comlencyclopedia_761564507_3/Kenya
.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
694. Note that many scholars distinguish between cultural and religious beliefs. See,
e.g., supra note 671 and accompanying text (discussing the CKRC's description of the
Kadhi's courts and distinguishing between practices that Islam requires and the differ-
ent cultural practices found in some Muslim communities); Azizah Y. A1-Hibri, Is Western
Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World! Minority Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 41, 45 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (noting that as a Muslim woman
she "believes that many oppressive practices attributed to Islam are either cultural ones
or ones that resulted from a patriarchal interpretation of religious texts'). A1-Hibri criti-
cizes the conflation of distinct systems, arguing that some cultures/religions support
change and others reject it. Id. at 44-45. Islam, she argues, supports change of cultural
practices. Id.
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not simply gendered individuals but also inhabit identities that are
ethnicized, raced, religious, or otherwise constructed by factors that
represent social cleavages.695
C. Recasting the Limitation on Equality for Kadhi's Courts
Support of Kadhi's courts may have placed Muslim and non-
Muslim women in solidarity and demonstrated women's commit-
ment to respect all women's voices and experiences, but it did not
reconcile the fact that the Draft specifically limited the principle of
equality in authorizing application of Islamic personal law by Kadhi's
courts.696 Whereas Muslim women had determined that support of
Kadhi's courts was in their best interests, non-Muslim women had
agreed that equality provided one of the best avenues for their own
liberation and advancement.697 The question remained how to rec-
oncile the two views in the context of the Constitution.
The coalition first considered simply eliminating the limitation
on equality, arguing that all personal and customary practices should
be subject to equality. Removing this limitation would also remove
any ambiguity regarding the reach of personal and customary laws,
as they would apply only to the extent that they met the equality
requirements of the Constitution. From this perspective, the Muslim
community would simply have to figure out ways to apply their laws
in a manner consistent with equality. After all, the primary prac-
tices that would be affected were the inheritance laws that provided
roughly two-thirds inheritance for sons and one-third inheritance
for daughters, the permitted practice of polygamy, and the practice
of unilateral divorce.69 Several "liberal" Islamic countries had found
these practices inconsistent with Islam.699 This push from the equal-
ity principle arguably would have encouraged the Muslim commu-
nity in Kenya to consult the laws of these other Muslim countries and
rethink these practices.
The campaign decided that this tactic would probably alienate
Muslim women and rupture the solidarity sought across religious
lines through the campaign's support of Kadhi's courts.700 Further,
695. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40.
696. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 31(4).
697. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 54-56.
698. See Mazrui, supra note 109, at 310-18 (considering practices such as polygamy
and divorce in countries such as Pakistan and Malaysia and making a similar sug-
gestion); see also Bharathi Anandhi Venkatraman, Islamic States and the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Are the
Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1977 (1995) (discussing
the practices in many Islamic countries as related to their reservations to CEDAW).
699. Mazrui, supra note 109, at 310.
700. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 53-56.
2006] GENDER EQUALITY IN THE KENYAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 99
they reasoned that the inheritance rules arguably sought to provide
an equitable division of property because Islamic law requires men
to maintain the family and allows women to keep all of their resources
for themselves, resulting presumably in equality in fact if not in for-
mal equality. This argument was extremely problematic, but it pro-
vided a possible solution to the problem of equality as limited in the
Draft.70 The campaign's idea was to split the difference: eliminate the
limitation on equality, place authorization for application of Islamic
personal law in the judicial section establishing Kadhi's courts, and
subject application of Islamic law to an idea of equality in fact.
The coalition thus suggested removing the limitation from the Bill
of Rights and placing the authorization for the application of Islamic
personal law in the judiciary section. The campaign proposed changes
to Article 199(1) that added language of social justice and "equality
in fact."7"2 This addition was to signal that the concept of equality as
applied in the context of Islamic law was somewhat different than the
stated application of equality found in the Bill of Rights. The proposed
provision provided:
There are established Kadhis Courts, the office of Chief Kadhi,
office of Senior Kadhi and the office of Kadhi to apply Islamic law
to persons who profess the Muslim faith in relation to personal
status, marriage, divorce and inheritance, consistent with the ends
of social justice and equality in fact.7"3
The proposed new language introduced a more complex concept
of equality, one that was inspired by the notion of gender equality but
broader in scope in that it encompassed notions of substantive equal-
ity. Islamic personal law now appeared to be subject to the equality
provision of the Bill of Rights, a condition to which many Muslims ob-
jected.7 "4 The campaign hoped that this language would signal differ-
ent considerations for understanding equality as applied to Islamic
701. The idea was problematic in at least three ways. First, it basically left Muslim
women dependent on men, albeit male family members. See Mazrui, supra note 109, at
317. As such it did little to aid in any efforts to further Muslim women's economic inde-
pendence. Second, it presumed that men spent a substantial amount, or at least one third
of their inherited resources, in maintaining the family. Third, it ignored the fact that the
economy within which Kenyan Muslims lived most likely required that most of a family's
resources, both men and women's, were necessary to support their families. Id. The argu-
ment obscured the fact that some men might not in fact support their families while women
might not be able to enforce such provisions. It further ignored the issues of polygamy
and allowed unilateral divorce as permitted by Islam, practices which could not be so
easily accommodated to the requirements of equality. Id. at 310. Nevertheless, the argu-
ment began to open the door to a resolution of the issue. See generally id.
702. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 87.
703. Id. (emphasis added to indicate proposed additions).
704. Mazrui, supra note 109, at 310-11.
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personal law and provide the room for adherence to Islamic personal
law principles. One could interpret the provision as providing the room
to understand Islamic personal law as effectively resulting in equality,
even if some laws did not meet the standard of formal equality under-
stood as "same treatment.""5 This type of language could also encour-
age Kadhis to interpret Islamic personal law with social justice and
equality in mind.7"6
Finally the campaign hoped that Muslim women could employ
this language as an explicit alternative discourse in their battles to
make their voices heard. In other words, one could view this arrange-
ment as providing freedom of choice within a group that receives pro-
tection as a minority. It thus strikes a balance between encouraging
external protections, which help a minority group "reduce its vulner-
ability to the economic or political power of the larger society," and
limiting internal restrictions, which "restrict individual choice in the
name of cultural 'tradition."'7 7 As such one can view the proposed
language as seeking to support institutions and practices that facili-
tate women's equal choices in an atmosphere of more "traditional"
worldviews. Muslim women did not have to employ this language in
their battles; rather they now had a choice to use it. 70 The campaign
was unsure whether the language would have any of these effects but
presumed that, in any event, Kadhis would have the first opportu-
nity to interpret the Islamic rules under the new legal order requiring
equality in fact. To the extent that the Kenyan Muslims argued that
705. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 55, 87.
706. Id. at 55.
707. Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?
31 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999). Providing and facilitating choice becomes a way of
magnifying women's positions and concerns within those traditions and potentially encour-
aging internal dialogue. Id. at 31-32. Catherine Hardee employs Kymlicka's distinction
between internal restrictions and external protections in the context of Kenyan marital
law, which allows people to marry under a variety of marriage regimes ("one for each of
the major religions and a civil statute"), some of which are viewed as embodying gender
hierarchy and disadvantage. Hardee, supra note 167, at 718-21. She supports this arrange-
ment because it allows women to choose the marriage regime rules to which they would
be subject and to which they therefore consent. Id. Women's choices as to which regime
they consent become a way of voicing their concern, rejecting those regimes that they
believe hurt women, and agreeing to those they find most advantageous. Id. at 729-32.
Hardee does argue, however, that these choices are often meaningless because the pro-
cesses and systems to make the choices real or to enforce and register those choices are
absent. Id. at 732-39. Thus the market systems and processes needed to facilitate these
choices should be buttressed. Id. at 739-49.
708. Catherine MacKinnnon asks what limitation, if any, should be placed on the prin-
ciple of equality. MacKinnon, supra note 310, at 32. One answer could be that individual
choice may limit equality in some ways. Muslim women therefore should be allowed to
choose to be treated according to their religious faith over a principle of gender equality
between them and Muslim men, but these choices must be real and within the purview
of the vulnerable group.
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Islamic practices were fair and did not result in inequalities between
women and men, this legal provision would encourage them to craft
arguments that reflected this understanding."°9
The language of "equality in fact" further complicated the equal-
ity concept, introducing an entirely new facet of equality into the text.
If one read the Draft as a whole, this language had the potential of
turning the equal protection clause into a more substantive notion.
In this sense the recasting of the limitation on equality was similar
to the idea of affirmative action. Affirmative action permitted policies
and measures that would advance the interests of women and other
disadvantaged groups and thereby treated them "differently" to bring
about equality. "Equality in fact" permitted Islamic rulings that ap-
plied only to Muslims and thus treated them differently, as long as
the end result approximated equality and was consistent with the
notion of social justice. This limitation on equality differed from the
original limitation, which simply exempted Islamic personal law from
equality notions and implied that equality had no place in Islamic
personal law, contrary to what some Muslims suggested.
In the end, the Muslim community did not endorse the alterna-
tive language. They nevertheless welcomed the support of women's
advocacy around the Kadhi's courts issue and seemed to support the
campaign's other initiatives for women's rights.71 ° The solidarity
among women thus held for the moment.
V. PROTECTING A WAY OF LIFE: ETHNICITY, RESOURCES,
DECENTRALIZATION, AND DEVOLUTION
Wangari Maathai, an internationally known Kenyan environ-
mentalist and Nobel Peace Prize winner,' argued that Kenya was
not made up of one people but of several peoples.7 12 "I am a Kikuyu,"
she exclaimed as she went on to explain that being Kenyan did not
709. Several Muslim women argued that Islamic practices were fair and equitable to
some extent and provided greater rights and freedom for women than many of the cultural
practices of various Kenyan communities. For example, while Islamic personal law pro-
vided some inheritance rights for women, some African cultures completely prohibited
women from inheriting property. See supra text accompanying notes 92-104.
710. Chege Maina, Kadhis Court Issue Resolved Amicably, YAWEZEKANA Sept. 25-Nov.
16, 2003, at 3; Marceline Nyambala, Kadhis Courts: Women's Affordable Means to Justice,
YAWEZEKANA, Jan. 23-30, 2004, at 3.
711. For more information on Wangari Maathai and the Green Belt Movement she
founded, see The Green Belt Movement, http://www.greenbeltmovement.org/ (last visited
Sept. 21, 2006).
712. See Juliana Omale, Women Take Time Off to Heal, YAWEZKANA, June 5, 2003, at
12, available at http://www.fidakenya.org/reports/Bumper.pdf.
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negate the fact that she was Kikuyu in some fundamental way.71 She
further challenged whether the Draft Constitution was an authentic
reflection of Kenya's various peoples' lives.1 The question of whether
the Draft reflected Kenya's various cultures invoked two potential
conflicts that the campaign faced. The first conflict specifically con-
cerned the campaign's focus and involved the tension inherent in a
constitutional framework that sought to protect and enhance women's
rights while also preserving cultural/religious community practices
that all too often embraced gender hierarchies that subordinated
women to men. The second conflict posed a serious challenge to the
constitutional process as a whole and involved ethnicity and ethnic
politics in Kenya as a pluralist society. Specifically the campaign had
to address the tension inherent in viewing the constitutional reform
process as an ethnic versus a national project.
The campaign signaled its support for the preservation of Kenya's
various cultural heritages through its language about "protect[ing] a
people's way of life," which first surfaced in the arguments about re-
taining Kadhi's courts in the constitution."' Rhetorically, the cam-
paign signaled its respect for preserving people's different ways of
life716 by emphasizing its commitment to solidarity of women across
diversity.7 1 Concretely, it created a scheme in its alternative language
proposals whereby women in every district would be represented in
Parliament through the one-third principle."' Ethnicity neverthe-
less divided women and did so in struggles over both material and
representative resources during the preparation for the National
Constitutional Conference, specifically as related to the decentral-
ization of executive power and devolution. When faced with these
and other actual ethnicized conflicts over resources, the campaign's
reactions were both problematic and late. Further, whereas a strong
normative value of equality may have aided in the resolution of these
conflicts, a narrow view of gender equality added little.
713. The author first heard Maathai make these arguments during the campaign's
training session in Central Province, the region in which many Kikuyu live.
714. See Omale, supra note 713, at 12 (quoting Maathai as saying "[w]e need to culti-
vate a super-nation of diversity and to recognise English and Kiswahili as our official
languages and the remaining 42 as national languages). She later assisted the sub-
committee to study culture and the ways in which it could better be reflected in the
Constitution during the NCC. See Janeloise Wambui, Could Culture Be the Missing Link
in Our Development?, YAWEZEKANA, Feb. 24-Mar. 1, 2004, at 2.
715. Press Release, FIDA, supra note 693.
716. Id.
717. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40.
718. Id. at 83.
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A. Preserving a People's Way of Life: Women and Culture
The notion of preserving a people's way of life provided three im-
portant insights into the campaign's view of community and women's
rights. First, it registered recognition of the fact that women have mul-
tiple identities, including cultural identities, and that their lives are
embedded in and shaped by the cultural communities to which they
often have allegiance. It recognizes that women's lives, like that of
Wangari Maathai's life, are embedded in the various ethnic cultures
and traditions within which they live. The campaign had clearly stated
this position in discussing the diversity of women and the intersections
of gender with ethnicity, race, age, and ability, among others.719
Second, it signaled recognition of ethno-cultural communities'
claims for recognition, authentic representation, and self-preservation
in opposition to imperialism and ethnicized central authority. These
claims are important because they reflect sentiments that value tra-
ditional ways of being, specifically an interest in preserving and pass-
ing on to future generations certain values and patterns of living and
resentment of ideologies and ways of being that threaten these ways
of living. These sentiments include resistance to colonial and post-
colonial practices and ideologies that have eroded and undermined
distinct social arrangements and practices indigenous to the over
forty ethnic communities in Kenya. 20 Colonial and post-colonial acts
and ideologies have altered or distorted many ethno-cultural prac-
tices, but each community retains many of its own customs, social re-
lations, and arrangements, including distinct languages and separate
though overlapping territorial origins and claims. 2 ' Ethno-cultural
communities' claims entail demands to live in culturally specific ways
under traditional or culturally ordered social arrangements and to
engage in specific cultural practices within the pluralist society. '22
719. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40. Cultural practices in communities
shape, define, and reaffirm individuals' identities. Women are part of these communities
and the cultural ways of living and defining a person are constitutive of their lives and iden-
tities. As such, these women, like all women and men, are culturally defined people as well
as an ethnically defined people and often find their cultural identities reaffirming and a
source of value. The lineage-based organization of the communities and their ethnic homo-
geneity often means that this organic group is far more cohesive than groupings and organi-
zations of women across ethnic and community lines. See Butegwa, supra note 36, at 109.
See generally Coomaraswamy, supra note 48. Thus, these women may have strong alle-
giance to their communities and wish to see their communities preserved and empowered.
720. See Mutua, Banjul, supra note 31, at 346-52.
721. Id.
722. Many of these cultures were self-governing, homogeneous, single-language com-
munities that shared a common culture and traditions in pre-colonial Africa. Id. at 347,
365-67 (describing African pre-colonial societies and suggesting that homogeneity contri-
buted to their cohesion and referring to them as nations even though they were not "states
in the modern or European sense"). Their governing structures and social arrangements,
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Third, this notion may recognized the political context in which many
Kenyans saw the constitution as an opportunity to redraw and re-
frame power relations among Kenya's various ethno-cultural groups,
a point addressed in more detail below.723
Women's rights activists seemed to support the preservation of
various communities' ways of life, including women and men's rights
to engage in cultural life. 24 These activists also seemed to support
the empowerment of the various Kenyan communities but recognized
that ethno-cultural empowerment could be in tension with ideas of
gender equality because many of these communities embrace a gen-
der hierarchy that subordinates women to men and rely upon these
unequal gender relations to transmit and ensure the survival of the
communities.725 The campaign nonetheless arduously fought for en-
hancing the status of Kenyan women through the constitutional pro-
cess and responded to these concerns in two ways. First, regarding
concerns about cultural rights, the campaign promoted the retention
of "positive" cultural practices.726 This support mediated the potential
tension between the campaign's support for cultural preservation and
women's rights and was a widely repeated retort.
Second, the coalition intended its suggestions and activities to en-
hance women's ability to both interpret and shape their own cultural
contexts. Thus, by insisting that certain percentages of both national
and devolved government consist of women, the campaign promoted
placing what could be considered as "community women" in positions
of power.727 In doing so the campaign sought to provide women not
only with representational status but also with opportunities through
like many sub-Saharan African communities, were organized through lineage-based cul-
tures that operated on corporate patterns of family groups and clans. See Mutua, Banjul,
supra note 31, at 347-49, 361 (discussing Akan of west Africa and the Kikuyu and
Akamba of Kenya as lineage-based societies). The worldview of these communities placed
the individual within the groups, and the status of these group-centered individuals
reflected the individual's place within the group as well as gender and often age. Id. at
361. Many of Kenya's ethno-cultural groups found common cause and resisted both the
material and ideological conditions of colonialism in the war of Independence. Id. at 366
(discussing the divide-and-conquer strategies of colonial powers but noting that colonialism
created a sense of unity among various African communities because they saw them-
selves as "victims of an alien, racist, and oppressive structure").
723. See infra Part V.C; see also Mary Kiio, Staying Focused on the Process,
YAWEZEKANA, Jan. 19-22, 2004, at 8.
724. Virginia Wangari & Frida Were, Delegates Salute Women's Gains, YAWEZEKANA,
Sept. 25-Nov. 16, 2003, at 1.
725. See Omale, supra note 647, at 1-2.
726. Janeloise Wambui, Culture Committee to Discard Retrogressive Practices,
YAWEZEKANA, Jan. 19-22, 2004, at 2 ("[A]lthough culture preservation is important, 'we
can only revive what is positive."').
727. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 83 (proposing alternative language for the
article on elections that would ensure that female candidates for office represent all
districts, as well as "persons with disabilities, the youth, ethnic minorities and other
interested groups").
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these positions to interpret their own respective cultural practices, in-
terpretations that might differ from dominant interpretations.728 One
can further characterize the campaign's efforts as enhancing women's
power to alter these practices within cultures that are dynamic and
capable of surviving change. 29 In other words, the campaign's efforts
valued and potentially enhanced women's potential views about their
own cultures.73 °
The campaign was not the only group that referred to a people's
way of life. The NCC also embraced Maathai's challenge about culture
preservation and established a committee of delegates to analyze
cultural rights.731 This committee proposed an additional chapter on
culture that defined culture as "the dynamic sum total of the spiritual,
emotional, intellectual, material features and aspects of a people's way
of life developed in and through their environment, science, technol-
ogy, language, communication, arts, and value systems. 732 Thus, the
provision sought to respect and preserve the diverse languages, cus-
toms, traditions, and religions of the various cultures both in their
expressive and material forms. The provision also sought to require
the government to educate Kenyans about the differing cultural tra-
ditions733 and to preserve and protect the scientific, technological, and
intellectual traditions and inventions of these indigenous cultures. 34
Finally, it sought to establish a national commission on culture 35 and
728. See generally Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at 404-06 (noting that society should
analyze practices to see if they simply represent dominant perspectives). Nyamu advo-
cates for what she calls a critical pragmatic approach that "enables proponents of gender
equality to evaluate each of the overlapping plural normative orders in terms of its
specific consequences for gender hierarchy." Id. at 410. She also encourages women and
others to question norms. Id.
729. See generally id.; Wambui, supra note 727, at 2 (using similar language); Culture
Shock: Delegates Grapple with Emotion and Intolerance, YAWEZEKANA, Sept. 8-10, 2003,
at 6 ("Culture is highly dynamic.").
730. Nyamu, Gender, supra note 50, at 404.
731. Alice N. Wafula, Technical Committee on Culture Formed, YAWEZEKANA, Sept.
22-24, 2003, at 4.
732. The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, National Constitutional Con-
ference, The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004 Art. 15A (Feb. 14, 2003) (unpublished
working draft of the Constitution, on file with author). The Culture chapter survived in
an altered format in the Zero Draft and without defining culture. See ZERO DRAFT, supra
note 11, Art. 25-27.
733. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 25(c).
734. Id. Art. 25(d)-(g). For example, Article 25(d) requires the state to "support, promote
and protect scientific and intellectual research, innovation and application." Id. Art. 25(d).
Article 25(e) provides similar support for medical knowledge and technology. Id. at 25(e).
Article 25(f) protects indigenous scientific knowledge and technology, whereas Article
25(g) provides similar support for "indigenous knowledge, literature, art, oral traditions,
performing arts and other cultural heritage and the intellectual property rights of the
people of Kenya." Id. Art. 25(f)-(g).
735. Id. Art. 26.
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an African Traditional Court system .1 6 The culture provision in the
Bill of Rights permitted the enjoyment of an individual's rights in
concert with others to enjoy his or her culture but also forbade the
compulsion of any individual to undergo or perform any cultural prac-
tice or rite. ' Even though the coalition had signaled its support for
preserving Kenya's various cultural heritages and had committed
itself to solidarity among women, their reactions were problematic
when they actually had to face the diversity of women in the context
of demands for resources based on ethnicity.
B. Donor Money and Training
On the day the campaign began sending out its eight teams to
train delegates in the provinces, one of its largest supporters, a
United Nations donor agency, called the campaign leadership to its
office to discuss problems with fund disbursement. 3 ' At that point
the donor agency's program on gender was one of the primary spon-
sors of the campaign, as well as a sponsor of many of the individual
women's organizations that comprised the campaign,7 39 but the pro-
gram officer with whom FIDA had worked while structuring the fund-
ing was leaving her position and being replaced by another woman.
Upon arrival at the donor's office, the coalition was greeted with
members of the Women's Political Caucus (WPC). Since the split in
the WPC, the group consisted primarily of women from the same
ethnic group as the woman who was now heading the donor agency's
gender project. Although the woman elected as president of FIDA
during the campaign was also from this particular ethnic group, most
of the women actively involved in the campaign and seated around
the table at the meeting were from differing groups.
The officer informed the campaign that the money they had allo-
cated for constitutional reform was to be shared among the different
women's groups, meaning that the campaign would have to share the
736. Id. Arts. 183, 184.
737. Id. Art. 68. Article 68, entitled "Language and Culture," provides:
(1) Every person has the right to use the language, and to participate in the
cultural life, of that person's choice. (2) A person belonging to a cultural or
linguistic community shall not be denied the right, with other members of
that community - (a) to enjoy that person's culture and use that person's
language; or (b) to form, join and maintain cultural and linguistic associations
and other organs of civil society. (3) A person shall not compel another to
perform, observe or undergo any cultural practice or rite.
Id. The Waco draft shortened this chapter significantly, establishing only a commission
on culture. WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Arts. 26, 27. Although individual rights may be
insufficient to protect individuals from group power, these sections at least provide indi-
vidual women a leg on which to stand in conflicts with their own communities.
738. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at ii (listing sponsors).
739. Id.
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funds allocated to it with the WPC, which claimed that they also in-
tended to train delegates. The officer insisted that because the groups
were fighting for the same issues and because the campaign had al-
ready prepared extensive training materials, the WPC should use the
campaign's training materials. She justified this position by noting
that the agency had sponsored the compilation of some of the cam-
paign materials.
The campaign reacted badly, with ideas of solidarity going out the
window. They complained that if they shared the money they would
not have adequate funds for the training sessions currently underway
and for other campaign activities. They further argued that three of
their teams had already left for the provinces. 40 Finally, the campaign
explicitly refused to share their campaign materials, on which, they
argued, none of the WPC members had been trained. WPC members
for their part argued that they had developed some of their own mate-
rials that they would use for training but that they needed funds.
Ultimately the funds were divided between the groups. 741 Further-
more, the campaign's training sessions went well except in the one
province where the predominant ethnicity was the same as that of
many of the WPC members. Delegates in this province refused to
attend the sessions and were believed to later have been trained by
WPC. The campaign and the WPC would not work together until late
in the National Constitution Conference process, when indeed they
found themselves supporting the same issues, issues for which the
Kenyan women's movement had been fighting for a decade.
C. Decentralizing Power: The Prime Minister's Position and
Devolution
The campaign repeatedly emphasized its understanding of
women's diversity, its commitment to solidarity across this diversity,
and its support for preserving people's ways of life. Nevertheless, its
efforts concerning matters related to ethnicity and ethnic competi-
tion over resources were problematic on the one hand and often late
on the other. Furthermore, a commitment to gender equality, which
focused only on equality between the genders, added little to the reso-
lution on these issues when they arose in constitutional discussions
of decentralizing executive authority and decentralizing central gov-
ernment through devolution.
740. The officer retorted that she had flagged a possible issue with the funds a week
earlier and the campaign therefore should have cancelled or delayed its training sessions.
741. The funding lost due to this partial withdrawal was replaced by monies provided
by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). See, e.g., YAWEZEKANA, Sept.
22-24, 2003, at 8 ("With Financial support from the Swedish International Development
Agency (SIDA)").
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One of the main goals of the constitution was to decentralize
executive and government power.742 The goal of decentralizing execu-
tive power was manifest in the Draft Constitution through mecha-
nisms to enhance legislative power and increase the independence
of the judiciary,743 as well as in adding the position of prime minister
to the executive branch.7" Civil society had long advocated for a prime
minister position as a way of decentralizing the seemingly intracta-
ble and expansive executive authority.745 Kenyans expected this de-
velopment, but once the new Kibaki government found itself in power
after defeating Moi, this fight became ethnicized among the political
class, with both decentralization of executive power and devolution
being interpreted as providing the resources of additional political
positions and seats to accommodate greater ethnic representation
and diversity.
Despite ethnic competition in Kenya (created in part by past gov-
erning policies and the ethnic politics of the emerging party system),
the election of NARC, a multiethnic party in which the top leadership
was ethnically diverse, embodied a positive accommodation of diverse
ethnic individuals in the executive branch. It also highlighted how-
ever the dark side of this mechanism in that it reinforced the idea that
ethnic communities could only access power through representation
by "one of their own." '746 The concrete realities of this competition
meant that political actors, including the campaign, had to demon-
strate this commitment to diverse ethnic representation. Furthermore,
the sentiment behind devolution and the reduction of executive power
was not unlike the one that propelled women's efforts. The argument
was not that people from specific ethnic groups could not represent
all the ethnic groups or that men could not possibly represent women,
742. See Draft, supra note 3, Art. 213(g).
743. See infra Part VII (discussing proposed arrangements for Parliament and devo-
lution in both the Zero and Waco drafts).
744. The Draft Constitution established a prime minister as the leader of the Cabinet,
with both the prime minister and members of Cabinet exercising executive authority
within the Republic by implementing national budgets and policy, preparing and initi-
ating government legislation for the Parliament, implementing and administering Acts
of Parliament, coordinating functions of ministries and departments, and other duties.
Draft, supra note 3, Art. 170. The president's duties would include addressing Parliament,
appointing the Prime Minister and all other ministers, judicial officers, and other public
officers (with limited dismissal powers), appointing commissions of inquiry with the con-
sent of the Cabinet, declaring states of emergency and war after consultation with the
Cabinet and the National Defense Council, appointing diplomats and receiving foreign
diplomats, seeking advisory opinions from the supreme court, pardoning or reprieving
offenders, and ensuring the independence of courts and commissions, among legislative
and other duties. Draft, supra note 3, Arts. 151-52.
745. See Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 151-56 (discussing the
struggles in the NCC over whether to create a Kenyan prime minister position).
746. IED, supra note 68, at 68.
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but rather that given their various conditions and their histories,
these groups had failed to represent outside groups or women in the
past and little in their present arrangements suggested that they
would adequately represent them in the near future.
The Draft Constitution included a prime minister's position,
which radically shifted the balance of power from an elected presi-
dent to an appointed prime minister. '47 The Draft also restricted
whom the president could appoint to the position748 and forbade the
president from dismissing the prime minister without a no-confidence
vote by the Parliament.749 The majority in the ruling party vehemently
opposed this arrangement,"' but given their failure to honor the
memorandum of understanding that created the NARC coalition
and would have demonstrated their commitment to wider ethnic rep-
resentation required by the concrete political context,5 the major-
ity's opposition to the prime minister position reinforced the need
felt by various groups for constitutional arrangements that ensured
ethnic representation and empowerment.
In the context of the NCC, issues of devolution worsened this
conflict, which further stimulated ethnic suspicions. '52 The goal to de-
centralize central government is manifest in the chapter on devolu-
tion of power, which envisioned creating governmental structures at
more local levels to decide and implement localized policies.753 Article
213(g) states that one of the principles and objects of devolution is
to "facilitate the decentralisation of central government powers and
the location of central government institutions and departments away
from the capital territory to ensure equitable distribution of resources
in all the provinces. '754
747. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 170.
748. Id. Art. 171.
749. Id. Art. 174.
750. See Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 154-55 ("[The NAK side...
saw the office as a direct threat to the Kibaki presidency"); see also Kiraitu Now Rules
Out Executive PM, THE SUNDAY NATION, Sept. 14, 2003, available at http://www.nation
audio.com/News/DailyNation/14092003/News/News1409200324.html (quoting Justice and
Constitutional Affairs Minister Kiraitu Murungi, who described advocacy for a prime
minister position as a "political impossibility and a big joke").
751. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 105; see also David Mugonyi
& Benard Namunane, Opposition Leaders Sign Unity Accord, DAILY NATION, Feb. 13,2002,
available at http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation13022002/News/News25.html.
752. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 144-56 (describing devolution
as a hotly contested issue and explaining why Kenya is a good candidate for devolved
government but noting the many pitfalls including the possible creation of ethnic enclaves).
753. See Draft, supra note 3, Art. 213-31.
754. Id. Art. 213(g). Draft Article 213 also states that the principles and objectives of
devolution are to:
(a) give powers of self-governance to the people at all levels...,
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The conflict revolved around whether to devolve power to one
or to several levels of local government in addition to the central gov-
ernment. 5 These local administrative units however were prone to
characterization as an opportunity for ethnic groups to empower
themselves and for leaders to create governmental units that rein-
forced ethnic communities as power bases on the one hand and as a
way to access resources (through the instruments of state power) on
the other.5 6 In other words, many saw constitutional review as a way
to access control over resources for the benefit of their own groups
and perhaps to preserve ethno-cultural traditions. ' Consequently,
at several points during the national conference, conversations about
devolution became discussions about which group would be in con-
trol in a certain area and whether the controlling group would allow
people of a different ethnicity access to jobs and other resources within
the area."5 '
The campaign favored the idea of equitable sharing of both rep-
resentational and material resources among the groups and regions,
as well as local community control, language found in the Draft Con-
stitution.5 9 These issues however were only superficially viewed as
issues of equality."6 Had the campaign as well as the various ethnic
(b) strengthen national unity by recognising diversity in ways that promote
the sense among all citizens that they belong to Kenya and share in its
government;
(c) ensure democratic and accountable exercise of power;
(d) increase checks and balances and the separation of powers;
(e) promote social and economic development throughout Kenya;
(f) ensure equitable sharing of national and local resources throughout
Kenya...;
(i) [and to] protect and promote the interests and rights of minorities and
disadvantaged groups ....
Id. Art. 213.
755. Specifically, the Draft Constitution required that power be devolved to four levels
in addition to the central government: village governments, locational governments,
district governments, and provincial governments. Id. Arts. 215-19. The Zero Draft had
government power devolved to three levels on the basis of regions, districts, and locations,
in addition to the central government. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Arts. 211, 217, 223.
The government's draft accomplished devolution through only one level, the districts, in
addition to the central government. WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Arts. 199-201.
756. Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note 7, at 149-50. They were prone to
being seen as ethnic issues given the pre-existing notion of majimboism, a concept of
federalism based on ethnic lines that informed the Independence constitution. See also
Arthur Okwemba, Getting to the Centre of Power, YAWEZEKANA, May 19, 2003, at 1.
757. James Oranga, Administrative Units Created along Ethnic Lines, YAWEZEKANA,
Mar. 2-8, 2004, at 3.
758. Id.
759. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 213(f).
760. The idea seemed to be that women supported devolution and their main concern
was trying to ensure women were adequately represented in these structures. See Mary
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groups viewed empowerment through the lens of equality in addition
to devolution or framed devolution more broadly as a matter of equal-
ity, these debates may have been more constructive. In addition they
may have collaterally provided additional support for gender equality.
In any case, the ideal of gender equality as between women and men
again proved too narrow conceptually to advance a vision that would
mediate or add to the resolution of these issues of which women were
clearly a part.
Ultimately, however, the campaign only took a formal position
on both of these issues in January 2004 through their model consti-
tution,7"' despite earlier requests. On the prime minister position, the
campaign embraced a prime ministership as part of the executive
branch of government on the theory that given past ethnic conflict,
showings of good faith had to be made, and on the theory that the
Kenyan people expected it.7"2 The balance of power in the coalition's
construction of the prime ministership, however, remained more fully
in favor of the president, with the prime minister executing adminis-
trative functions but whose duties, appointment, and dismissal were
subject to constitutional and legislative authority instead of presi-
dential authority.' On the issue of devolution, the campaign endorsed
three levels of devolved government similar to that adopted eventu-
ally by the Zero Draft.7" Given the lateness of the campaign's efforts,
however, these suggestions were seen as simply supporting a govern-
ment that had reneged on its promises of ethnic diversity in represen-
tation and seemed opposed to the constitutional process fought by civil
society for over a decade. Had the coalition taken this position earlier,
a position that again sought to promote solidarity and to strike com-
promises, it might have tipped the balance toward a compromise on
this issue.
Although the campaign had professed that all constitutional
issues affected women, and thus women were concerned with all of
the constitutional issues,76 its failure to address a central issue of
constitutional reform in a timely manner minimized the effect of
their suggested compromises. The campaign also learned the hard
way that solidarity of women across diversity, particularly in the
Kilo, Women Urged to Monitor Devolution Talks, YAWEZEKANA, Mar. 2-8, 2004, at 6; James
Oranga, Devolution to Benefit Women, YAWEZEKANA, Jan. 19-22, 2004, at 1.
761. Safeguarding Gains for Women in the Draft Constitution: Model Proposals,
YAWEZEKANA (SPECIAL ISSUE), Jan. 28, 2004 [hereinafter Model Proposals].
762. Caleb Atemi & Rosemary Okello, Taming the Devolution 'Beast, "YAWEZEKANA,
May 26, 2003, at 1.
763. Model Proposals, supra note 762, at 8-9.
764. See ZERO DRAFr, supra note 11, Art. 211, 217, 223; Kiio, supra note 761, at 6.
765. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 40.
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context of past ethnic competition, meant that they had to be atten-
tive to the allocation of resources, that they had to demonstrate this
commitment to the equitable sharing of resources in their suggested
arrangements, and that they had to be willing to suggest creative
compromises around these issues - all in a timely fashion.
VI. RURAYURBAN DIVIDE
The charge that elite urban women were incapable of represent-
ing rural women was a charge that preceded the constitutional review
process and one that was historically and cynically employed by the
Moi-KANU regime. 66 The tension inspired by this charge reemerged
at the beginning of the National Constitutional Conference. '67 The
effect of this renewed tension was to further poison an already chal-
lenging environment in which NGOS and other members of civil
society, including the campaign, initially had minimal and limited
access to the conference and to delegates.768 It thus made it initially
difficult for the campaign to seek to influence the delegates, par-
ticularly women delegates, or to try to hold them accountable for
women's demands.
The campaign's response demonstrates the need for independent
activist women's movements that can structure forums and build
mechanisms to allow diverse women to voice their opinions, educate
themselves, develop consensus on a set of issues, and later to pro-
vide a united front on issues where the group has reached a consen-
sus.719 It also may allow them to hold one another accountable for
these issues, including women in decision-making positions or other
positions of power.
766. FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 29-33.
767. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45; Isaiah Kipyegon & Susan Mwangi, It's Thumbs-up
and Thumbs-down from Kenyans, YAWEZEKANA, June 5, 2003, at 1 (mentioning the "war
between the urban elite and the rural folks" at the NCC).
768. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45 (discussing the way in which the in-fighting among
the two NARC factions and the hostility with which the CKRC viewed civil society, to-
gether with the tensions between the urban and rural delegates, impeded the campaign's
efforts to work with women delegates).
769. In some ways these meetings served as consciousness-raising meetings allowing
women to share and fight out their conflicts while potentially building a consensus on
issues that allowed the women delegates to represent women's "group perspective," how-
ever partial. See S. Laurel Weldon, Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation
for Women in Democraticpolicy Making, 64 J. POL. 1153, 1156-58, 1160-61 (2002) (explain-
ing that "[alutonomous women's organizing improves women's ability to articulate their
perspective" and suggesting that women's movements and organizations can hold govern-
ment bureaucrats accountable by providing places where women can develop their "group
perspective" through conversations about women's issues).
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Specifically, the campaign's response to the hostile environment,
created in part by the debate over the urban/rural divide, was to hold
two important meetings.770 This response in some ways became a
mode of operation for the campaign, which sponsored several other
gatherings later.77' These two meetings facilitated women delegates
in discussing and exploring their differing views, experiences, and per-
spectives as part of a process of forging and producing consensus on
particular issues. Furthermore, the campaign sought to remind these
delegates of the role the women's movement had played in their pres-
ence at the conference. It also sought to remind the delegates of the
movement's goals with the intent to hold them accountable to those
goals. These meetings then facilitated the campaign's entry and par-
ticipation in the forums established for women delegates and to insti-
tutionalize this form of participatory dialogue and action, providing
them a greater voice in the delegates' deliberations.772
These participatory forums were also consistent with the cam-
paign's response to the question of whether urban women can rep-
resent rural women. This response, as manifest in the campaign's
proposed scheme of representation, 7 3 suggests some skepticism about
the ability of elite urban women to represent poor rural women and
thus invites rural women to participate in selecting "one of their
own" to represent their interests in government. At the same time,
the campaign sought to create institutional structures that would
bring rural, urban, and other women together to direct their mutually
defined goals.
770. For a reference to these two meetings, see FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45 (noting
that the coalition "managed to secure an agenda item during the women's caucus lunch...
geared toward trying to heal the urban/rural... difference that divided women"). The
2003 report further notes that the campaign organized a meeting after Bomas I with
delegates who represented women's organizations. Id.; see also Martin Adhola, Susan
Mwangi & Betty Oyugi, Then and Now: Great Expectations, YAWEZEKANA, Aug. 18,2003,
at 7 (discussing training session); Omale, supra note 713, at 12 (on healing meeting).
771. Other meetings included several dinner sessions and a training session on MMP.
See Otumo Ongalo & Mary Kiio, Women Delegates Forge Unity in Diversity, YAWEZEKANA,
Sept. 8-10, 2003, at 3 (discussing a campaign-sponsored dinner); Otuma Ongalo, MMPR
or District Constituencies?, YAWEZEKANA, Mar. 2-8, 2004, at 1 (noting that the campaign
hosted a retreat for delegates to discuss MMPR. One of the concerns about the two systems
was that one might favor urban women.) Consultative meetings may well have been a
typical tool employed by women's organizations such as FIDA.
772. Ongalo & Kiio, supra note 772, at 3; Ongalo, supra note 772, at 1.
773. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 84-85 (proposing that election to National
Assembly be based on the Mixed Member Proportional Representation system and requir-
ing that the first eighty percent of the nominees be women representing every district);
see also id. at 59-60 (exploring the implications of the MMPR proposal under the one-
third principle).
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A. Providing Forums for "Healing" and Accountability during the
NCC
During the NCC, the CKRC arranged for women delegates to meet
biweekly for lunch, ostensibly to discuss the Draft Constitution.774
Instead, at many of the initial luncheons, CKRC commissioners gave
lectures on the Draft.7" Although these lectures were extremely help-
ful to the delegates, the commissioners had a particular position. They
were advocating for the Draft provisions as drafted. Initially, neither
the CKRC nor the delegates would grant women observers from the
campaign an opportunity to address the luncheon.7 6 The CKRC stated
that women's group observers could attend the luncheon but could
not participate. 77 Delegates made clear that they were working to
create a constitution for all Kenyans and not just women.7 8
The campaign had a rocky relationship with the CKRC. Although
the campaign had worked with the CKRC on the conference proce-
dures779 and secured a time to address Parliament during CKRC
training on the Draft,78 ° the CKRC remained distant from coalition
members. 78 ' This distance seemed to increase with the opening of the
NCC. 7"' The campaign had to struggle to get tent accommodations
at the site where the NCC was held. It also struggled with the CKRC
to get enough observer status passes for its observer delegation to
attend the NCC meetings. Despite the lip service that the CKRC gave
to the idea of facilitating discussion among all NCC participants, the
campaign soon realized that the CKRC viewed its primary obligations
as being to the delegates and perceived the observers as interfering.
Women delegates were also distant in the first few weeks of the
NCC even though many of the campaign's observers knew groups of
women from the provincial trainings. Ethnic tensions contributed par-
tially to this distance. Delegates also soon began to see themselves
as meshimwa (honorable), distancing themselves above observers and
774. Frida Were, Nyama Choma Ranch: Women's Strategy Ground, YAWEZEKANA,
Sept. 25-Nov. 16, 2003, at 10-11 (discussing the luncheons as a strategy ground, which
it increasingly became).
775. Id.; see also FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45.
776. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45.
777. Id.
778. Id.
779. Id. at 34.
780. Id. at 33-34.
781. Id. at 45; Otuma Ongalo, Editorial, Moment for Sober Decisions as D-time Dawns,
YAWEZEKANA, Mar. 2-8, 2004, at 8 (capturing this distance in suggesting that delegates
did not want to listen to anything that came outside of the forum, even at this late date
in the process).
782. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45.
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others."' Furthermore, the delegates were operating under much
speculation that the government might try to "scuttle" the conference
and perhaps bring in experts to review the Draft, a position delegates
found particularly offensive.7" In this context the charge that urban
elite women inappropriately were seeking to represent poor rural
women was explosive and seemed to give the delegates pause, espe-
cially district delegates.7 " Although these district delegates appeared
unlikely to classify themselves as poor rural women, their suspicion
among the delegates, the of elite urban women, among other things,
caused significant tensions campaign, and other women's groups ob-
serving the process.
In the midst of these tensions, Jane Kiragu of the campaign came
up with idea of having a meeting of "healing" among the women.786
She approached one of the women's group delegates who had emerged
as an organizing leader of the delegates to request such a meeting
during the women's luncheon. After much negotiation, the delegates
scheduled the meeting for the last week of May, 2003.
During the meeting a diversity of women spoke about the
urban/rural divide as well as other issues and sources of division
among women.787 For example, several Muslim women spoke about
the Kadhi's courts. Although the participants made no decisions, the
meeting lowered the temperature and distance among the delegates
and between delegates and observers, and they agreed to continue
talking about the issues. 8 Although women's groups observing the
conference did not receive immediate invitations to address the dele-
gates at the luncheon, campaign observers found the delegates more
interested in the materials they were providing and more committed
to pushing particular campaign agenda items." 9
Given the success of the meeting, the campaign decided to host
a workshop on August 21, 2003. 790 The campaign invited a range of
women delegates but particularly those delegates who represented
783. Id.
784. Id.; see also Juliana Omale, Spotlight on Role of Experts, YAWEZEKANA, May 29,
2003, at 1 (noting some concern over "experts").
785. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45; Kipyegon & Mwangi, supra note 768.
786. FIDA 2003, supra note 2, at 45; Omale, supra note 713.
787. Omale, supra note 713. See generally Weldon, supra note 770, at 1156-58 (noting
that part of what women's groups do is to discuss and seek to resolve their divisions,
particularly those arising because of their diversity).
788. Omale, supra note 713.
789. Id. (citing Ida Odinga who said that the meeting should have been held at the
beginning of the NCC).
790. Meeting with Campaign to Safeguard Gains for Women in the Draft and NCC
Delegates, in Silver Springs Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya (Aug. 21, 2003); see also Ongalo &
Kiio, supra note 772, at 3.
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women's groups. The campaign's intent was threefold. First the meet-
ing was to remind women delegates that the women's movement and
women's groups were largely responsible for their participation in the
NCC. Second, the idea was to remind delegates from women's orga-
nizations in particular that women's groups had sent them to the
NCC to advance women's interests, to "act for" women, not simply
to "stand for" women in terms of descriptive representation or be-
cause they were simply to mirror women's existence in the general
population.79' Third, the idea was to review the campaign's alterna-
tive constitutional language and suggestions.
The workshop took place after the conclusion of Bomas I and
before the beginning of Bomas II.792 Over twenty women delegates
participated. The campaign accomplished its goals of reminding the
delegates of their specific obligations to promote women's gendered
interests, despite their diversity. 93 The highlight of the meeting was
the discussion of the particular issues the campaign's materials
raised. For example, the meeting participants had a lively debate
over whether proportional representation and its mechanisms for
women's inclusion was the appropriate electoral institution for Kenya.
Many women had knowledge of and seemed to prefer the Ugandan
system of separate electoral districts or forums for women. 7' Another
lively debate was over whether the campaign's hands-off approach to
the abortion issue was correct. Many of the delegates wanted to di-
rectly advocate for "safe motherhood"7 95 and the right to choose.
791. Pitkin first articulated this formulation of the issue as between "acting for" and
"standing for." HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 144, 232 (1967); see
also SYLVIA TAMALE, WHEN HENS BEGIN TO CROW: GENDER AND PARLIAMENTARY
POLITICS IN UGANDA 68-90 (1999) (applying this analysis in her study of the Ugandan
experience with the affirmative action parliamentary system for women).
792. Ongalo & Kiio, supra note 772, at 3; see also Martin Adhola, The Battle for Words
Begins, YAWEZEKANA, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (discussing the focus on language and words
of the meeting in preparation for Bomas II).
793. Ongalo & Kiio, supra note 772, at 3; cf. Sylvia Tamale, Towards Legitimate
Governance in Africa: The Case of Affirmative Action and Parliamentary Politics in
Uganda, in LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 235, 249 (Edward Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor ed., 1999)
(noting that "the variety of women's interests does not refute the claim that interests are
gendered") (citing A. PHILLIPS, ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY (1991)).
794. For more information on the Ugandan Electoral Process, see Republic of Uganda,
The Electoral Commission, http://www.ec.or.ug/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2006).
795. For more information on safe motherhood programs, see generally ANNE TINKER
& MARJORIE A. KOBLINSKY, MAKING MOTHERHOOD SAFE (1993) and Republic of Kenya
Ministry of Health, Division of Reproductive Health, Safe Motherhood, http://www.drh
.go.ke/htmllmotherhood.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2006). The World Health Organization
(WHO), the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and the World
Bank founded a Safe Motherhood Initiative in Nairobi, Kenya at the Safe Motherhood
Conference, Feb. 10-13, 1987. Susan A. Cohen, Special Report: The Safe Motherhood
Conference, 13 INTL FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 68 (1987).
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The meeting facilitated the development of some common goals
and strategies that the delegates decided to pursue.7 96 The meeting
also helped to establish greater communication between the cam-
paign and this group of delegates. Through them the campaign gained
greater access to women delegates more generally. In particular they
gained greater access to the luncheon forum. In this sense the cam-
paign, as part of a larger movement for women's rights, helped to
provide the fora and opportunity for women to build a consensus on
controversial issues and to work on and across their differences.
B. A Question of Representation
The specific question of whether urban elite women, who stood
to gain the most from increased representational status in govern-
ment, could or would represent the interests of poor rural women
goes to the heart of questions about democratic representation. 797 It
particularly addresses these concerns in contexts of group conflict
or a history of subordination and oppression. One could characterize
the campaign's push to have more women in positions of representa-
tion as raising a similar question about democratic representation.
The question raised by both situations is whether one group (such as
men or urban elite women) can adequately represent another group
(such as women or poor rural women).
796. Ongalo & Kiio, supra note 772, at 3.
797. Jane Mansbridge has argued that in contexts of distrust and in contexts where
interests have not yet crystallized, both present situations in which constitutional de-
signers and individual voters may want to institute policies of descriptive representation.
Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A
Contingent "Yes," 61 J. POL. 628 (1999). Mansbridge defines descriptive representation
as consisting of representatives who "are in their own persons and lives in some sense
typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent. Black legislators represent
Black constituents, women legislators represent women constituents, and so on." Id. at
629. She notes that this descriptiveness includes not only visible characteristics but also
shared experiences. Id. Mansbridge argues that representative democracies have two
primary functions, one deliberative and the other aggregative. Id. at 634. Descriptive
representation aids primarily in the deliberative function. Id. It aids in the mutual com-
munication between representative and constituent (vertical communication) in contexts
of group distrust and subordinate groupings. Id. at 641-43. It also aids in bringing new
and different perspectives to the table among deliberators (horizontal communication)
where these perspectives and interests have yet to crystallize (where parties or groups
have not yet formed positions around an issue because it is just emerging). Id. at 643-48.
She notes regarding the latter situation that rules such as requiring representatives to
be long-time residents of a region or nations' requirements that the president be born in
the nation may capture this form of descriptive representation. Id. at 629. Regarding
novel legislative issues that require introspective representation, constituencies often
see politicians from the same region or sharing similar experiences as the best repre-
sentatives for the region's constituents. Id. at 643-48.
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Although the theories of democratic representation are beyond
the scope of this article, the initial campaign members might have re-
sponded to this question in a variety of ways to justify their push for
more female legislators. One response is that it is doubtful that men
can represent the lives, experiences, and interests of women absent
women's equal and valued participation. 9 A second response is that
men could represent women and their interests if they had sufficient
interest, concern, education, commitment, and means to understand
women's lives and interests. Most electoral systems are based on
theories that assume that those who choose lawmaking as their
vocation have the commitment, education, concern, and interest in
representing their constituencies and that elections provide those
constituencies the opportunity to choose among individuals who are
so committed.
A third response might have been that men may choose not to
represent women's interests even if they could do so, given the fact
that many of men's societal advantages depend on women's subordi-
nation. As one example, male legislators might not heed women's
demands for more female legislators or descriptive representation
because it might cost them their jobs. Disincentives may also arise
from socialized perspectives about proper social arrangements, per-
spectives that require mothers to stay at home for example. Stated in
the alternative, the question is whether men will represent women's
interests without significant pressure to do so. A fourth response may
have been that the question of whether men can represent women
is irrelevant; rather the questions are whether men have repre-
sented women's interests in the past and are they likely to do so in
the future, given the current arrangements and structures in place.
In the context of the rural versus urban divide, Kenyan women
have had three specific responses to these questions. First they ex-
posed the cynicism of those who raised the question by pointing out
that most of the men in government, and in Parliament in particular,
were also middle class men from urban areas, yet they assumed that
they were better able to represent both rural men and women, poor
and rich alike.799 Second, some elite urban women were once poor
798. The presumption here is that women and men have different interests. One should
query whether they do in fact have different interests across the range of issues. Vega
and Firestone, in looking at the effects of gender on congressional behavior in the United
States from 1981 through 1992 and focusing on the introduction of bills and cohesive
voting, found that female members of Congress were increasingly representing women's
issues, but in terms of voting behaviors, female members of Congress as a group were not
significantly different from their male counterparts. Arturo Vega & Juanita M. Firestone,
The Effect of Gender on Congressional Behavior and the Substantive Representation of
Women, 20 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 213 (1995). This study may suggest that men and women
may not have significantly different interests across a range of issues.
799. FIDA 1998, supra note 67, at 34-35.
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rural women or came from poor rural families, and the divide was
therefore artificial to some degree. 00 Third, the campaign had mini-
mally responded to this charge initially by creating a scheme in which
rural women, or at least district women, could represent themselves.
In the campaign's representational campaign scheme, women would
be represented in Parliament from every district in the country, a
system that would limit the seats urban women from Nairobi could
occupy. o The campaign had also promoted Article 106 of the Draft
Constitution, which established a second legislative chamber con-
sisting of one hundred seats, thirty of which were reserved for women
representing the provinces and Nairobi. 2 Furthermore, they sup-
ported provisions about devolved government in which women
would occupy half the seats at the locational and provincial levels,
which would require additional local women to be in government.0 3
Two theories support the campaign's efforts and its other repre-
sentational suggestions: a justice theory and a difference/exclusion
theory."0 4 Justice arguments suggest that because women are half the
population and because talent is not limited to one gender, women
should be in elective office to roughly the same extent as men absent
discrimination.8 0 5 Difference arguments suggest for example that
having women in office, especially where there is a critical mass, will
bring different or enriching perspectives that will aid decision making
and may transform the way business is conducted.' The campaign's
difference/exclusion arguments suggested that women's voices rep-
resented the concrete, material, and expressive social experiences of
difference and subordination and that these experiences informed per-
spectives that had been excluded from decision-making processes."
800. Id. at 34.
801. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 83-84 (suggesting alternative language and
proposing that election to National Assembly follow a Mixed Member Proportional
Representation system requiring that the first eighty percent of the nominees be women
representing every district); see also id. at 59-60 (explaining this proposal as crucial to
realizing the one-third principle).
802. Draft, supra note 3, Art. 106.
803. Id., Art. 217, 219; TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 33 (recommending that
delegates support the current devolution requirement of fifty percent election of women).
804. Cf. Marian Sawer, Parliamentary Representation of Women: From Discourses of
Justice to Strategies of Accountability, 21 INT'L POL. ScI. REV. 361, 362-66 (2000) (noting
two types of arguments often employed by women's groups to justify increased descrip-
tive representation).
805. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 76; see also Sawer, supra note 805, at
362. Sawer further argues that opening offices to women may double the pool of talent
from which legislators are recruited. Id.
806. Sawer, supra note 805, at 365-66.
807. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 34 ("Greater participation of women in
political leadership would bring new perspectives and priorities in politics ... add value
to debates and deliberations and enlarge the democratic spaces.").
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Furthermore, the campaign's actions evidenced a belief that having
a critical mass of women in government would allow these perspec-
tives to emerge. Finally, the campaign believed that the emergence
of these perspectives would render beneficial changes for women gen-
erally, would improve the country as a whole, and possibly transform
current governmental processes from its traditionally patriarchal
workings. 8 The campaign thus made no difference between improv-
ing the welfare of women and improving the welfare of the country
but rather suggested that improving the situation of women would
improve the overall state of the country, an argument that had been
made in the development context in particular. 9 In this sense, they
.refuted the idea that writing a constitution to advance the status
of women was inconsistent with writing a constitution to advance
the country; the former served the latter.
On the particular question of representation of rural women, the
campaign hedged, inspired in part by the approach taken by the Draft
Constitution, which sought to ensure the representation of a broad
range of people including specifically marginalized groups, people with
disabilities, the young, and the elderly."' 0 On the one hand, the cam-
paign sought to include rural women's actual representation of them-
selves by electing "one of their own" local people through the district
scheme.811 On the other hand, their activities evidenced a commitment
to creating forums in which women in their "heterogeneity" could ex-
plore their different perspectives and to reach policies or strategies in-
formed by those perspectives.81 ' This commitment to considering all
points of view would also encourage individual women representatives
808. Cf. Sawer, supra note 805, at 365 (discussing critical mass).
809. Cf. Statement from Kernal Dervis, Adm'r, United Nations Dev. Programme, to
UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board (Sept. 6, 2005), http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/
september-2005fboard-undp-unfpa-20050906 (last visited Sept. 21, 2006) ("Strong evi-
dence from around the world confirms that gender equality accelerates overall economic
growth, strengthens democratic governance and reduces poverty and insecurity. As we
move forward with the implementation of the MDGs, it is important that we are fully
committed to investing in policies and programmes that empower women and promote
gender equality.").
810. See, e.g., Draft, supra note 3, Art. 14(11).
811. Note that local women and poor rural women are not synonymous terms. In all
likelihood, local women will be local elite rural women. Cf. TAMALE, supra note 792, at 75
(noting that the profiles of professional women in Uganda differ from the typical profile
of more than ninety percent of Ugandan women, who are "illiterate or semiliterate rural
peasants engaged in subsistence farming").
812. This commitment was particularly evident in the campaign's ideas for the Gender
Commission. For example, campaign members discussed having the commission's local
offices both to identify the needs of local women through different kinds of forums and
to identify and train local women that emerged as possible leaders to run for elections.
See Betty Oyugi, It[s] Time We Had a Gender Commission, YAWEZEKANA, Aug. 18, 2003,
at 2.
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to represent their group or gendered interests. In this sense they
expected women not simply to stand for women but to act on behalf
of them, on platforms formed through consensus-building and in-
formed by their diversity.
VII. ASSESSING AND STRATEGIZING
The experiences of Kenyan women over the past decade pro-
vide a potential road map about how to articulate and safeguard
human rights in constitutional and legislative reform movements.
The Kenyan people seek to overcome countless obstacles in their
struggle to effect governmental change. Colonization, exploitation,
political corruption, and ethnic and class division are obstacles in
themselves, and they have led to an extremely pluralistic state con-
sisting of many competing interests. Women in particular have faced
decades of oppression and subordination without having sufficient
political rights to plead for change.
Kenyan women have mobilized to protect their human rights, as
evidenced in the constitutional review process. Here, at least in these
first rounds of negotiations, women were able to safeguard their rights
through open debate, consideration of all views, and compromising
in the interest of women's solidarity. By analyzing their successes
and their missteps, other women's movements can find guidance in
advocating for women's interests.
Reviewing the NCC's Zero Draft and the government's Waco
draft reveals that Kenyan women's efforts and particularly the ef-
forts of the campaign for Safeguarding the Gains of Women in the
Draft Constitution were a qualified success. Women's advocacy of
the gender equality ideal led to its partial embodiment in the initial
Draft. Nevertheless, women were only successful in enshrining into
later constitutional drafts those issues on which they could agree
and pursue as a group across their diversity, and nothing more. In
addition, women were successful on those issues supported by a long
history of activism, giving them the time to publicly develop, discuss,
debate, and cultivate positions in women-centered forums and efforts.
Furthermore, women were successful where their positions were
closely aligned with the status quo or met the overall expectations
of society. In each of these situations, women were able to frame,
shape, or sustain the debate in ways that were beneficial to them.
Conversely, novel provisions or arrangements that the campaign
proposed were almost always rejected, even where they might have
deepened or expanded the goals of a broader gender equality ideal.
These results point to the necessity of an independent women's move-
ment with organizations and opportunities for women to consult one
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another across their diversities and that are capable of articulating
and fighting for women's gendered interests.
As stated above, women had their greatest successes on those
issues supported by both current advocacy and a history of activism.
For example, the Gender Commission, the one-third provision, and af-
firmative action measures generally were all areas that had received
substantial activism in Kenya throughout the previous ten years.
Both later drafts largely embraced these ideals. Kenyan women were
successful in securing a constitutionally mandated independent gen-
der commission, 13 although the later drafts did not adopt the novel
idea of providing greater institutional support for gender parity
through the judiciary and parliamentary service commissions in the
Waco Draft. The campaign was also successful in enshrining a prin-
ciple for the elimination of gender discriminatory laws, regulations,
customs, and practices in relation to land, 14 although the Waco Draft
dropped the provision securing a spouse's access to marital property."1 5
Unfortunately, because determining the specific language used
to capture these ideas in a constitution was a recent issue itself,
women achieved less consensus about how to word provisions em-
bracing these ideas. The campaign's efforts went far in providing
suggestions about how best to capture these ideas. In addition, the
campaign's suggested language, stated positions, and explanations
provided the campaign and women greater credibility and perhaps
confidence in the NCC process. 16
813. See ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 297(b); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 76.
814. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 77(2)(f); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 78(2)(f);
see also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 90 (making this suggestion).
815. See ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 82.
816. The author bases this statement on anecdotal evidence from the conference.
Observers often commented that women were one of the most active groups in the NCC,
largely due to the campaign efforts. See Makau Mutua, Taming Leviathan, supra note
7, at 128-30. Although women delegates were initially distant from the campaign, they
nevertheless used its materials and came to rely on them in their deliberations. Further-
more, many considered Yawezekana, the only newspaper provided on site at the confer-
ence, to be a women's paper, which provided a degree of legitimacy to women delegates'
efforts. Several delegates also requested that the campaign develop materials on devo-
lution and create some suggestions for a special district plan based on the Ugandan model.
Furthermore, many Parliamentarians commented on the usefulness of the manual.
During one Parliament-organized session the week before the NCC in Mombassa, several
Parliamentarians insisted that the attendees review and discuss the campaign's Training
Manual, particularly the suggested language section. Similarly, Parliamentarians favor-
ably commented on the campaign's goal at the CKRC constitutional training session for
Parliamentarians.
Finally, several of the core campaign participants were asked to continue their work
on the constitutional review process. Jacinta Muteshi became an expert consultant to the
NCC. She was later named chair in the government-established gender commission. Koki
Muli was also later involved in the negotiation efforts centered around the government's
process to modify the Zero Draft.
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Nevertheless, the manner in which the various drafts enshrined
these issues conveys the power structure's resistance to women's em-
powerment and the necessity of a women's movement. For example,
although both drafts generally adopted the one-third principle in
the provision on national values, principles, and goals, the language
changed over the drafts. It now provides: 'The state shall... imple-
ment the principle that not more than two-thirds of the members of
elective or appointive bodies shall be of the same gender." ' The re-
written text is more abstract, and the delegates presumably sought
to make the principle more universal and less time-bound. They ap-
parently anticipated a time when women might constitute the major-
ity of governing bodies and sought to preclude this. The effect of the
language is to obscure the current political context in which men
overwhelmingly populate governing bodies. It also obscures the pro-
vision's initial goal, which was the empowerment of women within
this context. This change may have arisen out of the campaign's
efforts to explain the ways in which the term gender applies to both
women and men. Furthermore, given the current context, the change
likely provided some comfort to men, who were assured in the near
future of retaining a majority of seats.
Although this change seems harmless, one cannot say the same
about the provision on women. Again, this provision was meant to em-
power women. To the extent that certain men have unearned privi-
lege and status, the gender equality ideal seeks to undermine this
status in fact. The NCC renamed the provision on women to "Gender,"
and it now provides in part that "[a]ny law, culture, custom or tradi-
tion that undermines the dignity, welfare, interest or status of women
or men is prohibited." '18 One could thus characterize this provision
as protecting men's unearned privilege and prohibiting any actions
that would undermine that status. This language is perhaps simply
the result of sloppy drafting and the pressures of the particular po-
litical moment, but it is consistent with a particular limiting tone
taken by the later drafts in adopting the demands regarding gender
equality and women's human rights for which women have fought
over a decade.
Issues of women's representation and the one-third principle
also met with opposition. Women's groups intended to apply the one-
third idea throughout devolved government, thus embracing the in-
terests of a diversity of women. In this regard the campaign fought for
817. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 12(2)j). The Waco Draft also adopted this pro-
vision. WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 13.
818. See ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 37(3); WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 38(3).
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a mixed member proportional representation scheme that sought to
mainstream women through political parties throughout the system
and to place community or district women throughout devolved gov-
ernment. Unfortunately women did not have the time to agree on an
appropriate system, and the approach the campaign suggested was
novel. Although delegates discussed the campaign's plan, they ulti-
mately rejected it. The campaign further failed to structure an alter-
native scheme upon which women may have agreed. Women delegates
thus muddled through these sections of the constitution, forced to tin-
ker with the system initially contemplated by the Draft Constitution,
which was based on the scheme adopted in Uganda. Here however,
the Zero Draft and the Waco Draft took slightly different approaches
given the controversies around devolution. Whether either draft con-
templates the same level of women's representation that the cam-
paign's scheme promoted is unclear.819
The Zero Draft fully rejected the mixed member proportional rep-
resentation scheme and instead adopted a second chamber and a four-
tier government system with a central authority and three levels of
devolved government.82 The first chamber, the National Assembly,
would consist of between two hundred eighty and three hundred
members, two hundred ten representing each constituency, as is cur-
rently the case, and a woman from each of approximately seventy dis-
tricts.821 The second chamber, the Senate, would consist of a senator
from each district and two women from the eight or so regions plus
additional women from marginalized groups.822 Although women
senators are to be one-third of the total senate body, whether this
formula will meet the one-third target is unclear. 2 Finally, women
are to constitute one-third of the district counsel seats, a body that
acts as the Electoral College for the Senate seats and regional seats,824
but the Zero Draft contains no clear requirements that women be rep-
resented at the locational or regional levels of devolved government.825
819. The campaign proposed that Parliament seats be reserved for women from each
of the seventy districts. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 84-85. The campaign
then recommended the devolved government system proposed by the Draft Constitution.
Draft, supra note 3, Art. 106. The Draft also proposed a second chamber of one hundred
members, thirty seats of which were to be women. Id. It then proposed that women rep-
resent fifty percent of the representatives at the locational and provincial levels. Id., Art.
217(1), 219(2).
820. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 120.
821. Id. at 123(1).
822. Id. Art. 122(1).
823. See id. Art. 102(4) (stating the one-third principle).
824. Id. Art. 219(1)(b).
825. See id. Art. 212, 224.
2006] GENDER EQUALITY IN THE KENYAN CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 125
The Waco Draft adopts a single legislative body, Parliament, with
additional seats for women from "special constituencies" prescribed
by law.82 Nothing in the Waco Draft makes clear whether these seats
represent district-like constituencies or how many seats there will
be. The Waco Draft also devolves government to only one level, the
district.8 27 Although women are to make up one-third of the district
assemblies,828 the draft does not make clear whether they must be
represented in the district councils, which form the executive author-
ity for the districts.829 Finally, although there is no second chamber
of central government, the Waco Draft establishes a National Forum
for District Governments, whose "membership and procedure for the
conduct of business" are subject to an act of Parliament.83 °
Although women effectively advocated for the one-third principle,
the way the Zero and Waco Drafts enshrined it suggests that women
likely received less than they bargained for. In retrospect, the cam-
paign should have more thoroughly analyzed the devolution scheme
initially in a manner consistent with its philosophy that all of the
issues in the constitution affected women.83' Furthermore, it should
have proposed multiple representational arrangements regarding
devolution, particularly arrangements built on the strengths of the
Uganda scheme, since many Kenyans were familiar with it. In this
way, women may have found it easier to agree upon an arrangement
and fight as a group for that arrangement, with the details better ar-
ticulated. Such solidarity may have increased their chances of secur-
ing wider and deeper representation through devolved government
as provided in the drafts.
Furthermore, as women were subject to the tensions wrought
by the urban/rural divide and anticipated some of the ethnic and re-
gional divisions implicated in devolution, including the implicit claims
concerning allocation of resources, a more thoroughly developed devo-
lution plan may have forced the campaign to be more attentive ini-
tially to these issues. The campaign's overall philosophy supported
the view that resources should be equitably shared, that community
integrity and preservation in a pluralist society was important, and
that wide representation of the diversity of the society was necessary.
A developed devolution scheme may have given the campaign and
women delegates a greater ability to push these ideas. In this regard,
it is noteworthy that the coalition failed to conceptualize a broad
826. WACO DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 116.
827. Id. Art. 199 ("The district is the unit of devolution.").
828. Id. Art. 209(l)(b).
829. Id. Art. 210.
830. Id. Art. 206.
831. See TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 17, at 41.
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equality principle as a basis for gender equality and to articulate ex-
plicitly a goal of "promoting equality." Although this idea informed
the campaign's activities, the campaign failed to articulate this idea,
to seek its enshrinement in the Zero Draft, and to frame a number
of issues from this perspective. Greater advocacy of this broader
equality principle could have helped groups with different interests
to understand the connections between their efforts and the women's.
The campaign's success regarding the Kadhi's courts issue sup-
ports the argument that women might have had greater success in
the area of devolution if they had articulated a better-developed de-
volution scheme more familiar to the society at large. Women's soli-
darity and committed support to the Kadhi's courts was probably
essential for its success. The early publication of the campaign's po-
sitions was an important factor in tilting the debate of the Kadhi's
courts and appeared to sway the political parties to unite on this issue.
Here the campaign took seriously the divergent views and voices of
women and sought to address the concerns they raised. The campaign
used its own commitment to equality both to legitimate the varying
views and to fashion a compromise. This compromise took note of
the argument that women within the Islamic community in Kenya
might want access to equality and given a chance might use it, but
the coalition overall supported the particular way in which Muslim
women believed they might best be empowered: through retention
of the Kadhi's courts. Although Muslims ultimately rejected the com-
promised equality language, both Muslim and non-Muslim women
benefitted from their solidarity. Muslim women benefitted from the
support of their sisters in their efforts on the Courts and non-Muslim
women gained an ally in the Muslim community. In addition, the two
groups politically defeated an adversary whose positions would have
limited the human rights of both groups. This success is a clear ex-
ample of how working towards solidarity across competing interests
could have benefitted the campaign in its efforts regarding other con-
troversial issues.
This success also supports the argument that had women ini-
tially formulated a position on the prime minister position they may
have shaped this debate. Early discussions with women delegates
to the NCC made clear that most were going to come out in favor of
a prime minister position. The campaign's informal questionnaire
to delegates during their provincial training confirmed that the dele-
gates and the public supported a prime minister position. Neverthe-
less, many people in civil society, including the male leadership of the
KHRC, saw little need for a prime minister position given the election
of NARC. These individuals argued that a strengthened Parliament
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provided a sufficient check on presidential power. Influenced by
these arguments, the campaign was ready to compromise on a prime
minister position with fewer powers. Unfortunately, by the time the
coalition announced its position, the issue had become intractable
in the NCC, and many observers simply saw women's efforts as sup-
porting the NAK faction of the NARC government.
Where women had advocated for particular issues over many
years but the campaign failed to highlight these issues, women were
also less successful. For example, although the Draft established age
requirements for marriage, as women had demanded for many years,
these requirements were challenged and defeated in the Zero and
Waco Drafts. 32 Furthermore, where the campaign took a hands-off
approach with regard to abortion rights and same-sex marriage, these
too suffered challenge and defeat. These outcomes demonstrate the
fact that women cannot rest on their laurels but rather must continue
to fight and advocate for those rights that affect women's empower-
ment even though they may believe those rights have already been
safeguarded. Where the campaign failed to carry past advocacy for-
ward into the constitutional debate, these issues suffered setbacks.
This finding also suggests that had women failed to advocate actively
for, for example, the one-third principle, little suggests that the cur-
rent power structure would have seen fit to provide it.
CONCLUSION
Women's identities are embedded in and shaped by the society,
communities, and cultures of which they are apart. They are a diverse
group subject to the division of social cleavages along the lines of
ethnicity, race, religion, and region, among others. They therefore
live and think differently and have diverse views on a host of issues,
making it difficult to agree on strategies to improve their conditions.
Furthermore, even if women were unified and could agree on com-
mon positions and strategies, they often have only limited access to
resources to help them change and improve their condition because
women historically have been a subordinated group. Nevertheless,
women's movements, which can provide women an opportunity to
forge common philosophies, positions, and strategies, are essential to
changing this subordinated status. Women's efforts and organization
provide opportunities for women to access positions of power and other
resources and can be essential to women's efforts to gain greater
opportunities in government.
832. ZERO DRAFT, supra note 11, Art. 41 ("Every adult - (a) has the right to marry a
person of the opposite sex, based upon the free consent of the parties..."); accord WACO
DRAFT, supra note 12, Art. 42.
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The Kenyan experience demonstrates the necessity of women's
movements in forging common positions among diverse women. It
further demonstrates that a commitment to solidarity informed by
women's diverse perspectives and experiences is a fundamental part
of being in a position to forge these common ideas. This solidarity is
based in part upon ideas of gender equality, not simply between men
and women but among women. It not only values women's different
perspectives but takes them into account through a willingness to
strike creative compromises. These compromises understand gender
equality as a flexible and complex idea that must address the sub-
stantive needs of women in their diversity. As such it rejects an abso-
lutist, universal notion of equality as merely same treatment and
oblivious to outcomes. Furthermore, the notion of gender equality and
a commitment to solidarity within women's movements must also
be attentive to resources. The allocation and distribution of resources,
both material and expressive, are evidence of a commitment to soli-
darity and further facilitate it, as well as facilitating efforts to forge
a common agenda. Where women are not attentive to the allocation
of resources, their commitment to the empowerment of all women
is open to challenge.
Finally, although the Kenyan experience focuses on legal em-
powerment and largely representational resources, even as they may
implicate material resources, it does not engage the larger problem
of women's subordination and limited access to resources in a rapidly
globalizing world in which power over both expressive and material
resources is increasingly in the hands of private corporate institu-
tional entities as opposed to government. Nevertheless, the tools of an
engaged women's movement committed to women's empowerment
and solidarity based on a broad understanding of gender equality
may well be indispensable to this larger struggle.
